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I. !NTRODUCI"ION: CONSENSUS, "DISSENSUS," AND CoNTRACT 
Under traditional notions of the nature of contract, binding 
"contractual" obligations come into being through manifestations 
of a corresponding common intent of the parties to a proposed 
transaction. The law then sanctions and gives value to this form of 
social ordering-upon satisfaction of certain requirements respect-
ing form and content-by offering the power of the state in aid of 
the enforcement of those obligations. 
The friction arises in identifying the contours of the transactors' 
common intent. Indeed, friction may be inherent in the very 
inquiry into shared intent itself, for the social institution of contract 
is part cooperative and part competitive in nature. In absence of a 
formal, final, integrated writing, it will thus be a rare case that the 
intent of the parties will correspond precisely. What is substan-
tially more common in modem transactions is that the parties fail 
to reach an express agreement on all aspects of their relationship, 
but nonetheless acknowledge that they have concluded a binding 
deal. As a result of the flexibility and informality (or, sometimes, 
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HeinOnline -- 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 2 1996-1997
2 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:1 
the complexity) of their relationship, the parties then proceed with 
the performance of the contemplated transaction and disregard the 
lack of agreement on the "details" previously proposed by one or 
both of them. 
Traditional contract doctrine in the United States lacks an over-
arching conceptual device to capture these types of flexible and 
informal relationships. Indeed, the classical rules of contracting 
would in effect deny their existence. Under traditional notions, the 
parties to a proposed transaction do not establish contractual obli-
gations as long as they continue to disagree over matters raised in 
the course of their negotiations. Even under the more accommo-
dating approach of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.), the debate has often centered not directly on the parties' 
actual intent, but instead on the narrow effect of their "forms" 
(hence, the "battle of the forms"). Much of recent contract law 
literature has discounted the process of agreement entirely. 
Instead, scholars have focused the analysis primarily on an identifi-
cation of the appropriate substantive background law (the "default 
rules") to fill gaps in extant contractual relations. 
All of this has tended to obscure what should be the threshold 
issue in addressing these more flexible and informal relationships: 
the role of the absence of a complete agreement of the parties in 
the creation and definition of contractual obligations in the first 
instance. Accepted contract doctrine in this country in fact lacks 
even the terminology to frame the analysis of this issue at the 
appropriate level of abstraction. In this Article, I discuss this com-
mon state of affairs in terms of a "dissensus" between the parties. 
This concept, which parallels terminology sometimes used by conti-
nental European scholars, broadly embraces both an affirmative 
disagreement and a passive lack of agreement between the parties. 
Of specific interest is the role of what I refer to below as a "partial 
dissensus," for the critical interpretive issue arises when the dissen-
sus between the parties is overcome by a more powerful consensus 
between them that they have nonetheless concluded a binding 
deal. 
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this issue in concep-
tualizing the formation process in modem contractual relation-
ships. Advancements in communications technology-electronic 
data interchange, e-mail, the internet, telefax, and the like-have 
made it possible for the parties to a proposed transaction to iden-
tify in a concrete form all terms of potential interest to them and to 
transmit those terms with a convenience and rapidity unimaginable 
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even twenty short years ago. The result is that in a substantial 
share of modem transactions both parties will make reference to 
their standard proposed terms in one form or another before they 
proceed with performance. Commonly, however, the parties have 
neither the time nor the desire expressly to agree on all issues 
raised in this routine manner. As a result, very often legally non-
essential, but nonetheless commercially significant matters-such 
as the seller's common proposal to exclude statutory warranties 
and to limit liability for consequential damages-will remain 
unresolved. Herein lies the heart of a partial dissensus. 
The entry into force of the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (U.N. Sales Convention 
or Convention or CISG) has presented contract scholars with a 
unique opportunity to revisit the role of a partial dissensus in the 
formation of contractual obligations. Indeed, for two related rea-
sons the resolution of this issue under the U.N. Sales Convention 
will have particularly significant implications. Frrst, the Conven-
tion broadly applies, to the exclusion of contract principles of 
national law, to all contracts for the international sale of goods 
between residents of states party to the Convention. The second 
reason relates to the decreasing relevance of this last prepositional 
phrase. Only nine years after its entry into force, the Convention's 
reach extends to commerce between states whose economies 
account for over sixty percent of all world trade-and the trend is 
decidedly toward a rapid increase in both the roster of contracting 
states and the relative significance of international over purely 
domestic trade Gust as interstate displaced purely intrastate com-
merce in the maturing of the economy in the United States). 
Unfortunately, there is a noteworthy absence of any detailed 
theoretical discussion of the proper role of a partial dissensus in 
contract formation under the U.N. Sales Convention. Scholarly 
attention has instead tended to focus on the mere fact that the 
Convention hews closely to the traditional offer-acceptance forma-
tion scheme and that, in their practical effect, the provisions of the 
Convention transform nearly all acceptances whose terms deviate 
from those of the offer into a rejection and counteroffer. This 
adherence to traditional notions has led to an inclination to view 
the Convention's formation provisions as inflexible, prescriptive 
rules that apply irrespective of the actual intent of the parties. 
Such interpretive rigidity has, in turn, infected the received wis-
dom on the treattp.ent of a partial dissensus. The traditional weight 
of opinion holds that the offer-acceptance scheme itself provides 
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the solution to all such issues of contract formation. In the event of 
a partial dissensus, therefore, an adjudicator need merely observe 
that each deviating reply amounts to a counteroffer coupled with a 
rejection of all previous proposals. Traditionalist commentators 
have proceeded from this formalist premise to the conclusion that 
the last formal declaration exchanged between the parties must be 
given effect in its entirety if the parties subsequently proceed to 
perform. 
I argue here that the principles and policies of the U.N. Sales 
Convention require a more refined analysis. Specifically, my thesis 
is that an appropriate understanding of the effect of a partial dis-
sensus must begin with an analysis of the values the Convention 
seeks to protect in the recognition and enforcement of contractual 
obligations in the first instance. My examination of the treatment 
of a partial dissensus thus begins with a review in Part III.A. of the 
general principles of uniform international sales law that inform 
the interpretation of the Convention itself. With this foundation, I 
then turn, in Part III.B., to a study of what these general principles 
reveal about the core values that underlie the Convention's con-
tract formation scheme. 
The conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the tradi-
tional approach to the treatment of a partial dissensus, though pos-
sessing a certain analytical purity, lacks sufficient justification in 
the core policies and principles of the Convention. Of particular 
significance among these policies and principles are the primacy of 
party autonomy, a heightened significance of flexibility in the 
search for intent, and a rejection of normative solutions for intent-
based interpretive issues. Contrary to these values, the traditional 
approach proceeds on the static premise that the offer-acceptance 
scheme is both the beginning and the end of the analysis. In the 
event of performance in spite of a partial dissensus, the conse-
quence of this premise is that the parties are deemed to assent to 
the "last shot" exchanged between them. The nature of the par-
ties' prior relationship-the level of complexity, the degree of for-
mality, and their prior declarations-becomes irrelevant to the 
analysis. 
This Article maintains that such a formalist adherence to the 
offer-acceptance scheme is ill-suited to accommodate the role of a 
partial dissensus in the formation of modern contractual relation-
ships. The approach I advocate in Part IV.B. instead seeks to 
refocus the analysis to the essential interpretive inquiry in such 
cases: the effect of the parties' prior declarations of intent where 
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they proceed to perform in knowing, mutual disregard of the 
absence of a complete agreement (that is, a partial dissensus) 
between them. I argue that the Convention's interpretive values 
require that the effect of such a partial dissensus be calibrated to 
the nature of the parties' prior relationship. Refocusing the analy-
sis in this way to the essential interpretive inquiry will give particu-
lar emphasis to the parties' prior express declarations of intent. 
Thus, for example, where the offeror affirmatively declares her 
objection to terms that deviate from her own, her performance 
would not (without more) manifest her assent to any "last shot" 
proposed by the other party. In other words, the intent the tradi-
tional approach purports to imply from performance alone would 
not be of sufficient expressive weight to overcome this prior 
express declaration of a contrary intent. 
The result in such cases is that the declarations and expressive 
conduct of neither party manifest unqualified assent to the formal 
declaration of the other. It is in such situations that the principle of 
party autonomy assumes its appropriate function in the hierarchy 
of norms of uniform international sales law. In the event of mutual 
performance, that principle will, first, require the recognition of 
enforceable contractual obligations. Party autonomy then operates 
to define the content of those obligations on the basis of the actual 
common intent that emerges from the parties' prior express decla-
rations. In practical outcome, this means that the parties' respec-
tive writings (in particular their standardized business terms) will 
take effect only to the extent that the writings are in agreement. 
Where gaps remain, the substantive provisions of the Convention 
respecting the rights and obligations of buyer and seller likewise 
assume their appropriate function of defining the "background" to 
the parties' relationship. 
Much of the analysis in support of the approach I advocate 
departs from the traditional notions of the manner by which pri-
vate actors create binding obligations. The difficulty with these 
traditional process assumptions arises from the tendency to view 
them as irreducible values in themselves. The result has been that 
the assumptions have often transformed themselves into rigid rules 
decoupled from the interpretive values they purport to reflect. The 
received wisdom on the interpretation of the U.N. Sales Conven-
tion nonetheless seeks to import a similar prescriptive rigidity to its 
formation provisions. The sum of the argument I advance below is 
that a reasoned appreciation of the Convention's interpretive val-
ues counsels against an adoption of formation rules so rigid in their 
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application that the Convention ceases to be an aid and begins to 
be an independent impediment to the effectuation of the common 
intent of the parties to international sales transactions. 
II. CoNTRAcr FoRMATION AND THE UNITED NATIONS SALES 
CONVENTION (CISG)1 
A. The Background 
1. The Scope and Significance of CJSG 
It can be said with little risk of overstatement that the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods2 represents one of history's most successful efforts at the 
unification of the law governing international transactions. The 
significance of the Convention is revealed not only by the number, 
but also by the geographic and political distribution of its con-
tracting states-in the eight short years since it entered into effect 
in 1988, forty-seven states have either acceded to or ratified the 
Convention,3 the combined economies of which account for over 
sixty percent of world trade.4 Moreover, represented among this 
number are states from all comers of the globe, from all political 
perspectives (former socialist states, as well as traditional western 
democracies), and from all stages of economic development (highly 
and newly industrialized countries, as well as developing ones).5 
This worldwide acceptance has provided ample confirmation of the 
1. The U.N. Sales Convention is commonly known, even outside of the English-speaking 
world, by its English language acronym, "CISG." 
2. The official English language text of the Convention is published in the Final Act of 
the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official 
Records, Annex 1, at 178-90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980) [hereinafter CISG]. The 
official version of the Convention in the English language is also published at 52 Fed. Reg. 
6264 (1987). 
3. The United Nations Commission on International Thade Law, Status of Conventions, 
UNCITRAL, 29th Sess., at 7-10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/428 (1996) (identifying forty-seven 
nations that have either ratified or acceded to the CISG). The Status of Conventions is 
updated periodically. The most recent Status of Conventions can also be found on the 
UNCITRAL homepage on the internet: <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/sessions/unc/unc-29/ 
acn9-428.htm>. 
4. Based on statistics published by the International Monetary Fund, in 1994 the forty-
five states parties to the U.N. Sales Convention accounted for approximately 65% of all 
world imports of goods and 63% of all world exports. See International Monetary Fund, 
Direction of Thade Statistics Yearbook 2-9 (1995). 
5. Included among the parties to the Convention are, for example, such diverse states as 
France, Germany, and the United States; China, Cuba, and Russia (as well as nearly all 
formerly socialist, eastern European countries); Argentina, Chile, and Mexico; Syria, 
Uganda, and Zambia; and Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. See Status of 
Conventions, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
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observation of one German scholar as early as 1989 that the entry 
into force of the U.N. Sales Convention represented a "milestone 
in legal history."6 
The U.N. Sales Convention in fact arose precisely from the fail-
ure of an earlier unification effort to address the diversity of cul-
tures and legal traditions involved in international contracting. 
This earlier effort took the form of two separate conventions7-
one governing contract formation8 and the other the substantive 
rights and obligations of the parties9-adopted at a conference in 
The Hague in 1964. Although these "Hague Conventions" were 
comprehensive in their substantive application, nearly all partici-
pants in their creation represented industrialized western Euro-
pean states. As a consequence, neither developing states nor the 
then-socialist states viewed these conventions as a serious attempt 
at a worldwide unification of the law.10 Thus, almost from their 
very adoption the 1964 Hague Conventions had "no chances for 
broad international acceptance. "11 
6. Rolan Loewe, lnternationales Kaufrecht 5 (1989} (" Markstein der Reclztsgeschichte"). 
Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this article are the responsibility of the 
author. For simplicity, subsequent translations are occasionally made sub silencio. 
7. The drafting work on the Hague Conventions first began in 1930 and was conducted 
under the auspices of the Rome Institute for the Unification of Private Law (commonly 
known by its French acronym "UNIDROIT"}. For a more detailed examination of the 
drafting history of the Hague Conventions of 1964, see E. Allan Farnsworth, The Vienna 
Convention: History and Scope, 18 Int'l Law. 17, 17-20 (1984) (hereinafter FanlS\vorth, 
Vienna Convention]; Bradley J. Richards, Note, Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods: Applicability of the United Nations Convention, 69 lO\va L. Rev. 209, 212-14 
{1983). 
8. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods {1964) (hereinafter Hague ULF]. The full text of The Hague 
ULF is to be found in John 0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 
1980 United Nations Convention 659-66 {2d ed., 1991}. 
9. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods {1964) 
[hereinafter Hague ULIS]. The full text of the Hague ULIS is to be found in Honnold, 
supra note 8, at 667-91. 
10. See Elizabeth Hayes Patterson, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination, 22 
Stan. J. Int'l L. 263, 266-68 {1986); Richards, supra note 7, at 214; Martin L. Ziontz, 
Comment, A Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods, 2 Nw. J. lnt'l L. & Bus. 
129, 130 {1980). The participation of the United States was limited to a small number of 
(largely disregarded} proposals at the Hague Conference in 1964. See Farnsworth, Vienna 
Convention, supra note 7, at 17; Henry Landau, Background to U.S. Participation in the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 Int'l Law. 
29, 30-31 {1984}. 
11. Ulrich Huber, Der UNCITRAL-Entwurf eines Obereinkommens Ober 
Internationale Warenkaufvertrlige, 43 Rabelszeitung 413, 414 {1979}. 
HeinOnline -- 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 8 1996-1997
8 VIRGINIA JouRNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw [Vol. 37:1 
With these developments as a backdrop, the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) began as 
early as 1968 with the advance work for a comprehensive review of 
the Hague Conventions, and in 1969 established a Working Group 
charged with this responsibility.12 This Working Group initially 
proceeded on the basis of separate documents governing formation 
and substantive sales law; after nearly ten years of drafting efforts, 
however, the drafters decided in 1978 to combine the drafts of the 
two conventions into one document.13 In the course of these 
efforts, UNCITRAL also prepared and published extensive materi-
als documenting the drafting history of the Convention. This 
travaux preparatoires provides a rich source of material for inter-
preting CISG's express provisions and for analyzing the meaning of 
the gaps in those provisions.14 
After the preparation of a commentary by the General Secreta-
riat of UNCITRAL,15 the United Nations General Assembly con-
vened a diplomatic conference in Vienna in April 1980 to debate 
the resulting unified draft convention. The delegates to the Vienna 
Conference unanimously adopted the Convention, with some revi-
sions, on Aprilll, 1980.16 The Convention then entered into effect 
according to its terms on January 1, 1988, after the ratifications of 
12. Although space limitations pennit only a brief discussion of the history of the U.N. 
Sales Convention here, I examine the drafting history of specific provisions of the 
Convention in detail where it is relevant. Scholars interested in a more detailed 
introduction to the history of the Convention should see Landau, supra note 10, at 30·35; 
Patterson, supra note 10, at 265-77; Maureen T. Murphy, Note, The United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Creating Unifonnity in 
International Sales Law, 12 Fordham Int'l. L.J. 727, 728-36 (1989). For an official summary 
record of the history of the drafting and adoption of the Convention, see Final Act of the 
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official 
Records, at 176-77, U.N. Doc. A1Conf.97/18 (1980) [hereinafter Final Act]. 
13. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work 
of Its Eleventh Session, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. Al33/17 
(1978), reprinted in [1978] IX Y.B. U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 13-14, U.N. Doc. AJCN.9/ 
Ser.Al1978. 
14. The compelling weight of scholarly opinion holds that adjudicators may consult the 
travaux preparatoires in interpreting the meaning of the specific provisions of the 
Convention. See Michael J. Bonell, Article 7, in Commentary on the International Sales 
Law 65, 90 (C. Massimo Bianca & Michael J. Bonell eds., 1987) [hereinafter Bianca & 
Bonell (author)]; Helen Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to 
the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 22· 
25 (1993). 
15. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, Official Records, at 14, U.N. Doc. AJCONF.97/5 
(1979) [hereinafter Secretariat Commentary]. 
16. See Final Act, supra note 12, at 177. 
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the United States, China, and Italy exceeded the required thresh-
old of 10 member states.17 
The significance of this event arises not only from the ever 
increasing number of states party to the Convention, but also from 
its very nature and status in the hierarchy of contract law norms.18 
Upon its ratification, the Convention applies as an independent 
contract law regime that supersedes national law principles for all 
contractual relationships within its scope. In the United States, the 
Convention functions as a self-executing treaty which applies by 
force of federal preemption without the need for any action by the 
fifty states.19 In other words, the Convention is not merely a form 
of restatement of (international) contract law,20 nor is it simply a 
"model law" which would be subject to modification by contracting 
17. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 99(1); Status of Conventions, supra note 3, at 3-4. The 
U.S. Senate ratified the U.N. Sales Convention in October 1986, and the United States 
deposited the ratification with UNCITRAL on December 11. For a history of this 
ratification, see Peter Winship, Congress and the 1980 International Sales Convention, 16 
Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 707 (1986). 
18. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has 
established a system for collecting and disseminating information on judicial decisions and 
arbitral awards relating to the conventions, such as the U.N. Sales Convention, adopted 
under its auspices. The result of this system, known by the acronym "CLOUT" (Case Law 
on UNCITRAL Texts), can be found on the UNCITRAL homepage on the internet: 
<http://www.un.or.at/uncitraV>. For a similar compilation, see UNILEX, International 
Case Law and Bibliography on the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (Michael J. Bonell et a!. eds., 1995) [hereinafter UNILEX]. UNCITRAL 
also annually develops and disseminates a bibliography of writings on its Conventions, of 
which the most recent on the U.N. Sales Convention is Bibliography of Recent Writings 
Related to the Work of UNCITRAL, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/402 (1994}. This document, as 
well as other comprehensive information on CISG, can also be found on the internet: 
<http://ananse.irv.uitno/trade_law/nav/uncitral.html>. For a more extensive bibliography 
on the Convention, see Peter Winship, The U.N. Sales Convention: A Bibliography of 
English-Language Publications, 28 Int'l Law. 401 (1994). 
19. Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992}, 
appeal dismissed, 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993); Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC 
Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 16 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 165, 166 ("In the United States, 
CISG is a self-executing treaty with the preemptive force of federal law."). 
20. Following the completion of CISG, many of the scholars involved in the drafting 
work in fact turned their attention to the drafting, under the auspices of UNIDROIT, of a 
form of "Restatement" of international contracts. See lvfichael J. Bonell, An International 
Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (1994); Joseph Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 281 (1994). 
Interestingly, these UNIDROIT Principles adopt an approach to the treatment of a partial 
dissensus in international commercial relationships that is very similar to the "consensus 
approach" I advocate infra part IV.B. See International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT), Principles of International Commercial Contracts, arts. 2.19-
2.22 (1994). 
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states to address local concerns; rather, upon ratification CISG 
applies of its own force to all proposed contractual relationships 
that satisfy its "internationality" requirements.21 
Briefly summarized, the sphere of application of the Convention 
is defined by three requirements. The primary element of "inter-
nationality" concerns the entities involved in the transaction. Arti-
cle 1 of the CISG requires for the applicability of the Convention 
that the parties to the putative contractual relationship have their 
"places of business"22 in different states and that either (a) both of 
those states are CISG contracting states or (b) conflict of laws prin-
ciples (known by the civil law label "private international law") 
lead to the application of the law of a member state.23 The second 
requirement concerns the subject matter of the contract itself. 
Similar to the Uniform Commercial Code in this country,24 CISG 
applies only to the sale (that is, not countertrade transactions) of 
moveable goods.25 Fmally, and not surprisingly, the contract at 
issue must have been concluded (or, if the issue is one of forma-
tion, the offer must have been made) after the relevant states 
became parties to the Convention.26 
21. The academic literature on the sphere of application of the U.N. Sales Convention is 
voluminous. Those interested in a more detailed examination of this issue should see John 
Honnold, The Sales Convention: Background, Status, Application, 8 J.L. & Com. 1 (1988); 
Kevin Bell, The Sphere of Application of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 8 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 237-58 (1996); Richards, supra note 7, at 
217-40. For an introduction to foreign language literature on the sphere of application of 
the Convention, see Kurt Siehr, Der Internationale Anwendungsbereich des UN-
Kaufrechts, 52 Rabelszeitung 587 (1988). 
22. Where a party has more than one business location the CISG provides that the 
relevant place of business is the one with the "closest relationship" to the contract. See 
CISG, supra note 2, art. 10. Neither the nationality nor the "civil or commercial character" 
of the parties "is to be taken into consideration" in determining the application of the 
Convention, however. See id. art. 1(3). 
23. This latter possibility based on conflict-of-laws principles is not binding on U.S. 
courts, for upon its ratification the United States exercised a right, set forth in article 95 of 
the CISG, to declare a corresponding reservation. Regarding the grounds for this 
reservation, see Message from the President, S. Theaty Doc. No.9, 98th Cong.,1st Sess. V-
VI, 21-22 (1983); E. Allan Farnsworth, Review of Standard Forms or Terms Under the 
Vienna Convention, 21 Cornell Int'l LJ. 439, 440 n.4 (1988) (hereinafter Farnsworth, 
Standard Forms]. Germany responded to this declaration by the United States (and other 
countries) with its own reservation that it "assumes no obligation to apply [art. (1)(b)] 
when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Party that 
has made a declaration to the effect that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1)(b) of 
article 1 .... " UNILEX, supra note 18, at Section B.2. 
24. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (article 2 applies to "transactions in goods"), § 2-105(1) 
(definition of "goods" as things that are "movable") (1987). 
25. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 1(1). 
26. Id. art. 100(1). 
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If a proposed transaction satisfies these elements, the Conven-
tion applies directly and automatically, and displaces (with certain 
limited exceptions identified in the Convention itself)27 the various 
systems of contract law of its member states in their entirety.28 The 
implications of this conclusion for international sales transactions 
are profound indeed, and no more so than on the issue of contract 
formation. What is often not sufficiently appreciated is that indi-
vidual participants in sales transactions that are international in the 
sense of article 1 cannot-by clever drafting of general business 
terms or otherwise-avoid the initial application of the Conven-
tion's formation principles. To be sure, article 6 permits the parties 
to an international sales contract to exclude the application of the 
Convention or derogate from its provisions, a subject I explore in 
detail below.29 A very significant subtlety emerges from the plural 
form of this provision, however. Although the principle of the pri-
macy of "party autonomy" established by article @0 extends even 
to contract formation issues,31 the language of that article makes 
clear that this result obtains only in the case of an express or 
implied common intent of the parties on the subject.32 
27. Article 2 specifically excludes from the scope of the CISG certain types of 
transactions with public policy implications, most notably sales of goods to consumers. Id. 
art 2; see also id. art 3 (standards for determining the application of the Q>nvention to 
manufacturing contracts in which the "buyer" supplies the necessary materials, as well as 
to mixed goods and services contracts). In addition, certain issues-including, in 
particular, issues relating to the "validity" of contracts-are excluded from the scope of the 
Convention. Id. arts. 4, 5; see also infra notes 38,213-14 and accompanying text. 
28. See Honnold, supra note 8, at 88-89; Paul Volken, Das Wiener Obereinkommen 
tlber den lntemationalen Warenkauf: Anwendungsvoraussetzungen und Anwendungs-
bereich, in Einheitliches Kaufrecht und Nationales Obligationenrecht 81, 83-85 (Peter 
Schlechtriem ed., 1987). 
29. The significance of this power of the parties to vary, by agreement, the effect of the 
provisions of CISG is of fundamental significance in the examination of the treatment of a 
partial dissensus under the Convention. This significance is explored throughout this 
article, particularly infra part III.A.1. 
30. See infra part III.A.l. 
31. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text 
32. See CISG, supra note 2, art 6 ("The parties may •.. vary the effect of any of [the 
Convention's] provisions.") (emphasis added). A significant dispute exists over whether 
this conclusion obtains for an exclusion of the Convention proposed by the offeror. Some 
commentators have argued that if the offeror, as "master of the offer," proposes an 
exclusion of the Convention in its entirety, the contract formation process as an initial 
matter is governed by applicable national law. See Rolf Herber, AbschluB Abweichung 
oder Anderung durch Parteiabrede, in Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht 79, 
83-84 (Ernst von Caemmerer & Peter Schlechtriem eels., 1994) [hereinafter CISG 
Kommentar (author)]; Huber, supra note 11, at 426-27. Others assert that for transactions 
within its sphere of application the Convention applies (including its formation principles) 
unless and until the parties have reached an agreement to the contrary. See E. Rehbinder, 
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This principle prevents a party to an international sales transac-
tion from excluding the application of the Convention by unilateral 
action. The common practice of including a choice-of-law clause in 
one's standard business terms, taken alone, thus avails a party 
nothing: Whatever terms a party proposes, the Convention's poli-
cies and principles governing contract formation will apply in the 
first instance to determine whether the parties have reached a bind-
ing agreement. It is only if-in application of those policies and 
principles-the agreement includes an exclusion of the Convention 
that the uniform law will, in fact, be so excluded. In short, within 
its sphere of application the U.N. Sales Convention's contract for-
mation principles will apply as an initial matter, and there is little 
that one party can do, by unilateral action, to avoid that result. 33 
The nature of the Convention as a directly applicable, independ-
ent contract law regime is reinforced by the principles governing 
matters not expressly resolved by its provisions. CISG article 7(2) 
prohibits reference to (non-uniform) national law on matters 
within its scope even if specific contract issues remain unsettled by 
its express provisions. Instead, the Convention establishes as the 
primary principle in such cases that gaps in its provisions must "be 
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is 
based." Matters left unsettled by the Convention, in other words, 
are to be resolved on the basis of the principles of the Convention 
itself.34 It is only in the (rare) cases in which those principles do 
VertragsschluB nach dem UN-Kaufrecht im Vergleich zu EAG und BOB, in Einheitliches 
Kaufrecht und nationales Obligationenrecht 149, 152-53 (P. Schlechtriem ed., 1987) 
[hereinafter Rehbinder]; RUdiger Holthausen, Vertraglicher AusschluB des UN-
Obereinkommens Uber internationale Warenkaufvertr!lge, in 1989 Recht der 
internationalen Wirtschaft 513, 514. As the discussion in the text indicates, in my view this 
latter approach is correct. An offeror may indeed specify the manner and means of 
acceptance. She cannot, however, by unilateral declaration impose on the offeree the legal 
standards (i.e., the governing Jaw) by which the actions in response to the offer are to be 
judged. 
33. A party may, of course, demand an understanding on governing Jaw and refuse to 
enter into negotiations as long as the matter remains unsettled. In absence of a 
corresponding agreement, however, the principles of the Convention will govern the 
formation process. The same conclusion obtains for a modification of the effect of specific 
provisions of the Convention. Where one party proposes a derogation from or variation of 
the Convention's provisions, and the parties do not reach an express agreement on the 
proposal, the contract formation policies and principles of the Convention will decide 
whether the derogation or variation is effective (for example, via an implied agreement). I 
explore this issue in greater detail in the immediately succeeding paragraphs of this section. 
See also infra part IT (discussing the basic formation provisions of the Convention) and 
part ill.A.- B. (analyzing CISG's broader formation values). 
34. One German commentator has coined the phrase in connection with the rules of 
article 7 of the CISG that it is to be interpreted, developed, and supplemented "out of 
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not provide guidance that article 7(2) permits reference to national 
law to resolve gaps in CISG's provisions.35 
Contract law issues falling in this latter category should be rare 
indeed, for the Convention broadly addresses not only the forma-
tion of international sales contracts (CISG Part ll) but also the 
substantive rights and obligations of the parties to such contracts 
( CISG Part III). The scope of the Convention on matters of con-
tract formation is particularly expansive. As a "structural" matter, 
CISG contains detailed provisions in articles 14 through 24 on the 
traditional manner by which contracts come into being.36 More-
over, CISG identifies in articles 6 though 11 certain "general prin-
ciples" whose application informs the identification of the policies 
that underlie the Convention's formation scheme.37 The interac-
tion between these general principles and specific provisions thus 
leaves little room for resort to principles of domestic law to resolve 
formation issues in transactions within CISG's sphere of 
application.38 
The difficulty with this observation for present purposes issues 
from the very nature of a multilateral international treaty such as 
the Convention. The drafting history of the Convention is replete 
with compromises on matters over which the legal and cultural 
backgrounds of the delegates differed.39 A derivative effect of 
these differences was that certain issues deemed too controversial 
itself." Huber, supra note 11, at 432 ("aus siclz selbst heraus"). Even in the context of the 
interpretation of its express provisions, the Convention requires that "regard •.. be had to 
its international character .... " CISG, supra note 2, art 7(1); see also Franco Ferrari, The 
Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction of Unifonn Law, 29 
Loy. L.A L. Rev. 1021, 1024 (1996) (stating that article 7(1) requires an "autonomous 
interpretation" of CISG). 
35. CISG, supra note 2, art 7(2) (stating that matters not resolved in the Convention 
itself nor by reference to its general principles "are to be settled ... in confonnity with the 
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law"). 
36. See infra parts II.A.2.-3.; see also CISG, supra note 2, art 4 ("This Convention 
governs ... the fonnation of the contract of sale .••• "). 
37. See infra part ID.A 
38. The one fonnation matter specifically excluded from the scope of the Convention is 
the "validity" of contracts. See CISG, supra note 2, art 4(a) ("[E]xcept as otherwise 
expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with: (a) The validity of the 
contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage ••.. "). The focus of this rule is the 
public policy of member states on the validity of consent itself, specifically such issues as 
infancy, mental competence, and the like. See Honnold, supra note 8, art 4, at 114-17; 
Bianca & Bonell (Khoo ), supra note 14, at 45-48. For a thorough analysis of article 4(a) of 
the CISG, see generally Hartnell, supra note 14. 
39. See, e.g., Alejandro Garro, Reconciliation of Legal 'Ii'aditions in the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 Int'l Law. 443, 444 (1989). 
See generally Gyula :Ejrsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Fonnation of Contracts for 
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to permit an express consensus between the delegates were simply 
left unresolved in CISG's express provisions. 
As I explore in detail below,40 one such issue is the treatment of 
contractual relationships in which the declarations and expressive 
conduct of the parties do not track the traditional lock-step model 
of offer and unconditional acceptance. Because such an issue of 
contract formation is certainly a "matter[] governed by [the] Con-
vention," the resolution of the treatment of a partial dissensus must 
be divined by reference to the core values of the Convention as 
revealed by both the "general principles" on which it is based and 
the rules that emerge from its more specific contract formation 
provisions. I tum to a brief review of these latter rules first. 
2. Contract Formation Under CISG: The Basics 
It is now common wisdom that the U.N. Sales Convention gener-
ally adheres to the "classical" or "traditional" conception of the 
manner in which private actors create contractual obligations.41 
The contract formation provisions of CISG thus reflect the tradi-
tional assumption that the determinative agreement of the parties 
to create such obligations arises out of two constitutive declara-
tions of intent. That is, in the words of the General Secretariat's 
commentary to the 1978 "New York Draft" of the Convention, 
"contractual obligations arise out of expressions of mutual agree-
ment. "42 It thus approaches a mere truism to observe that under 
the U.N. Sales Convention a contract is formed and defined by the 
the International Sale of Goods, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 311 (1979) (analyzing the 1978 Draft 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods). 
40. See infra part II.B. 
41. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Formation of Contract, in International Sales: The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Nina M. 
Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Formation]; Burghard Piltz, UN-
Kaufrecht, in Handbuch des Kaufvertragsrechts in den EG-Staaten 8, 15 (Friedrich Graf 
von Westphalen ed., 1992). 
42. Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 17, para. 2, Official Records, at 24. 
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manifested common intent, or "consensus,"43 between the 
parties.44 
With this general principle of consensus as a foundation, the 
Convention turns to what would appear to be the specifics,45 that 
is, to the assumed "mechanics" of how that consensus typically will 
come into being. It is here, perhaps, that the Convention reveals 
itself most clearly as the "lowest common denominator" among the 
various legal systems represented in its preparation, for the basic 
"structural" contract formation provisions of the Convention will 
surprise neither common law nor civil law jurists and will challenge 
few with their complexity.46 Only a brief examination of this basic 
formation scheme is thus necessary here. 
43. At this most elemental level, the U.N. Sales Convention's conception of the nature 
of contractual obligation reflects, not surprisingly, the common lineage of the civil and 
common law systems. Indeed, the development of the "consensus theory of contract" in 
this country in the nineteenth century was influenced, in no small measure, by parallel 
notions of the formation of contract obligations in continental European civil law S)'Stems. 
For an introduction to the debate over the origins of the consensus theory among legal 
historians, see Philip A Hamburger, The Development of the Nineteenth-Century 
Consensus Theory of Contract, 7 Law & Hist Rev. 241 (1989); A W :B. Simpson, 
Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 Law Q. Rev. 247,265-69 (1975). Civil 
law commentators have continued to use corresponding terminology in analyzing contract 
formation under the Convention. See CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 
122-23 (noting that contracts are formed through a "consensus"-in the original German 
"Konsens"-of the parties); Rehbinder, supra note 32, at 166 (CISG's formation scheme is 
"an expression of the material consensus principle"-"ein[] Ausdruck des materiellen 
Konsensprinzips"); Bianca & Bonell (Rajski), supra note 14, at 122 (observing in 
connection with the absence of form requirements that CISG follo\\'S "the theory of 
consensualism"); see also Summary Record of the 202nd Meeting of UNCITRAL, 
UNCITRAL OR, 11th Sess., 202d mtg. para. 49, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.202 (1978) 
(Czechoslovak representative observing that "the principle of consensus between the 
parties ... [is] the most important tenet of international trade"). 
44. The necessity of an actual, and complete, consensus between the parties in the 
creation of contractual obligations under the Convention is, of course, of fundamental 
significance in the treatment of a partial dissensus. This is the precise focus of the analysis 
infra parts m-IV. 
45. I say "appear to be" here intentionally. As I discuss in detail below, it is precisely 
the misapprehension of the nature of the specific formation provisions of CISG, and the 
conclusions drawn from this misapprehension, that threaten to "encrustify" the contract 
formation process under the Convention without a reasoned analysis of the assumptions 
underlying those conclusions, nor sufficiently compelling doctrinal or policy justifications 
for them. See infra part IV .A. 
46. CISG's contract formation provisions have proved to be fertile ground for 
explanatory pieces in the academic literature. See Franz Bydlinski, Das Allgemeine 
Vertragsrecht, in Das UNCITRAL-Kaufrecht im Vergleich zum Osterreichischen Recht S1 
(Peter Doralt ed., 1985) (comparison with Austrian law); Rehbinder, supra note 32, at 149-
70 (comparison with the Hague ULF and German law); Marc Wey, Der Vertragsschluss 
beim internationalen Warenkauf nach UNCITRAL- und Schweizerischem Recht (1984) 
(comparison with Swiss law); Burte A. Leete, Contract Formation Under the United 
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In accordance with traditional notions, the Convention identifies 
an offer and its acceptance as the basic "structural" components of 
a contract.47 In conformance with traditional notions, an offer 
under the Convention sets the formation process in motion by 
"empowering" the offeree to conclude a contract solely with a cor-
responding expression of intent to be bound to the deal as pro-
posed.48 In other words, an offer within the sphere of application 
of CISG must alone be sufficient not only as a declaration of intent 
of the offeror but also as a definition of the necessary reciprocal 
obligations of the parties. In the language of article 14, an offer is a 
proposal to conclude a contract that both reveals an "intention of 
the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance" and is "sufficiently 
definite. "49 
The intent element of this standard, of its essence, involves inter-
pretive considerations. This conclusion is made all the more clear 
by article 14's admonition that an effective offer need only "indi-
cate" the offeror's intent to be bound.50 The sum of the intent 
"requirement" of article 14 is thus a mere reference to the general 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 6 Temp. Int'l & Comp. LJ. 193 (1992); 
Clement Ngongola, The Vienna Sales Convention of 1980 in the Southern African Legal 
Environment: Formation of a Contract of Sale, 4 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 835 (1992) 
(comparison with the law of certain southern African countries); James Edward Joseph, 
Note, Contract Formation Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 Dick. J. Int'l L. 107 
(1984). For general analyses of the contract formation provisions of CISG, see Kazuaki 
Sono, Formation of International Contracts Under the Vienna Sales Convention: A Shift 
Above the Comparative Law, in International Sale of Goods: Dubrovnik Lectures 111 
(Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986) [hereinafter International Sale of Goods); John 
E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & 
Com. 11 (1988) [hereinafter Murray, Convention]; J. Clark Kelso, Note, The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Contract Formation 
and the Battle of the Forms, 21 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 529 (1983). 
47. See CISG, supra note 2, arts. 14-17 (offer) and 18-24 (acceptance). In contrast to 
many common law systems, the Convention contains no provision requiring consideration 
for the formation of contracts. Modifications of contracts likewise do not require for their 
effectiveness any form of consideration. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 
27, paras. 2-3, Official Records, at 28. 
48. See Sono, supra note 46, at 118. This notion also comports with the nature of an 
offer in this country. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.3, at 114-15 (2d ed. 1990) 
[hereinafter Farnsworth, Contracts]. 
49. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 14. With regard to these requirements in general, see 
Kelso, supra note 46, at 534-38; Joseph, supra note 46, at 118-28. 
50. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 14(1) ("A proposal for concluding a contract •.. 
constitutes an offer if it ... indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of 
acceptance."). 
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interpretive provisions of the Convention (article 8), which define 
the standards for assessing the meaning of the declarations and 
expressive conduct of the parties.51 
The focus of the "definiteness" requirement is the substantive 
elements of a sales contract. Article 14(1) thus sets forth the ele-
mental proposition that in order to rise to the level of an "offer" a 
proposal to conclude a contract must identify the subject of the 
transaction (that is, the goods), as well as "the quantity and the 
price."52 In other words, an offer under CISG must identify the 
essential elements of the contract, often known in civil law jurisdic-
tions as the "essentialia negotii"53 and in the United States by Pro-
fessor Llewellyn's now famous "dickered terms. "54 
51. In making this determination, the Convention prescribes a level of flexibility not 
often found in domestic law. As I analyze in detail in parts III.A.2. and ill.B., article 8(3) 
of the CISG mandates in such interpretive inquiries an expansive consideration of "all 
relevant circumstances,'' including the negotiations prior and the conduct subsequent to 
the making of the proposal. 
52. An examination of this provision and its place in the formation values of the 
Convention reveals significant flexibility in assessing whether the "definiteness" 
requirement for a valid offer is satisfied, however. Even the very subject of the contract, 
the goods, need only be "indicated" in the offer. Indeed, it would seem that the entire 
purpose of this language is not in the nature of a "requirement,'' but rather to ensure that 
adjudicators do not impose more stringent requirements on the identification of the goods. 
Were this provision considered otherwise, it would be wholly superfluous, for it is difficult 
to imagine an offer that would satisfy the requirements for the application of the 
Convention in the first place, see CISG, supra note 2, art 1(1) (sale of "goods"), that does 
not "indicate" that the subject of the proposed contract is, in fact, "goods." Moreover, the 
search for an identification of the essential elements of a sales contract is not limited to the 
express or even such implied terms of the offer itself; rather, aU that is required pursuant to 
article 14(1} is that the offer "make[] provision for determining" the quantity and price. 
See CISG, supra note 2, art 14(1); infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
53. See, e.g., Bianca & Bonell (B)rsi), supra note 14, at 138; CISG Kommentar 
(Schlechtriem}, supra note 32, at 129 (also termed the "essentialia contractus"). 
54. For a definition of "dickered terms,'' see Karl N. UeweUyn, The Common Law 
1radition: Deciding Appeals 370 {1960}; John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: 
Romancing the Prism, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1447, 1449 n.9 (1994) ("'[D]ickered terms' 
[are] terms to which the parties have consciously adverted."}; John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Chaos of the Battle of the Forms: Solutions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1307, 1385 n.44 (1986) 
[hereinafter Murray, Solutions] (same). 
A final element of a valid offer under the Convention is an identification of the 
"empowered" offerees. In conformance with traditional notions, article 14(1) provides 
that a valid offer must be "addressed to one or more specific persons .••. " CISG, supra 
note 2, art 14(1}. In absence of such a specification, a proposal is considered to be merely 
a solicitation of offers {often known in civil law jurisdictions by its Latin title "invitatio ad 
ojferendum"). In contrast to the other elements of an offer, there is a presumption in 
support of this conclusion concerning the intent of the proposing party, namely, that there 
is no intent to be bound "unless the contrary is clearly indicated .•.. " ld. art. 14(2) 
(emphasis added}. This presumption has correctly been the subject of intense criticism. 
See Murray, Convention, supra note 46, at 18. 
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Although this irreducible core of a sales contract will be signifi-
cant in determining whether there has been a complete failure of 
agreement of the parties,55 the appropriate treatment of a partial 
dissensus is to be found in the standards for acceptance by the 
offeree. At the core of the definition of an acceptance under the 
Convention is the requirement of manifested assent. Article 18(1) 
of the Convention provides that in order to qualify as an accept-
ance, the response of the offeree must "indicat[e] assent to [the] 
offer .... "56 This indication of assent can take a variety of forms. 
In a noteworthy improvement on the unclear language of the 1964 
Hague Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation 
of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Hague ULF),57 
article 18(1) of the CISG instructs that the essential indication of 
assent can take the form of either a statement (that is, a return 
promise) or "other conduct. "58 
With the use of the term "indicates assent," CISG once again 
makes clear the central significance of the general interpretive pro-
visions of article 8 for contract formation issues. The common case 
of a statement of the offeree communicated to the offeror will 
often pose few interpretive difficulties. But even here, confirma-
tions of receipt, conditional responses, and ambiguous "order 
acknowledgments" will require an application of the principles out-
lined in article 8 to determine the import of the expressions con-
tained in the response to the offer.59 
55. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
56. CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(1). 
57. Article 6 of the Hague ULF provided only that an acceptance consists of a 
"declaration communicated ... to the offeror ... ," in article 6(1), or of "the dispatch of the 
goods or of the price or any other act equivalent to [such a] declaration ... ," in article 
6(2). Hague ULF, supra note 8, art. 6. By contrast, even the initial drafts of what is now 
article 18(1) of the CISG stated more clearly what was implicit in article 6 of the Hague 
ULF, namely, that a response to an offer must indicate the offeree's assent in order to 
qualify as an acceptance. See Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of 
Goods on the Work of Its Ninth Session, UNCITRAL Working Group on the 
International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL OR, 9th Sess., para. 231, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/142 
(1978), reprinted in [1978] IX Y.B. U.N. Comm'n lnt'l Thade L. 78 [hereinafter Report on 
the Ninth Session]. 
58. See Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra note 14, at 166-67. 
59. A mere confirmation of receipt of an offer or an "acceptance" that sets forth 
conditions to its effectiveness will not indicate the requisite assent of the offeree to the 
offer, absent other circumstances that would permit the offeror reasonably to conclude 
otherwise, see CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(2), or contrary and established practices or 
international trade usages, see id. art. 9. See Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra note 14, 
at 165-66; CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 150. 
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Such an inquiry into the intent of the offeree becomes signifi-
cantly more challenging when the only relevant external manifesta-
tion of that intent is the offeree's conduct. To be sure, article 18(1) 
sanctions the possibility of divining a valid indication of assent in 
conduct alone.60 A closer examination of article 18 cautions 
restraint in doing so, however. Frrst, the grammatical structure of 
the first sentence of article 18(1) makes clear that the analysis of a 
claimed implied acceptance is subject to no less exacting standards 
than an express statement of acceptance.61 Moreover, concerns by 
the drafters about an overly liberal interpretation of article 18(1) 
led to the inclusion in that article of a specific admonition that 
"[s]ilence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance."62 
This provision is unique among the contract formation provisions 
of CISG, for-although the principle that silence alone does not 
indicate assent is well established in civil and common law jurisdic-
tions alike63-no such explicit admonition is to be found with refer-
ence to any other expressions of intent contemplated by the 
Convention. 64 
The difficulty of discerning whether the conduct of a merchant in 
international commerce is an indication of her unqualified assent is 
compounded when one considers that the focus of the inquiry is 
not simply on assent to the creation of contractual obligations in 
general. Rather, what is required is assent to the specific offer as 
proposed. Admittedly, the flexibility inherent in article 18(1) will 
permit the general statement that even silence may amount to 
acceptance when coupled with other "relevant circumstances" in 
60. This possibility arises from the disjunctive form of article 18(1) of the Convention. 
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(1) ("or other conduct indicating assent") (emphasis 
added). 
61. See id. ("A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent is 
an acceptance."); Bydlinski, supra note 46, at 67-68. 
62. CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(1) (second sentence). This sentence was added in the 
ninth session of the UNCITRAL Working Group in September 1m, but provided only 
that silence did not amount to acceptance. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 58, 
para. 234. The words "or inactivity" were added to the article (then numbered article 16) 
at the Vienna Conference in 1980 upon the recommendation of the United Kingdom. See 
Fmal Act, supra note 12, at 95; U.N. Doc. NConf.97/C.l!L.56. 
63. See Farnsworth, Contracts, supra note 48, § 3.15, at 155; U. Schlesinger, The 
Common Core of Legal 'Ihiditions 131 (1971) (summarizing the approach of a variety of 
jurisdictions). But see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 (1m) (identifying 
attending factors that would permit the conclusion of assent by silence). 
64. The significance of this admonition is explored in greater detail below. See infra 
notes 256-58 and accompanying text 
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the sense of the interpretive standards of article 8. 65 The word 
"may" is significant here, however. It is essential to observe even 
at this initial stage in the analysis that whether the actions of a 
party attain a level equivalent to an affirmative and unconditional 
expression of assent is a fact-specific inquiry that will be driven by 
the circumstances of each case (including, in particular, the state-
ments and actions of the parties both prior and subsequent to the 
conduct at issue).66 It is here, perhaps more than with any other 
inquiry in the formation process, that the values that underlie the 
recognition of contractual obligations under the Convention,67 in 
particular the interpretive standards of article 8,68 will play a deci-
sive role. 69 
The formation process is completed under the Convention at the 
moment the acceptance of the offer "becomes effective. "70 In con-
formance with traditional civil law notions, an acceptance becomes 
effective when the requisite indication of assent "reaches the 
offeror,"71 as long as it does so within the time specified in the 
offer, or in absence of such a specification, within a "reasonable 
time."72 
65. See CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 152; Bianca & Bonell 
(Farnsworth), supra note 14, at 166-67. 
66. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(3); infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
67. See infra part III.A. 
68. These interpretive standards are discussed in detail infra part III.A.2. 
69. This observation is of particular significance with regard to the main inquiry here-
the treatment of a partial dissensus under the Convention. See infra parts IV.A.- B.l. 
70. CISG, supra note 2, art. 23. For an analysis of the significance of this provision with 
respect to contract formations that do not track the lock step offer-acceptance scheme, see 
infra part IV.B.2. 
71. CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(2). This approach is to be contrasted with the common 
law "mailbox rule." See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 63(a) (1977). As with an 
offer, see CISG, supra note 2, art. 15(2), an acceptance governed by CISG can be 
withdrawn. See id., art. 22. 
72. CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(2). In the case of a purported acceptance in the form of 
expressive conduct, this timing issue is more complex. As a general proposition, to be 
effective even an acceptance by conduct requires that corresponding notice "reach" the 
offeror within the time fixed for acceptance. See Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra 
note 14, at 169-70; see also Huber, supra note 11, at 443. Article 18(3) of the Convention 
carves out a limited exception to this rule, however, for offers that, either directly or on the 
basis of established practices or trade usages, permit the offeree to indicate assent by 
performing an act without a corresponding notice to the offeror. In such a case, the 
acceptance "is effective at the moment the act is performed .... " See CISG, supra note 2, 
art 18(3). This provision has spawned considerable controversy. Compare Honnold, supra 
note 8, at 224-26 (arguing that even where an offer permits acceptance by performance, the 
offeror must receive actual notice of the act of acceptance, in the absence of "special 
circumstances," within the time defined by article 18(2) of the Convention) with Murray, 
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3. The Treatment of Deviating Acceptances 
a. The Background and Structure of CISG Article 19 
The issue of the appropriate treatment of a declaration that pur-
ports to be an acceptance but contains terms that differ from those 
of the offer has been a vexatious one in the United States and else-
where for decades. 1!aditional contract doctrine adheres to a rigid 
assumption on this score: If a reply is not a "mirror image" of the 
offer, no contract is formed.73 In recent decades, this rigid conclu-
sion has become the subject of increasing criticism in light of, 
among other things, the widespread use of the preprinted, standard 
business terms that are exchanged as routine supplements to the 
respective contract declarations of the parties. To address these 
developments, the drafters of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code in the United States adopted a more flexible approach. The 
basic policy of U.C.C. § 2-207 is to recognize a binding contract if 
"in commercial understanding" the deal between the parties "has 
in fact been closed."74 Although this undoubtedly represented a 
significant advancement in the recognition of mutually-intended 
contractual obligations, the particular solution of § 2-207 with 
respect to the content of the resultant contract has not, to put it 
mildly, received broad support among scholars75 and the courts,76 
with the commentary of the former being particularly acerbic.77 
Convention, supra note 46, at 30-33 (arguing that Professor Honnold misreads the clear 
language of article 18{3) of the CISG) and Kelso, supra note 46, at 541-42 (same). 
73. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1977); Farnsworth, Contracts, supra 
note 48, § 3.13, at 150. For a recent case discussing this rule, see Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of 
White House, 36 F3d 540, 546-47 {6th Cir. 1994). 
74. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2 (1987). 
75. The list of law review articles on the "battle of the forms" under U.C.C. § 2-2Cfl is so 
long that one can hardly contain it in a single footnote. For an introduction to the 
literature on the subject {with extensive further citations), see Murray, Solutions, supra 
note 54, at 1307, 1309 n5 (containing citations); Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, 
Rules, Standards and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-W, 68 Va. L. Rev. 
1217 {1982); Gregory M. "llavalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness 
and Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-2f17, 33 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 327 
(1983). The National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Lav.-s (NCCUSL) and 
the American Law Institute are currently involved in a comprehensive review and revision 
of U.C.C. Article 2, including § 2-207. The most current drafts from this work on the 
revision of Article 2 can be found at the home page of the NCCUSL at the University of 
Pennsylvania: <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>. 
76. See Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett Co., 297 F.2d 497,500 {1st Cir. 1962) (noting that 
Section 2-207 is "not too happily drafted"); Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Martin "llactor Co., 473 
P .2d 18, 25 (Kan. 1970) (referring to the section as a "murky bit of prose"). 
77. See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, supra note 75, at 1224 ("[Section] 2-W is a statutory 
disaster whose every word invites problems in construction."); John E. Murray, Jr., A 
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It is not surprising, then, that the treatment of a deviating accept-
ance likewise was among the most controversial issues in the delib-
erations over the contract formation provisions of the U.N. Sales 
Convention. Unfortunately, hopes for a comprehensive solution to 
this fundamental problem were left unsatisfied. In the end, the 
severe differences among the drafters on this issue allowed only a 
narrow compromise, now reflected in article 19, a prime objective 
of which remains to protect parties from the imposition of contrac-
tual obligations where they have failed to reach a clear agreement 
on the content of their relationship.78 
The determinative issue on the effect of a deviating acceptance 
under the compromise of article 19 is, briefly, whether the "accept-
ance" contains terms that "materially alter" those of the offer.79 
The first paragraph of the article sets forth the traditional "mirror 
image" rule that a deviation in the reply to the offer has the twin 
effects of rejecting the offer and transforming the reply into a 
counteroffer. The second paragraph then purports to ameliorate 
the harsh effect of this rule in the case of "nonmaterial" terms in 
the "acceptance" declaration.80 What the second paragraph giveth, 
however, the third paragraph taketh away, for the latter defines as 
material effectively all terms that could be of significance in inter-
national sales contracts.81 
Surprisingly, the basic rule in article 19(1) that a deviating 
acceptance does not, in principle, operate to conclude a contract 
Proposed Revision of Section 2-2ff7 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J.L. & Com. 337, 
344 (1986) ("[T]he ramifications [of the unclear language of§ 2-2ff7] are so broad as to be 
called the nuclear accident of Article 2."). 
78. See infra notes 296-302 and accompanying text. 
79. Article 19 provides as follows: 
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, 
limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a 
counter-offer. 
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains 
additional or different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer 
constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally 
to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not so object, 
the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications 
contained in the acceptance. 
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, 
payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of 
one party's liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to 
alter the terms of the offer materially. 
CISG, supra note 2, art 19. 
80. See infra part ll.A.3.c. 
81. See infra part ll.A.3.b. 
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was not particularly contentious in the drafting process. The origi-
nal proposal of the Secretary-General82 on this score was only 
slightly amended in the deliberations of the Working Group.83 The 
sum effect of the amendments was to make clear that a reply to an 
offer that merely makes inquiries or suggests, but does not insist 
on, possible additional terms does not invoke the rule of article 
19(1).84 
By contrast, the issue of whether more detailed provisions were 
appropriate beyond the simple rule of article 19(1) was among the 
most disputed matters of the entire Convention. The draft of arti-
cle 19 initiallySS approved by the Working Group included only 
paragraph (1) along with a second permitting contract formation 
notwithstanding "nonmaterial" deviations.86 It was this latter prin-
ciple that proved to be a nexus of friction among the delegates. 
The dispute over this provision arose between, on the one hand, 
82. This proposal closely followed the corresponding provision of the Hague ULF. See 
Hague ULF, supra note 8, art. 7 ("An acceptance containing additions, limitations or other 
modifications shall be a rejection of the offer and shall constitute a counter-offer."). The 
proposal of the Secretary-General merely replaced, for clarity, "[a]n acceptance" with "[a] 
reply to an offer." See Report of the Secretary-General: Formation and Validity of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Working Group on the International Sale of 
Goods, Official Records, Annex ll, Appendix I, art 7, U.N. Doc. AJCN.91128 (1977), 
reprinted in [1977] VITI Y.B. U.N. Comm'n lnt'l 'frade L. 100 [hereinafter Secretary-
General Formation Report]. 
83. In the course of the deliberations, the drafters added the words "which purports to 
be an acceptance" after "a reply to an offer." See Summary of Deliberations of the 
Commission on the Draft Convention on the Formation of Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L., Official Records, Annex I, para. 154, U.N. 
Doc. A/33/17 {1978), reprinted in [1978] IX Y.B. U.N. Comm'n Int'l 'frade L. 42 
[hereinafter Formation Deliberations]. 
84. See id. paras. 153-54. The amendments also made clear that a like conclusion 
obtains if the reply deviates not from the substantive content of the offer, but rather simply 
as a result of language differences or imperfect terminology. See Secretariat Commentary, 
supra note 15, art. 17, para. 3, Official Records, at 24 ("[T]he acceptance need not use the 
exact same words as used in the offer so long as the differences in the wording used in the 
acceptance would not change the obligations of the parties."); see also CISG Kommentar 
(Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 161 (noting that in international transactions minor 
differences in expression can "creep in" as a result of language barriers and imperfect 
translations). 
85. For a discussion of a radically different approach proposed by the Secretary-General 
in 1977, see infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text 
86. This provision, like its antecedent, article 7(2) of the Hague ULF, was based on a 
comprehensive 1915 Scandinavian law to the same effect See CISG Kommentar 
(Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 160. In deference to the well-developed taw on the basis 
of this Scandinavian statute, the drafters included a special right of reservation respecting 
contract formation issues. See CISG, supra note 2, art 92(1) (permitting a contracting 
state to declare that it will not be bound by the contract formation rules in Part ll of the 
Convention). 
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traditionalist scholars and representatives of socialist countries, 
who preferred only the strict mirror image rule and thus desired to 
strike the provision in its entirety,87 and on the other, certain indus-
trialized countries that supported a more flexible solution. When 
efforts to strike the second paragraph failed,88 the former group 
sought to limit the definition of "nonmaterial" alterations to "mere 
differences in wording, grammatical changes, typographical errors" 
and similar insignificant matters.89 
The dispute between the two camps led to the formation of a 
special working group charged with defining the contours of the 
term "material" in the context of deviating acceptances.90 The 
result of the efforts of this working group was a proposed addi-
tional paragraph for article 19 (the present article 19(3)) which set 
forth a non-exhaustive list of terms that would be deemed material. 
This draft also included, however, a controversial final clause that 
would have given effect to an acceptance containing material alter-
ations if the offeree had "reason to believe" such terms would be 
"acceptable to the offeror."91 In spite of this controversy, the 
Working Group adopted this draft of article 19(3) in 1978 and 
included it within the comprehensive New York Draft of the Con-
vention of the same year.92 
Both of the latter two paragraphs of article 19 nonetheless 
remained controversial and were the subjects of attacks from both 
traditionalists and reformers at the Vienna Conference in 1980. 
Proposals made during the Conference to strike both paragraphs in 
their entirety failed, however.93 Traditionalists were nonetheless 
successful to a limited extent at the Conference in that they were 
able to defeat France's proposal to limit the list of "material" terms 
in article 19(3) to price, quality, and quantity of the goods.94 They 
frl. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, paras. 224-25. 
88. Id. para. 227. A later attempt in the Working Group to delete the second paragraph 
of article 19 likewise failed. See Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, paras. 156-58. 
89. See Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, para. 159; Francois Vergne, The "Battle 
of the Forms" Under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 33 Am. J. Comp. L. 233, 235-37 (1985). 
90. See Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, para. 163. 
91. Id. paras. 164-68; see also Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra note 14, at 176-77; 
Rolf Herber & Beate Czerwenka, Internationales Kaufrecht 103 (1991). 
92. See Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, para. 171. 
93. See Summary Records of the Deliberations of the Frrst Committee-lOth Meeting, 
paras. 23-49, Official Records, at 284-86, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.l/-SR.10 (1980) 
(proposals of the United Kingdom and Bulgaria) [hereinafter First Committee 
Deliberations (Meeting Number)]. 
94. Id. paras. 63-84, Official Records, at 2fr7-88; see also Vergne, supra note 89, at 237. 
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likewise succeeded in deleting from the final text of article 19(3) 
the controversial proposal to give effect to materially deviating 
acceptances if there was "reason to believe" that the deviations 
were acceptable to the offeror.95 
b. Deviating Acceptance with Material Alterations 
The result of the "timorous"96 compromise of article 19 was, in a 
practical sense, a departure in form only from the strict mirror 
image rule. The second paragraph of article 19 purports to miti-
gate the harsh effects of that rule for acceptances that deviate from 
the offer in nonmaterial respects only. Further examination 
reveals, however, that the relief afforded by article 19(2) is merely 
illusory, for article 19(3) then proceeds to define as "material" all 
terms worthy of mention. 
The article 19(3) list of presumptively material terms in a deviat-
ing acceptance is indeed comprehensive. One finds there not only 
the "usual suspects" of price, quantity, and time of delivery (that is, 
the essentialia negotii) but also less "essential" terms such as those 
"relating to payment, quality ... of the goods, place ... of delivery, 
extent of one party's liability to the other or the settlement of dis-
putes." And the scope of article 19(3) does not end there. The 
provision makes clear that the listed terms are only "among other 
things" that may be considered "to alter the terms of the offer 
materially." Thus, the materiality of terms beyond those expressly 
identified may also arise from the particular circumstances of a 
transaction. 97 
This latter category should be of limited practical significance, 
however. This follows from the simple fact that the terms listed in 
95. See Frrst Committee Deliberations (lOth Meeting), supra note 93, paras. 52-53, 
Official Records, at 286; Vergne, supra note 89, at 237. 
96. Perillo, supra note 20, at 283. 
97. See Rehbinder, supra note 32, at 165; CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 
32, at 161-62. An interesting issue in this context is whether the converse is also true, that 
is, whether, in considering the circumstances of a particular case, the terms specifically 
identified in article 19(3) can nonetheless be deemed "not material." According to one 
view, article 19(3) establishes an irrebuttable presumption of materiality for such terms. 
See Herber & Czerwenka, supra note 92, at 103. Other commentators have argued that 
the principle of party autonomy set forth in article 6 mandates that article 19(3) be 
interpreted as establishing only a rebuttable presumption of materiality. See, e.g., 
Bydlinski, supra note 46, at 72; CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 162-63; 
Kelso, supra note 46, at 549-50; see also Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 17, 
para. 7, Official Records, at 24 (the listed terms "are normally to be considered material") 
(emphasis added). 
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article 19(3) embrace "most aspects of the contract,"98 and in any 
event effectively all subjects that would be of significance in the 
typical sales transaction. Thus, the practical consequence of the 
broad list in article 19(3) is that in transactions within the sphere of 
application of the U.N. Sales Convention nearly all purported 
acceptances that are not limited to a simple "yes" will be deemed 
to alter the terms of the offer "materially" as contemplated by arti-
cle 19(3). 
The legal consequence in such a case is a straightforward one: 
As the "nonmaterial alteration" exception of article 19(2) does not 
apply, the reply, even though intended as an acceptance, is not one; 
rather, it constitutes a rejection of the offer by operation of article 
19(1). At the same time, the deviating acceptance becomes a 
counteroffer, which, to form a contract, would in tum require a 
valid acceptance in the sense of article 18(1) of the CISG.99 At this 
executory stage in the parties' relationship, application of article 
19(1) thus leads to the practical result that no contract is formed on 
the basis of the parties' formal declarations. 
It is here that the regulatory scheme of the Convention breaks 
down. As I discuss in Part II.B., article 19, though it supplies a 
clear rule at the executory stage of the parties' relationship, fails to 
address the case in which the parties nonetheless proceed to carry 
out the perceived "contract." The express provisions of the Con-
vention, in short, fail to provide definitive guidance on the issue of 
the proper treatment of such a "partial dissensus" where the par-
ties nonetheless manifest a broader agreement on the conclusion of 
a binding deal.100 
c. Deviating Acceptance with Nonmaterial Alterations 
Taken literally, the provisions of article 19(2) operate as an 
exception to the strict mirror image rule of the first paragraph of 
the article. According to article 19(2), additional or different terms 
98. Honnold, supra note 8, at 232. 
99. The deviating acceptance will not operate as a counteroffer under article 19(1), 
however, if, in light of the existing circumstances, it fails to satisfy the requirements for an 
offer of definiteness and an intent to be bound. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 14; see also 
supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. 
100. See Arthur von Mehren, The Formation of Contracts, in VII International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 9, at 9-168 (International Association of Legal 
Science, 1992) ('The Convention "does not address the battle of the forms ••.. "); Jan 
Hellner, The Vienna Convention and Standard Form Contracts, in International Sale of 
Goods, supra note 46, at 335, 342 (article 19 provides "little guidance" on this score); see 
also sources cited infra note 106. 
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in a deviating acceptance that do not materially alter the terms of 
the offer likewise do not prevent the formation of the contract. 
The contrary result obtains only if the offeror, ''without undue 
delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to 
that effect." If the offeror does not so object, the contract is con-
cluded on the basis of the offer as supplemented by the modifica-
tions in the acceptance.1o1 
As the list of terms deemed material by article 19(3) encom-
passes effectively all matters of significance, and as the purpose of 
the general terms of business in widespread use in such transac-
tions is precisely to address such matters, the provisions of article 
19(2) will rarely be of practical relevance. Indeed, as Professor 
Farnsworth has correctly observed, "it is difficult to imagine" modi-
fications in an acceptance "that would not be material" in the sense 
of article 19(3).102 As a consequence, it will be a rare case indeed 
where article 19(2) will operate to "save" a formation of a contract 
in the case of a deviating acceptance.1o3 
101. CISG, supra note 2, art 19(2) ("If [the offeror] does not so object, the terms of the 
contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance."). 
102. See Farnsworth, Formation, supra note 41, § 3.04, at 3-16; Murray, Convention, 
supra note 46, at 42. 
103. Indeed, even an acceptance containing only "non-material" deviations from the 
offer may not lead to the formation of a sales contract. Under article 19(2) the offeror 
retains a right of objection in such a case. See CISG, supra note 2, art 19(2). Under § 2-
207(2)(c) of the U.C.C. such an objection only affects the applicability of the proposed 
tenns. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c) (1987} (As between "merchants," the additional terms in a 
deviating acceptance "become part of the contract unless: ••• (c) notification of objection 
to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is 
received."). In contrast, the consequence of an objection as contemplated by CISG article 
19(2} is to preclude the formatiDn of a contract entirely. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 19(2). 
This right of objection creates a serious opportunity for abuse by offerors. In this case of a 
reply with deviations that are linlited to non-material matters, the offeror will acquire a 
form of an "option" to permit or reject the formation of a contract even though the parties 
have agreed on all material terms. The potential for abuse (for example, speculating with 
the contract in a volatile market while the offeree remains bound to her acceptance) led 
the Netherlands to propose an amendment to article 19(2) at the Vienna Conference that 
would have recognized a binding contract if, after an objection by the offeror, the offeree 
chose to retract her non-material deviations. This proposal failed to garner sufficient 
support, however, and was withdrawn. See First Committee Deliberations (lOth Meeting), 
supra note 93, paras. 56-59, Official Records, at 286. The proper manner to avoid 
speculation by offerors in such a case is to calibrate the "without undue delay" requirement 
of article 19(2} to the volatility in the relevant market. In cases of extreme price volatility, 
an offeror may well have to object within hours of receipt of the deviating acceptance. 
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B. The Problem: The Role of Partial Dissensus in Contract 
Formation 
Although a system of contract formation founded on two consti-
tutive declarations of intent may appear familiar to many western 
scholars, there has been no shortage of criticism of the particular 
formation scheme set forth in the U.N. Sales Convention with 
regard to the treatment of a partial dissensus.104 This criticism is 
directed less at what the Convention does than at what it fails to 
do. The conceptual constructs of offer and unqualified acceptance 
can, of course, accurately describe the agreement process for some 
relationships. That a contract is formed through reciprocal expres-
sions of assent may in fact be implied from the very nature of a 
formation scheme that founds contractual obligation on the mani-
fested intent of the parties.105 
The friction arises from the ability of the offer-unconditional 
acceptance scheme to accommodate the less formal relationship 
that perhaps more accurately describes modem commercial trans-
actions.106 These informal relationships may take a variety of 
forms. In some transactions, the parties may exchange a number of 
informal communications, none of which can be identified as a for-
mal "offer" or "acceptance," but the sum of which reveals an 
agreement on the creation of binding obligations. In a similar vein, 
the parties may have a continuing commercial relationship founded 
on a mix of oral, written, and other informal understandings, such 
that the import of any one exchange of communications is unclear. 
104. See Perillo, supra note 20, at 283 (describing the approach of article 19 to contract 
formation as "timorous"); Murray, Convention, supra note 46, at 40 (stating that the 
drafters "deliberately ignored the absurdity of [the] notion" that an acceptance must 
comply exactly with the offer); id. at 43 (referring to the system in article 19(2) as 
"objectively absurd"); CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 167 (observing 
that the failure to address the fundamental issue of a partial dissensus was "regrettable"). 
105. A formation scheme based on the "building blocks" of offer and acceptance is a 
common one. See Schlesinger, supra note 64, parts I.A-B., at 75-172 (summarizing the 
common aspects of contract law among a variety of jurisdictions). For a discussion of the 
nature of contractual obligation under the Convention, see infra part III. 
106. See Huber, supra note 11, at 445-46 (describing the variety of contract formation 
patterns not covered by the Convention's basic offer-acceptance scheme); Peter 
Schlechtriem, Einheitliches UN-Kaufrecht 34-35 n.151 (1981) [hereinafter Schlechtriem, 
UN-Kaufrecht] (same); cf. Hellner, supra note 100, at 342 (The battle of the forms "should 
not be judged at all by the rules on offers and counteroffers .... "); Schlesinger, supra note 
63, at 154 (observing that formation other than by offer and acceptance is common); 
Charles M. Thatcher, A Critique of the Murray Model for Revising the U.C.C. § 2-2CJ7 and 
a Derivative Proposal for Revision, 39 S.D. L. Rev. 93, 101 (1994) ("It must be conceded 
that many of the traditional rules governing offer and acceptance are practically irrelevant 
in resolving questions of contract formation and content."). 
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In other transactions, the parties may indeed enter into negotia-
tions toward a more structured and substantial contractual rela-
tionship. The point at which their negotiations cross the 
contractual threshold (with the result that all subsequent communi-
cations are viewed as mere proposals to supplement the contract), 
however, remains indeterminate. In still other transactions, the 
parties may informally agree on the essential elements of the deal, 
but their respective employees nonetheless exchange unread stan-
dard forms whose terms extend far beyond the business arrange-
ment of their principals. 
This short list is not intended to be exhaustive but descriptive. 
What is significant in these relationships is what they have in com-
mon: flexibility and informality, circumstances that are made pos-
sible by and remain a reflection of the convenience of modem 
means of communication. Electronic data interchange,107 telefax, 
e-mail, the intemet,108 and the like have enabled transactors to 
transmit relevant information with an ease and rapidity certainly 
beyond the imagination of traditionalist U.S. scholars who shaped 
the law of contracts many decades ago and most likely beyond that 
of those who drafted the U.N. Sales Convention in the 1970s. The 
consequence of this convenience and rapidity is a flexibility in the 
formation of commercial relationships that permits each party to 
communicate the entirety of her standard business terms as a mat-
107. Electronic data interchange refers to a technology that permits a party to transmit 
information and "electronic documents" for direct and immediate processing by another 
party's computer system. Through the use of standard electronic formats, buyers and 
sellers are able in this way to transmit electronic purchase orders and order 
acknowledgments without the necessity of direct human involvement. The standard 
formats typically contain, however, both computer data elements for processing by the 
receiving party's computer system and a so-called "free text" field. This field permits the 
inclusion of non-standard text-such as an incorporation by reference of a party's standard 
business terms-that must be reviewed by a human actor at the recipient's location. See 
Raymond Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues, 14 J. Marshall J. Computer & 
Info. L. 211, 213-14, 231-32 {1996). But see Thomas McCarthy, An Introduction: The 
Commercial Irrelevancy of the "Battle of the Forms", 49 Bus. Law. 1019, 1024-26 {1994) 
(suggesting that businesspersons will not make use of "free text" fields to wage a battle of 
forms). 
108. As the accessibility and use of the internet increases, one should expect that future 
contract negotiations will not involve even the current routine exchange of standard 
business forms. Rather, negotiators will simply make reference to such standard terms 
made available on their "home pages" on the internet. This raises an interesting question 
of precisely what must be done to make a term a formal part of one's contract proposa1. 
Specifically, the issue is whether a mere reference to contract terms elsewhere easily 
accessible to the other party suffices to make such terms part of a purported offer or 
acceptance. Although beyond the scope of the present article, this issue \viii almost 
certainly increase in significance along with the growth of the internet. 
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ter of routine in the course of the discussions over a proposed 
relationship. 
Fortunately (or unfortunately), businesspersons have neither the 
time nor the capacity to accommodate fully these facets of modem 
communication. The common outcome in these flexible modem 
relationships is thus equally important. Precisely because of the 
complexity, flexibility or informality of their relationship, parties 
commonly are unwilling or unable to take the time, assume the 
effort or incur the cost necessary to reach an express agreement on 
all routine matters raised in the course of their relationship. In the 
common case, the parties nonetheless proceed with performance of 
the essential commercial elements of the transaction once they 
have expressly agreed on those elements. 
From a perspective of the law of contract formation, the signifi-
cant, common element among these relationships is the absence of 
a complete agreement between the parties. In terminology famil-
iar to many continental-European scholars, I have labeled this 
state of affairs a "dissensus" between the parties.109 In particular, 
the defining feature of this dissensus is that it affects only some 
aspects of the parties' relationship, that is, it is only "partial." 
Traditional contract doctrine in the United States lacks an over-
arching conceptual device to capture this phenomenon.110 Instead, 
the common law has developed a variety of specific rules ("mirror 
image," "last shot," etc.) whose narrow focus either does not 
address all aspects of a partial dissensus or imposes a blanket result 
that often affirmatively disregards the core interpretive values the 
109. One of the difficulties in the unification of the law in the international arena is the 
divergence between the tenninology used to describe essentially the same legal 
phenomenon. I use the tenn "dissensus" here in part because of the similarity to the 
tenninology sometimes used by scholars from Gennan-speaking countries. See, e.g., CISG 
Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 166 (discussing this issue in tenns of a 
"partielle[r] Dissens"); Wey, supra note 46, at 487 ("Partialdissens"). 
110. The inability of traditional contract doctrine to accommodate the flexible 
relationships that are increasingly common in modem commerce was (and is) the 
foundation for the scholarly debate begun over twenty years ago regarding a "relational" 
theory of contract, the principal proponent of which is Professor Ian MacNeil. For an 
introduction to this debate, see Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 691 (1974) [hereinafter MacNeil, Many Futures]; Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: 
Adjustment of Long-tenn Economic Relations Under Qassical, Neoclassical, and 
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); Ian R. MacNeil, Relational 
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 483 (1985) (hereinafter 
MacNeil, Relational Contract]. For a similar approach, see Steven R. Salbu, The Decline 
of Contract as a Relationship Management Fonn, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 1271 (1995). 
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rules purport to apply.111 Alternatively, even under the more flexi-
ble Uniform Commercial Code scholarly discussion has often con-
centrated narrowly on the popular label "battle of the forms. "112 
The extrapolation of the supposed lessons from this concentration 
on "the forms" brings with it a serious risk of infecting the analysis 
of other, now increasingly common types of less formal relation-
ships founded on communications other than a lock-step exchange 
of preprinted documents. 
A principled analysis of the broad issues that result from the 
increased flexibility and informality of modem contractual rela-
tionships thus requires that scholars and adjudicators return to first 
principles. The foundational precept of contract law is that con-
tracts are formed and defined by a corresponding common intent 
of the parties. The analysis of these flexible modem relationships 
should, therefore, focus on an identification of appropriate stan-
dards to effectuate a common intent of the parties to form binding 
obligations in knowing, mutual disregard of the absence of a com-
plete agreement (that is, a dissensus) between them. 
There are three necessary elements of this common state of 
affairs of a "partial dissensus" in modem contractual relationships: 
(1) the dissensus between the parties cannot relate to those "essen-
tial" terms (the "essentialia negotii")113 which define the irreducible 
core of a sales contract under the Convention {the goods, quantity, 
and-perhaps114-price );115 (2) at least one, though more com-
111. For an insightful examination of the failure of some traditional common law 
interpretative rules to accomplish their intended result, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 Cal. L Rev. 
1127, 1148-80 {1994). Another useful source is Richard Caswell, Offer, Acceptance, and 
Efficient Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481, 547 {1996) [hereinafter CrasweU, Reliance] (many 
of the specific rules of contract law, including the rule that an offer terminates upon the 
making of a counteroffer, "probably do not reflect the intentions of all, or even most, 
contracting parties"). 
112. For an introduction into the relevant literature on the "battle of the forms," see 
sources cited supra note 75. 
113. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; see also CISG, supra note 2, art. 
14{1) (stating that a valid offer must be "sufficiently definite"). 
114. Article 14{1) of the CISG would seem to require at a minimum an implicit 
identification of the price, see CISG, supra note 2, art. 14{1) ("A proposal is sufficiently 
definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for 
determining ... the price."), but in light of a seemingly contradictory provision elsewhere 
in CISG {article 55), there is substantial debate in the legal literature about whether even 
this is necessary. Article 55 provides that in the case of a "validly concluded" contract that 
"does not expressly or implicitly fix or make provision for determining the price," there is 
in effect a presumption that the parties have agreed on the price "generally charged" for 
such goods at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Id. art. 55. This provision has led 
a number of commentators to conclude, in my view correctly, that a contract may be 
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monly both, of the parties must have proposed other terms in the 
course of the formation of their relationship over which they have 
either affirmatively disagreed or passively failed to agree; and (3) 
the other declarations and/or expressive conduct of the parties 
must manifest a broader consensus between them that they have 
nonetheless created binding contractual obligations. 
In the absence of the first or third element, the consequence of a 
partial dissensus between the parties to an executory relationship 
governed by the U.N. Sales Convention is clear: (1) if the parties 
have failed to agree on the "essentialia negotii," pursuant to article 
14 no sales contract has been formed in the contemplation of the 
Convention;116 (2) likewise, if the parties do not in some manner 
manifest a common intent sufficient to overcome the dissensus on 
the non-essential terms previously proposed by one or both of 
them, the basic mirror image rule in principle adopted in article 
19(1) will preclude the recognition of enforceable contractual 
obligations.U7 
When all three elements of a partial dissensus are satisfied, how-
ever, the Convention provides little explicit guidance on the defini-
tion of the parties' relationship. Uncertainty about this issue for a 
time led some commentators to argue that the problem was insolu-
ble with the conceptual tools provided by the Convention. The 
result for these commentators was that adjudicators would have to 
resort to principles of the otherwise-applicable (and non-uniform) 
domestic law of the contracting states.118 In light of the principles 
validly concluded under CISG on the basis of an offer that does not even "make provision 
for detennining" the price, so long as the parties intend to conclude a binding contract 
without doing so. See Honnold, supra note 8, at 199-203; CISG Kommentar 
(Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 132-33; Murray, Convention, supra note 46, at 17. Other 
commentators believe that such an interpretation misreads the clear language of article 
14(1). See Farnsworth, Fonnation, supra note 41, § 3.04, at 3-8 to 3-10; Kelso, supra note 
46, at 537. 
115. The effect of the pliable language governing the "definiteness" requirement of a 
valid contract is to leave substantial flexibility to the parties in shaping their agreement. 
See supra note 52 and accompanying text. As long as there is a corresponding intent, an 
offer is considered "sufficiently definite" even if it proposes that the quantity or price be 
detennined in the future (for example, by reference to a market quotation at the time of 
delivery), or that the detennination be made by a third party, or even by the offeree. See 
CISq Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 130-31. 
116. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra part II.A.3. 
118. See Huber, supra note 11, at 444 (relying on the "validity exception" in article 
4(a)); Vergne, supra note 89, at 256-57. Concerns about such an application of national law 
by the courts are also to be found in more recent scholarly writings. See Peter Winship, 
Changing Contract Practices in the Light of the United Nations Sales Convention: A 
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of article 7(2), a majority of scholars correctly reject this 
approach.119 Because issues of contract formation certainly fall 
within the "matters governed by [the] Convention," and because 
the Convention sets forth "general principles" that inform the anal-
ysis of the role of a partial dissensus in contract formation, article 
7(2) mandates that this issue be resolved within the Convention 
itself.120 
m. THE NATURE oF CoNTRAcruAL OBLIGATioN 
UNDER CISG 
The issue of contract formation in spite of a partial dissensus 
between the "contracting" parties arises at the very core of con-
tract doctrine. 'I!aditional contract theory, in its purest form, 
would seem to tell us that "contract" and "dissensus" are mutually 
exclusive propositions. By classical definition, a contract comes 
into being through a corresponding complete agreement between 
the parties. So far, so good. The friction occurs when an agree-
ment on formation collides with a dissensus on content, specifically 
where the conduct and words of the parties unambiguously reveal 
a mutual assent to the creation of binding obligations notwith-
standing a lack of agreement or outright disagreement on terms 
proposed by one or both of them. 'I!aditionally, contract law 
resolves such frictions by adopting so-called "default" rules whose 
purpose it is to fit the practice into the doctrinal mold (or, occa-
sionally, vice versa). 
The subject of default rules has spawned considerable debate in 
U.S. academic literature in recent years. Although the terminology 
has differed, much of this debate has focused on the distinction 
between what can be labeled "mutable" and "immutable" default 
rules, or, in other words, between those rules that yield to a con-
Guide for Practitioners, 29 Int'l Law. 525, 544 (1995) ("[T]he Convention does not have a 
rule that resolves (the partial dissensus] dispute and domestic law may govern •.•• "). 
119. See, e.g., Schlechtriem, UN-Kaufrecht, supra note 106, at 44; Frans J.A. van der 
Velden, Uniform International Sales Law and the Battle of the Forms, in Unification and 
Comparative Law in Theory and Practice, Contributions in Honour of Jean Georges 
Sauveplanne 233, 243 (1984) ("The absence [of] uniform laws ••. does not lead to the 
conclusion the ULIS and CISG are inapplicable and therefore to be replaced by rules of 
national law."); Christine Moccia, Note, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods and the 'Battle of the Forms,' 13 Fordham Int'l W. 649, 
674-75 (1990). 
120. van der Velden, supra note 119, at 243; see also supra notes 34-35 and 
accompanying text. 
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trary will of the parties and those that do not.121 The focus of this 
debate, though important in itself, has been directed, however, 
more to the definition of the substantive background law that 
serves to "fill the gaps" in extant contracts than to what Richard 
Craswell has termed the "agreement rules. "122 These rules govern 
the process by which the parties create and shape contractual obli-
gations in the first instance. 
It is important to observe at the outset that these "agreement 
rules" are of a fundamentally different nature from the "back-
ground law" that has occupied much of the recent contract law 
literature.123 Although, as with the background law, the parties 
also retain the power to deviate from the rules governing the for-
mation process,l24 the essential question with agreement rules is 
not what to do with gaps in the parties' relationship; rather, the 
function of such rules is to determine whether the parties have in 
fact so agreed to deviate from otherwise-applicable law (that is, 
whether the parties have validly created obligations and on what 
they have agreed).125 The task in the treatment of a partial dissen-
sus is thus to craft the appropriate rule to govern the process of 
agreement itself where the parties have not achieved an express 
understanding on the subject. 
As with any other system of contract law, an analysis of such 
rules governing the process of contract formation under the CISG 
implicates the very grounds for recognizing and enforcing "con-
121. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ. 87 (1989); Jules L. Coleman et al., A 
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 
12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 639 (1989); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, 
and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989) [hereinafter Craswell, 
Default Rules]; see also Symposium, Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. Cal. 
Interdisc. LJ. 1 (1993). 
122. See Craswell, Default Rules, supra note 121, at 503. 
123. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 121, at 119 n.133 (observing that, notwithstanding 
the debate over the appropriate background rules, a theory of contract formation is needed 
to determine whether the parties have agreed to derogate from such rules). 
124. This power of the parties is particularly expansive under the U.N. Sales 
Convention. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 6 and the analysis infra part III.A.l. 
125. Because the parties are (in principle) permitted to agree on terms that differ from 
the substantive background law, a failure to do so leaves considerable latitude to scholars 
and courts to pursue broader societal concerns in shaping the background law (hence the 
considerable scholarly debate). As I explain in more detail below, this latitude is 
circumscribed with respect to agreement rules, however, for the issue here is whether the 
parties have in fact exercised their power to deviate from otherwise-applicable law. In 
contrast to background law, therefore, the importance of actual agreement and individual 
autonomy may play a much greater role in shaping the appropriate agreement rules to 
govern specific factual situations. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. 
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tractual" obligations. In other words, in order to define the "rules 
of the contracting game," we must first identify the values CISG 
seeks to further by enforcing contractual promises in the first 
place.126 Fortunately, at a certain level an analysis of the grounds 
for enforcing promises under CISG is met with unique clarity: In 
contrast to a common law system-which by its nature admits of 
substantial flexibility in reexamining even established doctrine-
CISG is an international treaty whose very purpose is to bring uni-
formity to international transactions involving participants from 
differing cultural and legal backgrounds.127 In furtherance of this 
goal, CISG's drafters identified in the treaty's text itself certain 
express principles of general application (in particular, articles 6 
through 11) whose purpose it is to inform the interpretation of the 
remainder of the Convention. 
These principles fulfill their essential function in the context of 
issues that are not resolved by the Convention's express provi-
sions.128 As we have seen, one such matter on which the provisions 
126. In this country there has been an animated debate in the academic literature in 
recent years on the competing theoretical grounds for enforcing promises as binding 
"contractual" commitments. When addressed at a functional level of abstraction, these 
competing theories can be reduced into three general types: (1) autonomy theories; (2) 
reliance theories; and (3) what might be termed "communitarian" theories. For an 
introduction into this recent debate, see, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of 
Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 271-91 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory]; 
Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 
47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 697, 702-16 (1990); David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The 
Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1825-48 (1991); see 
also the brief discussion of these theories infra notes 193 and 205-06. The debate between 
these competing theories is characterized principally by differing conceptions of the extent 
to which the social ordering sanctioned by the enforcement of promises is a purely private 
affair driven by the autonomy of private actors or whether social or other normative 
considerations influence the creation of "contractual" obligations as well. I examine these 
competing values in recognizing contractual obligations in the context of the U.N. Sales 
Convention in part III.B. 
127. See CISG, supra note 2, Preamble (observing that "uniform rules" for international 
contracting "would .•. promote the development of international trade"); id. art. 7(1) (In 
interpreting the Convention, "regard is to be had ••• to the need to promote uniformity in 
its application .•.. "). 
128. As observed above, article 7(2) mandates that matters within the scope of the 
Convention but not addressed therein "are to be settled in conformity with the general 
principles on which it is based." See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. The 
general issue of contract formation is, of course, a "matter[] governed by th[e] 
Convention." See CISG, supra note 2, art. 7(2). Indeed, there is perhaps no subject more 
squarely within the scope of the Convention than the manner in which contractual 
obligations are created in international sales transactions. See Burghard Piltz, 
Internationales Kaufrecht 71 (1993) (hereinafter Piltz, Kaufrecht]; Schlechtriem, UN-
Kaufrecht, supra note 106, at 34, 44. 
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of the Convention provide little explicit guidance is the treatment 
of a partial dissensus where, through their performance or other-
wise, the parties manifest a broader agreement on the conclusion 
of binding obligations.129 The principles of general application 
reflected in articles 6 through 11 will thus assume a particular sig-
nificance in resolving this fundamental gap in the formation provi-
sions of the Convention.130 
As a foundation for an analysis of the appropriate "agreement 
rule" to govern contract formation in spite of a partial dissensus 
between the parties under the U.N. Sales Convention, this section 
will, accordingly, first address the relevant "general principles" on 
which the Convention is based. It will then tum to a more specific 
examination of what these core principles reveal about the values 
that underlie the enforcement of contractual obligations under the 
Convention. 
A. The Core Principles of the U.N. Sales Convention 
1. Party Autonomy 
It can fairly be said that there is no provision more significant to 
an understanding of the policies and principles of the U.N. Sales 
Convention than article 6. At first glance, article 6 appears only to 
address the limited issue of the right of contracting parties to deter-
mine the law that is to govern their relationship. An analysis with 
a more discerning lens reveals something much more fundamental. 
Article 6 initially sets forth the basic principle that the parties to 
a sales contract that is "international" in the sense of article 1 may 
nonetheless agree that the Convention should not govern their con-
tractual relationship. As they did with many other provisions of 
CISG, the drafters distilled this principle into a few short words: 
"The parties may exclude the application of this Convention 
• • • "
131 The proposition that the parties retain the power to 
129. See supra part II.B. and infra part IV.B.1-2. 
130. See Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 80·82 (reference to the general 
principles such as those in articles 6, 7, 11, and 29 is particularly appropriate where an 
analogical application of the specific provisions on related issues would fail to resolve the 
gap in the Convention); Franco Ferrari, Unifonn Interpretation of the 1980 Unifonn Sales 
Law, 24 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 183, 221-26 (1994) (discussing the interpretation by 
analogy and role of the general principles of the Convention). An analogical application of 
the more specific contract fonnation provisions does not lead to a definite resolution of the 
partial dissensus issue. The precise problem is that in the typical case neither party will 
have expressed assent to the fonnal declaration of the other as contemplated by the offer-
acceptance scheme. See infra Part IV.A. 
131. CISG, supra note 2, art. 6. 
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exclude the application of uniform international law traces its ori-
gin to article 3 of the 1964 Hague Convention Relating to a Uni-
form Law on the International Sale of Goods (Hague ULIS) and 
was never seriously questioned in the preparation of the CISG. 
The only noteworthy limiting proposal-that in order effectively to 
exclude the application of the Convention in its entirety the parties 
must affirmatively identify what other system of laws will govern 
their relationship-failed to muster sufficient support in the draft-
ing process.132 Instead, there was general agreement already by the 
second meeting of the Working Group that the basic (unrestricted) 
principle of the Hague ULIS should be retained.l33 
The proposition that contract parties retain a choice-of-law 
power for their contractual relationship may not be surprising in 
itself.134 The real message of article 6, however, is much broader 
and more fundamental to an understanding of the hierarchy of 
norms prescribed in the Convention. What is sometimes over-
looked in resolving unclear issues under the Convention is the ele-
mental principle established by article 6 of the preeminence of 
"party autonomy" in general, that is, the supremacy of the will of 
the parties even over the express provisions of the Convention 
itself. The drafters accomplished this policy of party autonomy 
through the latter half of article 6. In a marked improvement on 
the elliptical language of article 3 of the Hague ULIS,135 article 6 
132. See Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work 
of Its Eighth Session, UNCITRAL Working Group on the International Sale or Goods, 
UNCITRAL OR, 8th Sess., para. 26, U.N. Doc. AJCN.9/128 (1977), reprinted in [1977] 
VIII Y.B. U.N. Comm'n Int'l 'frade L. 76 [hereinafter Report on the Eighth Session]. 
133. See Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work 
of Its Second Session, UNCITRAL Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, 
UNCITRAL OR, 2d Sess., para. 43-46, U.N. Doc. A1CN.9/52 (1971), reprinted in [1971) II 
Y.B. U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 55 [hereinafter Report on the Second Session]. A similar 
restriction on the power of the parties to exclude the application or uniform international 
law had also been rejected in the preparation of the Hague ULIS. See Rolf Herber, 
Internationales Kaufrecht in Kommentar zurn Einheitlichen Kaufrecht, 1, 19-20 (Hans 
DOlle ed., 1976); Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 51-52. 
134. The parties to a contract otherwise subject to the U.C.C. may, pursuant to U.C.C. 
§ 1-105(1) (1987), likewise agree that the law of another jurisdiction shall govern their 
contract, so long as the transaction at issue "bears a reasonable relation" to such other 
jurisdiction. Even this latter limitation does not apply in many other countries. See, e.g., 
Introductory Act to the German Civil Code and Marriage Law or the Federated Republic 
of Germany § 27 (Simon L. Goren trans., Ian S. Forrester ed., 1976). 
135. Article 3 of the Hague ULIS simply provided that the parties were free "to exclude 
the application" of the Uniform Law "either entirely or partially." Hague ULIS, supra 
note 9, art. 3. 
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makes clear that the parties retain extensive power to "derogate 
from or vary the effect of any of [the Convention's] provisions." 
This language goes far beyond simply permitting the parties to 
exclude, by express reference, the application of specific provisions 
of the Convention. Rather, the Working Group reserved to the 
parties the power to "vary the effect" of the rules of CISG with the 
broader purpose of clarifying "the relationship of the agreement of 
the parties and particular provisions of the Uniform Law" in gen-
eral.136 By permitting the parties to "vary the effect of' the provi-
sions of the Convention, article 6 prescribes, namely, that the rules 
of the Convention are purely "background law." In the words of 
the Working Group, article 6 establishes, in short, that the express 
provisions of the Convention merely "are supplementary and yield 
to the agreement of the parties. "137 
Although this precept, too, may appear less than revolutionary, 
the drafting history makes clear that article 6 sets forth much more 
than a simple contract law truism. Rather, from the very beginning 
of the deliberations over the Convention the drafters saw the prin-
ciple of party autonomy as essential not only to effectuate the com-
mon intent of the parties but also, and of equal importance, to 
ensure flexibility in the development of the law governing interna-
tional commercial transactions. A study submitted to UNCITRAL 
in 1970 at the request of the Secretary-General forthrightly 
rejected suggestions138 that the drafting of the Convention ought to 
proceed from a premise of inflexible, mandatory principles not 
subject to modification by the contracting parties.139 Such an 
approach, the study concluded, "would frustrate the natural evolu-
tion of commercial practice to meet changing situations and new 
demands, and thereby impede the development of international 
136. Report on the Second Session, supra note 133, para. 46. 
137. Id.; see also Report of the Secretary-General: Pending Questions with Respect to 
the Revised Text of a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Annex Ill, para. 
45, U.N. Doc. NCN.9/100 (1975), reprinted in [1975] VI Y.B. U.N. Comm'n lnt'l '!fade L. 
92; Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 51 (article 6 prescribes that "the 
Convention applies only to the extent that no contrary intention of the parties can be 
established"). Article 4 of the CISG makes clear, however, that the parties' agreement is 
subject to domestic law on the validity of the contract or any of its provisions. See supra 
note 38; Farnsworth, Standard Forms, supra note 23, at 440-41. 
138. See Analysis of Comments and Proposals Relating to Articles 1-17 of the Uniform 
Law on International Sale of Goods (ULIS) 1964: Note by the Secretary-General, para. 
41, U.N. Doc. NCN.91WG.21WP.6 (1970), reprinted in [1971] II Y. B. U.N. Comm'n Int'l 
'!fade L. 43 (relating comments by the representative of Thnisia). 
139. Id. paras. 40-43 (commenting on a study prepared by the representative of the 
United Kingdom). 
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trade."140 Following these sentiments, the drafters had already 
reached a general consensus in that same year in favor of a flexible 
principle of party autonomy and thereby against a policy of restric-
tive mandatory provisions in the Convention.141 
The significance of the flexibility inherent in this "general princi-
ple of party autonomy"142 becomes apparent in a variety of more 
subtle, but equally important, policy determinations made in con-
nection with the adoption of article 6. First, and perhaps most sig-
nificant for present purposes, the preeminence of party autonomy 
applies not only to the power of the parties to shape their respec-
tive substantive rights and obligations as buyer and seller but also 
to their control of the contract formation process in the first 
instance. This conclusion follows directly from the location of arti-
cle 6 in Part I of the Convention, which sets forth those provisions 
that apply to both Part II (Formation of the Contract) and Part ill 
(Sale of Goods). Indeed, the drafters of the Convention had con-
cluded even at the earliest stages of the (then separate) "Formation 
Draft" that-although the language of the corresponding provision 
in that draft differed slightly from the present article 6143-the prin-
ciple of the primacy of party autonomy would apply with equal 
vigor to agreements affecting formation issues.144 Ultimately, the 
Working Group decided to conform the language of the Formation 
140. Id. para. 43; cf. Honnold, supra note 8, at 60-61 ("The Sales Convention must be 
read and applied in a manner that permits it to grow and adapt to novel circumstances and 
changing times."). 
141. See Report on the Second Session, supra note 133, paras. 4446; see also Secretariat 
Commentary, supra note 15, art 5, para. 1, Official Records, at 17 {'>The non-mandatory 
character of the Convention is explicitly stated in article [6] ••.. "). 
142. See Secretary-General Formation Report, supra note 82, art 2, ant. 2. 
143. In its Eighth Session in 1977 (the first relating specifically to formation issues) the 
Working Group agreed to the following language for the Formation Draft provision on 
party autonomy: 
(1) The parties may [agree to] exclude the application of the Convention. 
(2) Unless the Convention provides otherwise, the parties may [agree to] 
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions as may appear from the 
preliminary negotiations, the offer, the reply, the practices which the parties have 
established between themselves or usages widely known and regularly observed 
in international trade. 
(3) However, a term of the offer stipulating that silence shall amount to 
acceptance is invalid. 
See Report on the Eighth Session, supra note 132, paras. 21, 24-25, 29. With regard to the 
brackets around the words "agree to" in the first and second paragraphs, see infra note 
149. 
144. See id. n.132, para. 20 ("As to the extent to which particular [contract formation] 
rules could be excluded or modified by the parties, it was decided that the general principle 
should be that of [the] autonomy of the will of the parties."). 
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Draft to that of the Sales Draft.145 Upon consolidation of the two 
drafts in 1978, it thus adopted a single "party autonomy" provision 
(the present article 6) as a general principle applicable to all provi-
sions of the Convention.146 
The core policy determination that emerges from this compre-
hensive applicability of article 6 is that the Convention ensures 
flexibility in the formation of contractual relationships as well. 
One party cannot, of course, unilaterally impose contract formation 
rules on the other.147 The flexible principle of party autonomy 
embodied in article 6 nonetheless ensures that an agreement 
between the parties regarding their contractual relationship and 
how it comes into being will preempt any contrary rule set forth in 
Part II of the Convention.148 
The liberality of the Convention toward the autonomy of the 
parties is perhaps no more manifest than with respect to the man-
ner in which the parties may arrive at an agreement sufficient to 
"derogate from or vary the effect of'' its provisions. The drafting 
history of the Convention makes clear that there are no formal 
requirements for an effective agreement as contemplated by article 
6. That is, the modification of specific CISG rules need not be 
expressly agreed upon, but may arise solely by implication from the 
145. See Fonnation Deliberations, supra note 83, paras. 7, 11. 
146. See id. para. 16. The only provision expressly identified in article 6 as outside of the 
principle of party autonomy is article 12. That article provides that the general rule of 
article 11 (which dispenses with fonnal requirements for contract fonnation, see infra part 
III.A.4.) does not apply to parties with a place of business in a member state that has made 
a corresponding declaration pursuant to article 96 of the Convention. For emphasis, article 
12 also expressly provides that in such a case the parties "may not derogate from or vary 
the effect of this article." CISG, supra note 2, art. 12. 
147. See in this regard Fonnation Deliberations, supra note 83, at paras. 8-9, 11-16. 
148. The issue of the timing of such an agreement to deviate from the provisions of the 
Convention proved to be somewhat more troublesome in the drafting process. The draft 
of the party autonomy provision in the "Fonnation" draft prior to the consolidation with 
the "Sales" draft in 1978 seemed to indicate that the parties were required to "agree to" 
deviate from the Convention's fonnation provision prior to their negotiations over the 
substantive tenns of their contract. For the text of this draft provision, see supra note 143. 
The "agree to" language was, as the Secretary-General's report at the time observed, to a 
certain extent, superfluous, for "it is understood that an agreement is necessary." See 
Report of the Secretary-General: Incorporation of the Provisions of the Draft Convention 
on the Fonnation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods into the draft 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL OR, para. 35, U.N. Doc. N 
CN.9/145 (1978}, reprinted in [1978] IX Y .B. U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 123. 
Nonetheless, concern about an interpretation of article 6 that would require an express 
agreement between the parties led the Working Group to strike the words "agree to" upon 
the consolidation of the Fonnation and Sales drafts in 1978. See Fonnation Deliberations, 
supra note 84, para. 12. 
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conduct of the parties or otherwise as determined by the Conven-
tion's interpretive standards.149 Indeed, the drafters repeatedly 
rejected attempts during the drafting process to limit party auton-
omy to a corresponding express agreement between the parties.150 
A proposal by the Secretary-General to permit modification of the 
contract formation rules of the Convention only if the modification 
resulted in "more stringent" formation requirements likewise 
failed to find support in the drafting process.151 
The principle of party autonomy set forth in article 6, in short, 
makes clear that the provisions of the Convention-whether affect-
ing substantive rights and obligations or formation issues-func-
tion as mere background rules that yield to the common intent of 
the parties. Although this alone may be unsurprising, what is often 
overlooked in analyses of the Convention is the consequence of 
this policy determination. By giving effect even to implied modifi-
cations of its formation rules, the Convention broadly permits, 
indeed promotes, a flexible approach to the recognition and defini-
tion of contractual obligations in international sales transactions. 
Viewed in this light, article 6 will be of particular significance in 
149. See Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 55; see also CISG, supra note 2. 
art. 8 and infra part ill.A.2. For a discussion of "implied" agreements bet\'ieen the parties 
in the form of "established party practices" and usages of trade, see CISG, supra note 2. 
art. 9 and infra part III.A.3. Article 3 of the Hague ULIS expressly provided that the 
exclusion of uniform law "may be express or implied." Hague ULIS, supra note 9, art. 3. 
The drafters of the Convention refrained from including such express language in CISG as 
a cautionary signal to courts on the issue of an exclusion of the Convention in its entirety. 
In the words of the Secretary-General, the language was eliminated from CISG "lest the 
special reference to 'implied' exclusion might encourage courts to conclude, on insufficient 
grounds, that the Convention had been wholly excluded." See Secretariat Commentary, 
supra note 15, art. 5, para. 2, Official Records, at 17 (emphasis added). 
150. See Report of the Committee of the Whole I Relating to the Draft Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL OR, Annex I, paras. 56-57, U.N. Doc. A/32/ 
17 (1977), reprinted in [1977] VIII Y.B. U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 29. The deliberations 
at the Vienna Conference likewise make clear that article 6 (then numbered article 5) 
permits implied derogations from the provisions of the Convention. See First Committee 
Deliberations (4th Meeting), supra note 93, paras. 4-30, Official Records, at 248-50 
(rejecting various proposals to restrict party autonomy, including one by Pakistan to limit 
the principle to express agreements); see also Report of the Frrst Committee to the Plenary 
Conference, UNCITRAL OR, paras. 32-33, at 201, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/ll1Add. 1 and 2 
(comments by the representatives of Italy and Pakistan objecting that the final version of 
the Convention permits implied exclusions and derogations). 
151. In its eighth Session in 1977, the Working Group rejected a proposal by the 
Secretary-General which would have recognized party autonomy respecting contract 
formation issues only if the parties' agreement would have led "to the application of more 
stringent legal rules or more stringent agreed principles to determine whether a contract 
has been concluded." See Report on the Eighth Session, supra note 132. paras. 22. 29; see 
also Secretary-General Formation Report, supra note 82, art. 2, paras. 4-5. 
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resolving uncertainties created by gaps in the provisions of the 
Convention itself.152 The simple message of article 6 in such cases 
is that the principle of flexible party autonomy counsels against a 
rigid application of CISG's background rules and in favor of a flex-
ible analysis that proceeds from a primary goal of effectuating the 
common intent of the parties. 
2. Interpreting Intent 
Although article 6 establishes the principle of the preeminence 
of the common intent of the parties, it does not prescribe how that 
intent is to be identified. Article 8 fulfills that function. That is, as 
a complement to the principle of party autonomy article 8 sets 
forth the standards for interpreting the meaning of the declarations 
and conduct of the parties. We are instructed in this regard that 
the task of interpretation must begin with the premise that a 
party's actual intent is to be given effect. It is only if that intent 
cannot be determined that reference to more objective factors is 
appropriate. Such interpretive standards are naturally of necessity 
found in civil and common law systems alike.153 In its unique 
domain of interpreting the expressions of contracting parties from 
widely divergent cultures and legal traditions, however, article 8 
will play a particularly significant role in identifying and accommo-
dating the determinative common intent of the parties as contem-
plated by article 6. 
Article 8 applies broadly to all statements and conduct of rele-
vance under the Convention. The article's interpretive rules thus 
apply not only to the determination of the meaning of contractual 
terms but also to the interpretation of the declarations and conduct 
relevant to the formation of a contract in the first place.154 
The structure of article 8 defines a clear order of priority in the 
interpretation of such declarations and conduct. The primary test 
152. See infra part IV.B. 
153. See, e.g., Restatement (Second} of Contracts §§ 20(1}, 201(1) (1977); Eisenberg, 
supra note 111, at 1130-35. For an example of the approach in a civil law country, see, e.g., 
The German Civil Code §§ 134, 157 (Ian S. Forrester et al. trans., 1975} (hereinafter 
Forrester, German Civil Code]. 
154. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 24, para. 1, Official Records, at 18; 
Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra note 14, at 97-98. The standards of article 8 likewise 
govern all other declarations of intent contemplated by the Convention. Examples of such 
declarations include notifications of avoidance (article 26), notices that goods are defective 
(article 39), notices fixing deadlines for curing such defects (article 48), and notices that 
future performance will otherwise be interrupted (articles 68, 71, 72, 79, 88). See CISG, 
supra note 2. 
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for interpreting a party's expressions of intent is a subjective one. 
According to article 8(1), the statements and other conduct of a 
party "are to be interpreted according to [her] intent where the 
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent 
·was." In a substantial victory over the rigid objective tests of classi-
cal contract law ,!55 the focus of the primary rule of interpretation in 
paragraph (1) is, in other words, on the actual intent of the speaker 
or actor.156 This intent will govern where there is a common under-
standing between the parties of what that intent is, even if idiosyn-
cratic or otherwise inaccessible to third parties. To be sure, article 
8 continues the traditionalist presumption that a contract is the 
product of unilateral expressions of intent. 157 Where there is a 
mutually held subjective understanding between the parties, how-
ever, under the primary interpretive rule of article 8(1) that under-
standing will prevail.15S 
In the typical case, it may of course be a difficult task for a party 
to prove that the other party had actual knowledge of her unex-
pressed subjective intent. The more significant aspect of article 
8(1) thus may well be the latter half of its interpretive standard. 
This supplement to the "subjective" standard provides that the 
actual intent of the speaker or actor will govern if the other party 
"could not have been unaware" of that intent.159 The effect of this 
language is to bolster the significance of the actual intent of a 
speaker or actor in the interpretive values of the Convention in 
155. For a discussion of the strict objectivist approach of contract law in this country in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see infra note 205. 
156. 'fraditionalist representatives repeatedly attempted throughout the drafting process 
to subordinate the subjective test in paragraph (1) of article 8 to a rigid objective test (now 
in a more flexible, modified version in paragraph (2) of the article). See Summary Records 
of the 189th Meeting of the Working Group, UNCITRAL, 11th Sess., 189th plen. mtg. 
paras. 5-6, 8-9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR189 (1978); Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, 
paras. 32, 37-40; Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 58, para. 22 (rejecting a proposal 
to combine present paragraphs (1) and (2) of article 8 into a single objective standard). 
157. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art 7, para. 2, Official Records, at 18; 
Honnold, supra note 8, at 163. The original focus of article 8 was on the interpretation of 
the "common intent of the parties." See Report on the Eighth Session, supra note 132, 
paras. 155-68. In order to avoid confusion over which party's intent controlled in the event 
of a dispute, the Working Group decided at its Ninth Session to recast the article in terms 
of the "intent of a party." See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, para. 25; 
Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra note 14, at 96-97. 
158. This conclusion applies even if the actual common understanding of the parties is 
contrary to a "reasonable" interpretation of the statement or conduct at issue. See CISG 
Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 97; Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra 
note 14, at 98. The same rule applies in this country. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts§ 201(1) (1977). 
159. See CISG, supra note 2, art 8(1). 
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that it decreases the risk of false claims by the other party that she 
subjectively did not "know" what the speaker's actual intent was.160 
The fortification of the subjective standard thus has the effect of 
providing greater protection to the actual intent of the speaker 
where under the circumstances known to both parties the 
addressee of a statement or act could not fail to understand what 
was actually intended.161 
If the subjective standard of article 8(1) does not apply, the focus 
of interpretation switches to the understanding of a reasonable per-
son in the position of the addressee. In such a case, article 8(2) 
prescribes that the ambiguous statement or unclear conduct is to 
be interpreted "according to the understanding that a reasonable 
person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the 
same circumstances." 
It is important to observe at the outset that this form of objective 
interpretation does not impose a normative resolution. Article 
8(2) does not call upon a court or arbitral tribunal to decide what is 
the "better," "preferred" or even "normal" interpretation of an 
ambiguous statement or action. Indeed, the drafters of the provi-
sion specifically rejected proposals to subject ambiguous expres-
sions to the interpretation "usually" given them in the relevant 
branch of commerce.162 
Rather, the standard contemplated by article 8(2) remains 
squarely rooted in a factual analysis of what a reasonable person 
would have understood "in the same circumstances" as actually 
experienced by the addressee of the statement or action. By its 
nature the "objective" standard will admittedly require an adjudi-
cator to extend beyond the simple observable facts and apply the 
understanding of a "reasonable" person. However, as the dele-
gates to the Vienna Conference emphasized (by inserting in article 
160. CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 103-04; see also Fritz Enderlein 
& Dietrich Maskow, International Sales Law 63 (1992); CISG Kommentar (Junge), supra 
note 32, at 97 (Subjective intent will govern, even if the other party in fact misunderstood 
the expression used, if he "must actually have understood what was intended .••. "). 
161. See Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 160, at 63 ("When one party clearly expresses 
his intent through a legal act, the addressee cannot pretend to have insufficient knowledge 
of that intent."). 
162. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, paras. 44-46. Both the Hague 
ULIS and the Hague ULF prescribed an interpretation of common trade terms according 
to their "usual" interpretation in the trade concerned. See Hague ULIS, supra note 9, art. 
9(3); Hague ULF, supra note 8, art. 13(2). It was precisely this form of normative or 
detached objective interpretation that the drafters of the Convention rejected in the 
drafting process. See Honnold, supra note 8, at 165 n.8, 176. 
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8(2)-after much debate-the modifier "of the same kind as the 
other party"),l63 the viewpoint of this reasonable person is directly 
controlled by the specific circumstances of each particular case. 
That is, the "understanding" of this reasonable person will include 
knowledge of the prior dealings and prior negotiations of the par-
ties, the skill and expertise of the other party, etcetera. Even the 
subsidiary objective standard of article 8 thus affirms the signifi-
cance of actual intent in the interpretive values of the 
Convention.164 
The flexibility mandated by article 8 is reinforced by the scope of 
the factors that are to be considered in applying its interpretive 
standards. In a further rejection of the rigid evidentiary rules 
found in some legal systems, the third paragraph of article 8 pro-
vides that in applying the subjective as well as the objective stan-
dard "due consideration" must be given to "all relevant 
circumstances of the case. "165 The paragraph then specifically 
defines such circumstances to include "the negotiations, any prac-
tices which the parties have established between themselves, 
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties." To American 
jurists, this concept may not at first blush appear particularly chal-
lenging.166 There is more here than is initially apparent, however. 
The deliberations over this language in article 8(3) reveal a clear 
policy decision to promote a flexible analysis of all circumstances 
that would reflect on the intent of the parties-specifically includ-
163. The drafting history of this modifier to the standard of article 8(2) is somewhat of a 
mystery. At the Vienna Conference, the representative of Egypt proposed amending the 
paragraph to provide that the interpretation would be governed by the understanding of a 
"reasonable person acting in the same capacity." See Consideration by the FJISt 
Committee of the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 7(B)(3)(v), Official 
Records, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.l/L.43 (1981). In the course of the discussions of 
this proposal, the Danish representative suggested appending to this language the words 
"as the other party." The Official Records of the Convention indicate in one place that the 
Egyptian proposal was rejected and at another that it was accepted. Compare id. arts. 
7(B)(3)(v), 7(B)(7), Official Records, at 88 (stating that the proposed amendment was 
accepted) with FJISt Committee Deliberations (6th Meeting), supra note 93, para 42. 
Official Records, at 261, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.l/SR6 (stating that the amendment was 
rejected). Nonetheless, the proposal obviously was adopted and sent to a drafting 
committee, which revised the language to the present version of article 8(2). See CISG, 
supra note 2, art. 8(2}. 
164. I explore this conclusion in detail below. See infra notes 234-39 and accompanying 
text. 
165. CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(3). 
166. Under the U.C.C., usages of trade and courses of dealing and performance are 
likewise relevant in determining the meaning of contractual provisions. See U.C.C. §§ 1-
205(1)-(3}, 2-208(1} (1987); see also infra note 170. 
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ing perhaps the most indicative factor, the pre-contractual negotia-
tions of the parties167-and thereby to reject the rigid evidentiary 
rules of some legal systems that restrict inquiry into the actual 
intent of the parties.168 Here as well, the drafters of the Conven-
tion chose a policy of flexibility over static rules that would pre-
scribe a result detached from or in disregard of the actual intent of 
the parties. 
The ultimate message of article 8 thus is part principle and part 
emphasis. The basic principle established is the importance of flex-
ibility in the search for actual intent over the sterile objective stan-
dard applied in some legal systems. The emphasis provided by 
article 8 is on the importance of intent in a system of contract law 
constructed on the primacy of party autonomy. With its primary 
focus on the actual intent of the parties and its rejection of rigid 
rules in favor of flexible standards to define that intent, article 8 
serves to remind us that the traditional rules originally developed 
to guide the determination of intent in specific contract formation 
issues should not be applied in such an inflexible manner as to 
obscure the ultimate issue of what that intent is.169 
In contrast to such prescriptive or normative rules, the interac-
tion of the principles in article 8 and article 6 mandates that issues 
not addressed by the express provisions of the Convention are to 
be resolved with a primary focus on the actual intent of the parties 
where that intent can be determined or, of equal importance, 
where one party cannot reasonably be in doubt over the actual 
intent of the other. As discussed in Parts IV.A. and IV.B., these 
considerations will be of particular significance in interpreting the 
content of "contractual" relationships not formed in accordance 
with the lock-step process assumed in Part II of the Convention. 
3. The Role of Trade Usages and Established Practices 
The above analysis shows that the basic policy of the U.N. Sales 
Convention on issues of contract formation and content favors a 
flexible analysis over prescriptive rules. Article 9 of the Conven-
167. See CISG Kommentar (Junge), supra note 32, at 96. 
168. The drafting history of article 8(3) reveals that the drafters of the Convention were 
well aware of the parol evidence rule in this country (now in a more moderate form in 
U.C.C. § 2-202), as well as the hostility in some countries to the consideration of 
subsequent conduct in interpreting intent. See Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, 
para. 36; see also Honnold, supra note 8, at 171-72. 
169. This is precisely the point of Professor Eisenberg's article questioning the validity 
of many common law formation rules. See Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 1148-80. 
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tion carries forward-and reinforces-this approach on perhaps 
the most controversial issue in the drafting of the Convention, the 
application of trade usages and party practices. 
There was little disagreement in the drafting process over the 
treatment of express agreements between the parties to be bound 
to particular commercial usages or practices. Pursuant to article 
9(1 ), the parties are bound by "any usage to which they have 
agreed," as well as "any practices which they have established 
between themselves." This largely uncontroversial conclusion is 
common to numerous legal systems170 and arguably is merely a 
specific reflection of the general principle of party autonomy set 
forth in article 6.171 
The more significant issue for purposes of divining the core val-
ues of the Convention is the treatment of commercial usages not 
expressly agreed to by the parties. The direct antecedent of article 
9 of the U.N. Sales Convention, article 9(2) of the Hague ULIS, 
prescribed a purely normative approach on this issue. Under the 
second paragraph of that article, the parties are deemed bound by 
usages that "reasonable persons" in the same circumstances "usu-
ally consider to be applicable to their contract. ''172 This approach 
thus permitted the inclusion of contractual terms even without the 
knowledge or consent of the parties. As a result, it provided fertile 
ground for criticism in the drafting of the Convention. The then-
socialist countries and the developing world, in particular, strenu-
ously objected to the application of normative trade usages that, in 
170. 'frade usages and "courses of dealing" also fonn essential elements of the contract 
fonnation and interpretation scheme of the Unifonn Commercial Code. The very 
definition of "agreement" in § 1-201{3) {upon which tenn "contract" is based, see U.C.C. 
§ 1-201(11) {1987)) embraces, inter alia, courses of dealing and usages of trade. U.C.C. § 1-
201{3). Similarly, § 1-205(3) prescribes that courses of dealing and usages of trade "give 
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement" "Unless 
carefully negated" under the U.C.C.'s parol evidence rule, see § 2-202 cmt 2. a course of 
dealing or usage of trade may "explain[] or supplement[]" even the terms of a fully 
integrated agreement § 2-202. Similar principles are also to be found in other legal 
systems. See, e.g., Forrester, Gennan Civil Code, supra note 153, § 362. 
171. See Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 107. An issue that may prove to 
be somewhat more contentious than express agreements on usages was that or the 
applicability of "practices" implied merely from the conduct or the parties. Here, too, the 
interpretive standards of article 8 will provide the governing guidelines. 
172. Hague UUS, supra note 9, arL 9(2) (emphasis added); see also Hague ULF, supra 
note 8, arL 13{2). For a comparative analysis of the Hague Conventions and the U.N. Sales 
Convention on the treatment of trade usages, see Muna Ndulo, The Vienna Sales 
Convention 1980 and the Hague Unifonn Laws on International Sale of Goods 1964: A 
Comparative Analysis, 38 lnt'l & Comp. L.Q. 1, 9-10 {1989). 
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their view, had been established solely to promote the interests of 
parties from industrialized, western states.173 
In contrast to the Hague ULIS, the compromise adopted in the 
drafting process for the U.N. Sales Convention resulted-after 
much heated debate-in a clear rejection of a purely normative 
approach.174 In its place, article 9 reaffirms the core value of the 
Convention that parties become bound to contractual terms only 
through corresponding express or implied declarations of intent.175 
Article 9(2) thus provides a rule that focuses on the intent that can 
fairly be implied as to specific trade usages: The parties are "con-
sidered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applica-
ble to their contract or its formation" those usages meeting certain 
defined criteria. In delineating those criteria, article 9(2) initially 
states that the parties are bound to usages of which they either 
knew or "ought to have known." It then sets forth, however, a 
series of strict, independent requirements,176 the sum effect of 
which is that usages will apply in a particular transaction only 
where the circumstances permit a conclusion that there is a corre-
sponding actual intent of the parties.177 
173. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Developing International 'Ii"ade Law, 9 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 
461, 465-66 (1979); Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal 'Ii"aditions in the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 Int'l Law. 443, 477-80 
(1989); Note, Unification and Certainty: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1984, 1989-90 (1984). 
174. The drafters of the Convention specifically rejected attempts of traditionalists to 
subject ambiguous expressions to the normative interpretation of that "usually" given 
them in the relevant branch of commerce. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, 
paras. 44-46; Honnold, supra note 8, at 165 n.8, 176. 
175. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 8, paras. 2, 5, Official Records, at 
19 ("By the combined effect of paragraphs (1) and (2), usages to which the parties have 
agreed, are binding on them. The agreement may be express or it may be implied .••. 
[U]sages which become binding on the parties do so only because they have been explicitly 
or implicitly incorporated into the contract .... ") (emphasis added). 
176. Under article 9(2) of the CISG a trade usage is binding on the parties by 
implication only where (1) in international (not merely national or even regional) trade, 
and (2) it is "widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type 
involved in the particular trade concerned." CISG, supra note 2, art. 9(2). 
177. Viewed in this light, article 9 in effect merely defines standards for interpreting 
intent that are similar to those in article 8, but are more closely tailored to the implied 
inclusion of commercial usages. Where the intent of the parties on the applicability of a 
particular usage is clear, that intent will govern pursuant to article 9(1). Compare art. 9(1) 
(parties bound by usages to which they have agreed) with art. 8(1) (statements and conduct 
of parties are to be interpreted in light of the intent of the actor). Where that intent is not 
clear, however, the import of the statements and conduct of the parties will be judged by 
standards of reasonableness. See art. 8(2) (Where intent is unclear, statements and 
conduct of parties are "to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable 
person ... would have had in the same circumstances."). These inquiries must take into 
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Ultimately, the rules of the Convention on the applicability of 
trade usages, like the general interpretive standards of article 8, are 
properly viewed as more specific expressions of the fundamental 
principle set forth in article 6 of the preeminence of party auton-
omy. Where there is a common understanding between the parties 
on the applicability of a particular usage, whether express or rea-
sonably implied from the circumstances, article 6 mandates that 
that understanding supersede even the express rules of the Con-
vention.178 Indeed, attempts to subordinate trade usages implied 
· pursuant to article 9(2) to conflicting provisions of the Convention 
were specifically rejected in the drafting process.179 As a result of 
the acceptance of an amendment to article 9(2) proposed by Pro-
fessor Farnsworth of the U.S. delegation,180 even usages affecting 
issues of contract formation will preempt the corresponding forma-
tion rules of the Convention.181 
4. Proving the Common Intent 
As the above examination of the core values of the U.N. Sales 
Convention reveals, article 6 establishes, and articles 8 and 9 rein-
force and apply, a basic, flexible principle of party autonomy. Arti-
cle 11 of the Convention serves to complete the circle. Whereas 
those former provisions set forth flexible standards for establishing 
and interpreting the common intent of the parties, article 11 man-
dates a flexible approach in proving that intent. 
The principle established by article 11 is a simple one: "A con-
tract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and 
is not subject to any other requirement as to form." The obvious 
account "all relevant circumstances," including usages and established practices. Art. 8(3). 
In the context of trade usages, article 9(2) likewise gives effect to the intent of the parties 
reasonably implied under the circumstances, and provides more specific guidelines for 
resolving that issue. See Honnold, supra note 8, at 178-79; Wey, supra note 46, at 71-72; 
Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 107. 
178. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 8, para. 5, Official Records, at 19 
(usages applicable pursuant to article 9 "will be applied rather than conflicting provisions 
of this Convention on the principle of party autonomy"); CISG Kommentar (Junge), supra 
note 32, at 101; Stephen Bainbridge, Note, 'frade Usages in International Sales of Goods: 
An Analysis of the 1964 and 1980 Sales Conventions, 24 Va. J. Int'l L. 619, 661 (1984). 
179. See Frrst Committee Deliberations (6th Meeting), supra note 93, paras. 71-82. 
Official Records, at 263-64 (rejecting the proposal of the Czechoslovak delegation); 
Schlechtriem, UN-Kaufrecht. supra note 106, at 28. 
180. See Frrst Committee Deliberations {7th Meeting), supra note 93, paras. 1-8, Official 
Records, at 265. 
181. See Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 104 (also noting that this 
conclusion flows from the location of article 9 in Part I of the Convention, which applies to 
both Part ll (Contract Formation) and Part ill (Sale of Goods)). 
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targets of this rule are form requirements prescribed by some 
domestic laws (such as the Statute ofFrauds)182 for the enforceabil-
ity of certain types of contracts. The drafters of the Convention 
could hardly have been clearer on this score: Contracts within the 
sphere of applicability of CISG are not subject to any requirement 
as to form.183 Indeed, to emphasize the point, the drafters 
appended a second sentence clarifying that this principle extends 
with equal vigor to form requirements cloaked as evidentiary rules. 
Accordingly, a contract of sale "may be proved by any means, 
including witnesses. "184 
Here, again, the basic policy that emerges is the promotion of 
the freedom of the parties to structure their contractual relation-
ship in a flexible manner unimpeded by prescriptive rules. In a 
clear recognition of the particular significance of flexibility for 
international commercial transactions, 185 article 11 accomplishes 
this objective by renouncing all form requirements for the conclu-
sion and proof of sales contracts. By so reaffirming the power of 
the parties to define for themselves the manner by which they 
arrive at a contractual understanding, article 11 both reflects and 
reinforces the Convention's basic principle of the primacy of the 
common intent of the parties.186 
The policy of flexibility promoted in article 11 is a broad one 
indeed. The freedom of the parties from form requirements 
applies not only to the fact of the conclusion of the contract, but 
182. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (1987). 
183. Article 12 provides that the provisions of article 11 shall not apply where a party 
has a place of business in a contracting state that has made a corresponding declaration 
(via article 96). CISG, supra note 2, art. 12. Only a very small number of States 
(principally former republics of the Soviet Union, and not the United States) have made 
such a declaration. See Status of Conventions, supra note 3, at 7. 
184. In adopting this language, the drafters rejected arguments that the rules of the 
Convention should not spill over into the law of evidence. Instead, the drafters clearly saw 
the principle set forth in the second sentence of article 11 as necessary to promote the 
broader goal of ensuring flexibility in international commercial transactions. See 
Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, paras. 20-22. 
185. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 10, para. 2, Official Records, at 20 
("The inclusion of article [11] in the Convention was based on the fact that many contracts 
for the international sale of goods are concluded by modern means of communication 
which do not always involve a written contract."); CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra 
note 32, at 110. 
186. In the context of form requirements, this precept has variously been described as 
the "theory of consensualism," Bianca & Bonell (Rajski), supra note 14, at 122, and "the 
principle of freedom of form." See CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 
109-10 ("der Grundsatz der Formfreiheit"). 
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also to proof of its contents.187 The article permits a party to prove, 
"by any means, including witnesses," even an oral or other infor-
mal agreement that conflicts with express provisions of the Con-
vention itself. This policy of flexibility is mirrored by the rule in 
article 29(1) of the Convention that even written contracts can be 
modified by "mere agreement" of the parties.188 In this respect, 
article 11 (as bolstered by article 29(1)) reinforces the principle of 
party autonomy of article 6 in a particular way, because it sweeps 
away the formal impediments to the proof of the requisite common 
intent of the parties to "derogate from or vary the effect or• the 
provisions of the Convention. 
The impact of article 11 may be most profound with respect to 
the process of contract formation. By broadly abolishing the 
restrictions on the proof of both the fact and the content of sales 
contracts, article 11 supplies the conceptual tools for proving the 
existence of a contract concluded in a manner that deviates from 
the process assumptions defined in Part II of the Convention. 
Thus, significantly, where the parties arrive at a contractual under-
standing other than through a formal "offer" and a formal "accept-
ance," article 11, in conjunction with article 6, permits an 
adjudicator to give effect to such a contract.189 Indeed, the lan-
guage of article 11 reflects an intentional deviation from the word-
ing of its antecedent in the Hague ULF-which phrased the 
principle in terms of the proof of the "offer" and the "accept-
ance"190-thus embracing contracts formed through protracted 
negotiations or other informal statements and conduct where the 
expressions of intent of the parties cannot be parsed into an offer 
and its unqualified acceptance.191 
187. See CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 110-12. 
188. Article 29{2) does, however, give effect to a contractual provision requiring that 
contractual modifications be in writing, but states that a party may be precluded by her 
conduct from relying on such a provision if the other party has relied on such conduct. 
189. See CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 111; Bianca & Bonell 
(Rajski), supra note 14, at 121. 
190. Hague ULF, supra note 8, art. 3 ("An offer or an acceptance need not be evidenced 
by writing and shall not be subject to any other requirement as to form."); see also Hague 
ULIS, supra note 9, art. 15. 
191. See Bianca & Bonell (Rajski), supra note 14, at 121; see also sources cited infra 
note 340 (observing that the Convention embraces contracts formed in a manner other 
than via an offer and acceptance). 
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5. The Hierarchy of Norms of the Convention 
Through the identification of its core principles in articles 6, 8, 9, 
and 11, the U.N. Sales Convention defines a straightforward hier-
archy of norms for the conclusion and content of international 
sales contracts. It should now be clear that the preeminent princi-
ple of the Convention is the primacy of the common intent of the 
parties ("party autonomy"). In recognition of the importance of 
flexibility in international commercial transactions, articles 8 and 
11 then make clear that this common intent may be express or 
implied and, freed from the strictures of formality, may be proved 
by any means. Next in line of priority come usages of trade and 
party practices. These are on equal footing with party autonomy if 
expressly agreed, but of subordinate importance if their applicabil-
ity arises only by implication under article 9(2). It is only then, if 
no express or implied agreement of the parties is established, that 
resort may be had to the express provisions in Parts II and III of 
the Convention. 
It is equally important in the context of the role of party auton-
omy under the Convention to emphasize the converse of this latter 
statement. The express substantive provisions of the Convention 
themselves represent important values in its hierarchy of norms. 
After more than ten years of drafting work and a multitude of sig-
nificant compromises to accommodate the divergent interests rep-
resented in the process, the drafters settled upon certain value 
judgments about the appropriate relationship between the parties 
to an international sales contract, in particular about the appropri-
ate allocation of benefits and burdens between buyer and seller. 
The important negative implication that emerges from the preemi-
nence of party autonomy in article 6 is that these important value 
judgments should be displaced only where a party can establish a 
contrary, common intent of the parties.192 
B. The "Formation Values" of the Convention 
As the initial foundation for an analysis of the treatment of par-
tial dissensus under the U.N. Sales Convention, the discussion 
above has, in accordance with the mandate of article 7(2), identi-
fied and examined the relevant "general principles" on which the 
Convention is based. Like the parts of a disassembled machine, 
192. I explore the implications of this observation in notes 295 and 327-28 and 
accompanying text. 
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however, the principles in articles 6, 8, 9, and 11 fail to explain fully 
the essence of the Convention's contract formation scheme. The 
question left unanswered is whether those "general principles" can 
be distilled into a unifying set of values that underlie the recogni-
tion and enforcement of contractual obligations under the Conven-
tion, which I will refer to here as its "formation values." 
As is often the case in such inquiries, it is much easier as an 
initial matter to identify the grounds for enforcing promises that 
are not of significance in the formation values of the Convention 
than it is to divine a unifying theme for the nature of contractual 
obligation under its formation scheme. One such set of values that 
is not implicated in the Convention's formation scheme is a purely 
normative approach to the definition of contractual obligation193 
(whether on the basis of idealized norms or in the form of extant 
societal norms).194 The drafters of the Convention repeatedly 
rejected proposals in the drafting process that would have permit-
ted normative assessments of contractual relationships and their 
193. A number of modem U.S. scholars find the moral justification for contractual 
obligations outside of liberal notions of pure individual autonomy. At their most extreme, 
some proponents of this normative approach have argued that requirements of 
communitarian justice mandate that adjudicators evaluate the substantive fa/mess of the 
contractual exchange. See, e.g., James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 547, 
548 (1995). More commonly, the focus of these scholars has been on the more general 
normative role of contract law, specifically on a deeper understanding of the social (as 
opposed to individual) context of the institution of contract With contract viewed as a 
social institution, the contours of its obligations may thus fairly be defined by and/or 
supplemented with "socially extant expectations of fairness or reasonableness," Chamy, 
supra note 126, at 1836, or "minimum standards of decency and fairness," Braucher, supra 
note 126, at 732. In a broader sense, these scholars argue that embedded societal values or 
norms assume a positive role in recognizing contractual obligation, in that they set the 
context both for interpreting the meaning of promissory expressions and conduct and for 
filling gaps in the express agreement of the parties. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and 
Default Rules, 3 S. Cal.lnterdisc. LJ. 59, 69-73 (1993); Braucher, supra note 126, at 732-38. 
Indeed, this is one of the major premises of the flexible "relational theory of contract" 
advocated principally by Professor Ian MacNeil. See MacNeil, Relational Contract, supra 
note 110, at 485-93 (discussing the role of social norms in structuring "contractual" 
relationships); MacNeil, Many Futures, supra note 110, at 731 {discussing "non-promissory 
accompaniments of promise"); see also Salbu, supra note 110, at 1293-1304. 
194. At a certain level, of course, all individuals are influenced by the norms of their 
community. The more significant issue when we speak of the "expectations" of 
reasonableness and fairness that arise in the community context, therefore, is how the 
relevant "context" is delineated. The spectrum of possibilities here is a broad one: Does 
the legal system prefer to further idealize community standards of fairness and 
reasonableness over the extant ones? On a separate but related track, is an adjudicator to 
apply broad-based societal expectations or instead focus on the expectations that arise in 
particular circumstances at issue? I examine these issues in notes 220-29 and 
accompanying text 
HeinOnline -- 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 54 1996-1997
54 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:1 
creation. The lively debate over the role of trade usages, 195 for 
instance, was resolved in favor of a clear rejection of the purely 
normative approach of the Hague Conventions.196 This rejection 
of normative trade usages also carried with it a refusal to grant 
broad effectiveness to the contents of a written confirmation of a 
previously concluded contract based on normative considerations 
of a duty on the part of merchants to object to proposed terms.197 
Indeed, the drafters were even unable to agree on the precise 
role of "good faith" in the conclusion and performance of con-
tracts.198 The records of the drafting process reveal that the 
national representatives were unable to achieve a consensus on 
such a norm precisely because of their concerns about the widely 
differing conceptions of "good faith" among the various legal and 
cultural traditions represented in the creation of the Convention.199 
In the interests of uniformity in application, therefore, the drafters 
adopted a compromise which deleted a provision in early drafts 
that would have imposed such an obligation on the parties in the 
formation process;200 in its place the drafters inserted a clause 
195. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. 
196. To be sure, article 9(2) provides that the parties are considered to have "impliedly" 
agreed upon trade usages of which, inter alia, they "ought to have known." This standard 
is, however, substantially limited by the subsequent language of article 9(2), which limits 
the scope of the provision to usages that "in international trade [are] widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade 
concerned." For more detail on this issue, see supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text. 
197. As a result of the insistence of the German delegation, the Hague ULF in principle 
gave effect to the terms proposed in a written confirmation of a contract based on the 
recognition of a corresponding normative trade usage. See Schlechtriem, UN-Kaufrecht, 
supra note 106, at 44; Ernst von Caemmerer, Die Haager Konferenz Uber die 
internationale Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts, 29 Rabelszeitung 101, 125-26 (1965). The 
significant limitation of the scope of trade usages in article 9 of CISG, among other things, 
clearly amounted to a rejection of this approach to the treatment of written confirmations. 
See CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 124. The drafters of CISG 
likewise rejected attempts to give automatic effect to non-material terms in such 
confirmations in the absence of an objection by the other party. See Report on the Eighth 
Session, supra note 132, paras. 104-13; Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, para. 
228 (deleting a corresponding provision because "it was generally considered that any 
modifications to the contract after its conclusion should require agreement of the parties in 
accordance with [article 29]"). 
198. See Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, paras. 42-60. 
199. ld. paras. 44-45 (noting the argument of opponents of a general "good faith" article 
that "the development of a coherent body of case law was unlikely to take place, as 
national courts would be influenced by their own legal and social traditions in applying the 
article to individual cases"); see also Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 69. 
200. See Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, para. 42. The drafters likewise 
rejected attempts to subject ambiguous contractual expressions to a normative 
interpretation. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, paras. 44-46. 
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merely requiring that in the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Convention, "regard is to be had to . . . the observance of good 
faith in international trade. "201 
Ultimately, the drafters of the Convention determined to avoid 
many normative issues by carving from the scope of the Conven-
tion those issues that typically underlie the concerns of communi-
tarian theorists. Most significant, pursuant to article 2 the 
Convention does not apply to transactions with consumers.202 In 
addition, the drafters left room for contracting states to apply 
national public policy principles relating to the "validity" of con-
tracts, such as rules on incapacity and infancy.203 In this way, adju-
dicators are permitted to address issues of "unconscionability" and 
related concepts outside of the Convention.204 
Identifying the role of individual autonomy205 in creating con-
tractual obligations under the Convention presents a more chal-
201. CISG, supra note 2, art. 7(1). Although the rationale underlying a rejection of a 
general obligation of good faith is clear, the practical result of this compromise is less so. 
Compare E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the 
UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions and National Lav;s, 3 Thl. J. 
Int'l & Comp. L. 47, 55-57 (1995) (arguing that national courts can nonetheless apply 
domestic notions of good faith); Bianca & Bonell (Bonell), supra note 14, at 84-85 (arguing 
that the principle of good faith is implied in contracts governed by CISG in light of article 
7(1)); Amy H. Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United 
Nations Sales Convention, 8 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 574, 597-98 (1988) (same); Peter 
Wmship, Commentary on Professor Kastely's RhetoriCLZI Analysis, 8 Nw. J. Int'J L. & Bus. 
623, 631 (1988) (observing in response to Professor Kastely that "the reference to 'good 
faith' is limited to interpreting the Convention" but acknowledging the likelihood that 
"over time a general obligation on the contracting parties to act in good faith will be 
accepted"); and Gyula EOrsi, A Propos the 1980 Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 31 Am. J. Comp. L. 333, 349 (1983) (staling that the 
compromise "bur[ies] the principle of good faith"); Honnold, supra note 8, at 46 (observing 
that the drafters "decided that a 'good faith' provision should not be ••• imposed loosely 
and at large, but should be restricted to a principle for interpreting the provisions of the 
Convention"). 
202. CISG, supra note 2, art. 2(a) ("This Convention does not apply to sales: (a) of 
goods bought for personal family or household use •••. "). 
203. Id. art. 4(a). For a detailed analysis of this "validity exception," see Hartnell, supra 
note 14. 
204. Honnold, supra note 8, at 312-13; CISG Kommentar (Herber), supra note 32, at 71; 
id. (Schlechtriem) at 127 (applicability of national rules on "surprising clauses" in standard 
forms). 
205. Under the traditional view in the United States, the moral ground for enforcing 
contractual obligations arises from notions of individual freedom and autonomy, 
specifically from the consent of the parties. Over the course of the development of the 
common law, however, the significance of such notions of individual autonomy bas varied. 
Under the analytically purest form of these various "autonomy-based theories," the so-
called "will" theory of contract, the moral ground for enforcing promises is to be found 
solely in the actual, or subjective, will of the parties. See Charles Fried, Contract as 
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lenging and for present purposes more significant task. Notions of 
individual autonomy may have little to offer in determining the 
content of the "background" law that serves to fill gaps in extant 
contractual relations. As Richard Craswell has observed, because 
the principle of individual autonomy is essentially content neutral, 
and because the law imposes no compulsion to conclude contracts, 
"any default rule would ... be consistent with individual freedom, 
as long as the parties are allowed to change the rule by appropriate 
language. "206 
The value of individual autonomy in recognizing contractual 
obligation may be of controlling significance, however, in defining 
the process by which the parties must reach agreement sufficient to 
displace such substantive background rules, whatever their con-
tent.207 The choice of the appropriate rules governing how parties 
become bound in the first instance (the "agreement rules") will be 
Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 2-3, 14-17 (1981); see also Barnett, Consent 
Theory, supra note 126, at 271-74 (arguing that the "will" theory of contracts is frequently 
subverted to satisfy reliance interests); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. 
L. Rev. 553, 574-76 (1933) (explaining the "will" theory and its conflict with classical 
theory). The response of classical (late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century) contract 
law to concerns about the ability to divine subjective intent was an equally rigid adherence 
to a purely objective view of contract obligation. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Common Law 242 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) ("The law has nothing to do with the actual 
state of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge 
parties by their conduct."); see also Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293-94 
(S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913) ("A contract has, 
strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties."). 
Modern contract law in this country has retreated, at least in part, from such rigidity in 
the interpretation of intent by incorporating elements of both subjective intent and 
objective meaning. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 20, 201 (1979); Eisenberg, 
supra note 111, at 1130-35 (comparing modern contract law principles of interpretation 
with classical principles). Under this modern approach, the subjective intent of a party in 
making a promise will prevail if the other party attaches the same meaning to that promise. 
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(1). Similarly, even if the parties attach 
different meanings to a promise of one of them, the subjective intent of the promisor will 
prevail if the other party knew or had reason to know of that subjective intent. See id. 
§ 201(2)(a), (b). It is only if the parties fail to achieve a common subjective understanding 
that the meaning of their expressions and conduct will be determined by objective criteria. 
See id. § 201(2)(c). Barnett espouses a variant of the approach of modern contract law. 
See generally Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 126; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of 
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821 (1992) (advocating a 
"consent theory of contract" under which the moral ground for enforcing promises arises 
from a manifestation of an intent to alienate property rights). 
206. Craswell, Default Rules, supra note 121, at 515; cf. Braucher, supra note 127, at 
703-6 (questioning the role of consent in defining the appropriate substantive background 
law). 
207. See Craswell, Default Rules, supra note 121, at 514-15 (explaining the content 
neutrality of autonomy-based theories). 
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guided decisively by the extent to which the enforcement of con-
tractual obligations requires actual consent (that is, is controlled by 
notions of individual autonomy). An identification of the appro-
priate "agreement rule" for the treatment of a partial dissensus 
under the U.N. Sales Convention must therefore include an assess-
ment of the significance of individual autonomy in the values that 
underlie its formation scheme.208 
At a theoretical level, we have seen from the above examination 
of the basic principles of contract formation209 that the Convention 
conceives of a contract as a conformity between the declarations of 
intent of the parties. In accordance with traditional conceptions, an 
essential element of both offer and acceptance under CISG is that 
they reflect an intent to bind oneself to contractual obligations.210 
As the Convention imposes no duty to engage in "contractual" 
behavior, the journey to a conclusion that individual autonomy is 
the primary guiding value in recognizing contractual obligation 
would appear to be a short one. 
Upon further examination, however, one confronts in the CISG 
the same tension found in other legal systems between "intent" in 
its purest, subjective form and the interactive, social nature of the 
institution of contract.211 If one merely scratches the surface of 
CISG's provisions, it becomes apparent that the focus is not on 
intent alone but rather on the expressions of that intent.212 It 
would appear, therefore, that the salient characteristic of the 
accepted constitutive elements of a contract is not that the parties 
in fact intend to bind themselves with the expressions used, but 
rather that the expressions merely "indicate" that such an intent 
exists.213 This fact has led some European commentators to 
208. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra part II.B. 
210. CISG, supra note 2, art. 14(1) (offer must reflect "the intention of the offeror to be 
bound"), art. 18(1) (acceptance must indicate "assent"). 
211. A contract is a social institution because, by its very nature, it requires interaction 
between two (or more) legal entities. That is not to say that the institution of contract 
necessarily requires an interpretation of the declarations of the parties with reference to 
broad societal norms. Whether such communitarian values in fact play a role in the 
interpretive values of the U.N. Sales Convention is addressed below. See infra notes 220-
29 and accompanying text. 
212. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 17, para. 2, Official Records, at 24 
("[C]ontractual obligations arise out of expressions of mutual agreement.") (emphasis 
added). 
213. See CISG, supra note 2, arts. 14(1),18(2). Moreover, article 4 carefully carves from 
the scope of the Convention those issues of subjective assent (such as incapacity, fraud, 
mistake, and infancy) that touch on the validity of that assent. See CISG Kommentar 
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observe as a general proposition that the Convention is concerned 
only with the "external consensus"214 of the parties, or in other 
words "the externally perceivable convergence of offer and 
acceptance. "215 
In light of this tension between the role of subjective intent and 
the necessity of evaluating "contractual" expressions by external 
criteria, the interpretive provisions of article 8 will assume decisive 
significance in resolving the central inquiry into the formation val-
ues of the Convention. The core values that emerge from these 
provisions are perhaps best illustrated by their simple hierarchy of 
interpretive standards. In spite of vigorous attempts by traditional-
ists to adopt a strict objective approach,216 the primary rule of 
interpretation under article 8 is that a party's subjective intent must 
be given effect if the other party knew or "could not have been 
unaware" of that intent.217 
An analysis of article 8 and its role in the CISG formation 
scheme reveals, moreover, that even under the subsidiary objective 
standard of article 8(2) the goal remains to identify and give effect 
to the actual intent of the parties. To be sure, the language of arti-
cle 8(2), taken alone, does not refer to actual intent; the subject of 
the interpretive inquiry there is, rather, the "understanding" of a 
"reasonable person." In the context of contract formation, how-
ever, the critical "understanding" relates directly to the intent of 
the speaker or actor. In determining whether a statement or con-
duct has effectively concluded a contract, the essential interpretive 
issue is whether a "reasonable person" would understand the state-
ment or conduct as "indicating assent"218 to the assumption of con-
tractual obligations on the basis of the terms proposed by the other 
(Herber}, supra note 32, at 71; Honnold, supra note 8, at 114-15 (observing that the 
Convention does not govern cases of fraud). 
214. CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 122; Piltz, Kaufrecht, supra 
note 128, at 71. 
215. Piltz, Kaufrecht, supra note 128, at 71 ("[das] auj3erlich wahrnehmbare 
Zusammenfinden von Vertragsangebot und Vertragsannahme"). 
216. See supra note 156; Summary Record of the 189th Meeting of the Working Group, 
UNCITRAL, 11th Sess., 189th plen. mtg. paras. 5-9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.189 (1978). In 
rejecting an attempt to subordinate the subjective standard to the objective standard, see 
Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, paras. 32, 37-40, proponents of the present version 
of article 8 noted: "In establishing the existence of a contract the primary concern must be 
the subjective intent of the parties." Id. para. 34. 
217. For a more detailed discussion of the structure of article 8, see supra part III.A.2. 
218. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(1}; see also supra notes 59-69 and accompanying 
text. 
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party. The focus of the interpretive inquiry in this context remains, 
therefore, the actual intent of the speaker or actor.219 
This conclusion is confirmed by the nature of the objective stan-
dard of article 8(2) itself. As with all such "objective" rules, article 
8(2) necessarily implies a normative component, for the standard 
to be applied is the understanding of a "reasonable" person. This 
on the one hand makes clear that the effectuation of subjective 
intent alone is not the sole formation value of the Convention. 
Separated from its interpretive context, however, the adjective 
"reasonable" tells us little about the relative significance of this 
normative component as compared to the role of the specific fac-
tual circumstances in which the relevant expression is made. 
In the context of default rules, David Charny has appropriately 
termed these dimensions of interpretive standards "idealization" 
and "generality."220 "Generality" relates to the importance of 
interpretation in its strictest sense, that is, to "the extent to which 
the adjudicator particularizes her formulation to the particular 
transactors whose dispute is before her." As the subject of inter-
pretation switches from the individual to the group of which she is 
a member, the role of normative considerations increases. "Ideal-
ization," on the other hand, will expose the degree to which values 
other than the effectuation of the intent of the parties are of signifi-
cance in the interpretive inquiry.221 Here, the extent to which an 
adjudicator may prefer the "better" or "fairer" interpretation will 
define the importance of the normative component of an objective 
standard. Where the rules of a particular legal system fall on these 
dual spectra222-generality vs. particularization, interpretation of 
219. Where, in contrast to an inaccurate interpretation of the legal effect of an 
expression intentionally used, a party unintentionally uses a mistaken expression (for 
example, $5,000 instead of $50,000), the possibility arises that the speaker can avoid the 
contract based on the doctrine of mistake. As an issue of the "vaaidity" of a contract, 
whether a party may do so is excluded from the scope of the Convention by article 4 in 
favor of the otherwise-applicable national law governing mistake. See Bianca & Bonell 
(Farnsworth}, supra note 14, at 103. 
220. Chamy, supra note 126, at 1820. 
221. Id. at 1820-21. 
222. "Generality" and "idealization" do not represent opposite ends of the same 
spectrum but rather independent dimensions of an interpretive scheme. A S}'Stem can, for 
example, be both highly generalized (that is, identify as the relevant subject of 
interpretation the broad group of which the actors are members) and highly idealized (that 
is, apply the "best" or "fairest" norms applicable to that group). 
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intent vs. application of societal norms-will reveal a significant 
amount about the values that underlie its interpretive scheme.223 
Even a cursory examination of article 8 reveals that the "objec-
tive" standard of its second paragraph falls squarely on both the 
most particularized and least idealized ends of these spectra. The 
drafters made clear that the analysis of the understanding of a rea-
sonable person must proceed on the basis of the specific circum-
stances actually experienced by the addressee of the relevant 
statement or action.224 In doing so, the drafters rejected attempts 
of traditionalists to subject ambiguous expressions to a more nor-
mative interpretation, specifically the interpretation "usually" 
given these expressions in the relevant branch of commerce.225 
Even as late as the final conference in Vienna, the delegates con-
tinued to refine the importance of a particularized and non-ideal-
ized interpretation. Modernist delegates succeeded, over vigorous 
objection, in inserting a modifier in article 8(2) to make clear that 
the perspective of the relevant "reasonable person" was to be 
determined with specific reference to the position of the actual 
addressee-with knowledge of the prior dealings and prior negoti-
ations of the parties, the skill and expertise of the other party, et 
cetera-as opposed to an idealized reasonable person in the rele-
vant branch of commerce in general.226 
The final paragraph of article 8 reinforces this situation-specific 
form of "objective" interpretation by mandating effectively 
unrestricted evidentiary flexibility in seeking out the actual intent 
of the parties.227 Particularly significant in article 8(3) is the 
express rejection of the evidentiary restrictions of some national 
systems that limit the consideration of "parol evidence" as well as 
223. It is interesting to note here that these spectra in fact capture the overlap between 
autonomy-based theories and communitarian theories of contract. See supra note 193 and 
text accompanying notes 205-06. The more a particular "objective" standard approaches 
the "generalized and idealized" ends of the spectra, the more a legal system seeks to 
promote communitarian values in recognizing and enforcing contractual obligations. The 
reverse is true as well, as the discussion of the U.N. Sales Convention in the text below 
reveals. 
224. CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(2) ("[T]he understanding that a reasonable person •.. 
would have had in the same circumstances.") (emphasis added). 
225. See supra notes 163, 174 and accompanying text; see also Report on the Ninth 
Session, supra note 57, paras. 44-46. 
226. CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(2) ("a reasonable person of the same kind as the other 
party"). For the drafting history relevant to this amendment, see supra note 163. 
227. For a more detailed discussion of article 8(3), see supra notes 165-68 and 
accompanying text. 
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the subsequent conduct of the parties in identifying actual intent.228 
This flexibility in the search for actual intent is validated with par-
ticular reference to contract formation in article 11. That provision 
broadly abolishes all form requirements for the creation of contrac-
tual obligations, as well as similar evidentiary restrictions on the 
proof thereof.229 The interaction of the particularized standard of 
article 8(2) and the interpretive flexibility mandated by article 8(3) 
precludes generalized or normative conclusions about how transac-
tors in international commerce express their intent. 
The interpretive flexibility mandated by article 8(3) also has 
implications in the context of the allocation of burdens of proof.230 
An analysis of the structure of the interpretive standards of article 
8 reveals that the burden of proof regarding "objective" meaning 
will fall on the recipient of the relevant statement or expressive 
conduct. Where a party seeks to rely upon favorable terms in a 
putative contract, in other words, the burden will be hers to prove 
that the other party's statements and conduct must be interpreted 
as indicating a corresponding assent (that is, that the parties in fact 
concluded a contract on such basis). Where the speaker or actor 
contends that a contrary subjective intent should control in this 
regard, the burden will switch to her to prove that the recipient 
"knew or could not have been unaware" of that intent.231 
As a consequence of the flexibility prescribed by article 8(3), it 
should rarely be necessary for a speaker or actor to assume this 
burden. The sum effect of article 8(3) is a charge that all facts of 
which the recipient of an "indication" of intent knew or reasonably 
should have known must be considered even (and perhaps espe-
cially) under the objective approach of article 8(2). As a conse-
quence, it will be a rare case indeed that the burden will fall on the 
speaker or actor to prove that the recipient knew or could not have 
228. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra part ID.A.4. 
230. The allocation of the burden of proof on matters within the scope of the 
Convention must be determined within the Convention itself, at least where the particular 
provision at issue is structured in the form of a rule and an exception. See CISG 
Kommentar (Herber}, supra note 32, at 74. Article 8 follows such a rule-exception format. 
See article 8(1} (subjective standard applies only "if'' the other party knew or could not be 
unaware of that intent); article 8(2} (objective standard applies only "if" the requirements 
for article 8(1} are not established). 
231. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 62 1996-1997
62 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:1 
been unaware of an intent not otherwise indicated by available 
facts.232 
The flexibility in the interpretive standards of article 8 does not 
mean, however, that all indicative factors are of equal expressive 
weight. Notwithstanding the list of secondary factors identified in 
article 8(3), the primary interpretive material remains the parties' 
express declarations of intent.233 In this sense, the objective stan-
dard of article 8(2) can, paradoxically, play a protective role for the 
speaker or actor: Where a party has made an express declaration 
of her intent, the burden imposed by article 8(2) on the other party 
to show a contrary implied intent from the secondary factors of 
article 8(3) will be an onerous one. 
This latter point is worthy of emphasis with respect to the recog-
nition of contractual obligations in the first instance. The objective 
standard of article 8(2) will often operate to protect the expecta-
tions of the recipient of an indication of intent. Under this stan-
dard, however, such a recipient must prove that her expectation 
was "reasonable." In light of the general preference in favor of 
express indications of intent, the latitude for such a party in claim-
ing a "reasonable" misunderstanding will decrease as the degree of 
clarity in the declarations and expressive conduct of the speaker or 
actor increases. Where the speaker or actor has declared her intent 
expressly, the policies underlying the three subparts of article 8 will 
232. The principal role of the "could not have been unaware" supplement to article 8(1) 
may well be merely to emphasize the central significance of actual intent in the formation 
values of the Convention. When taken to its logical end, the "could not have been 
unaware" extension of the subjective standard of article 8(1) will only rarely fall within the 
burden of proof of the speaker or actor in issues involving contract formation. Because all 
factors of relevance are to be considered even under the objective standard of article 8(2), 
the "reasonable person of the same kind" and "in the same circumstances" as the recipient 
should not, by simple logic, have less knowledge than the actual recipient. Thus, if the 
recipient "could not have been unaware" of a fact, then such a reasonable person would 
have like knowledge, with· the ultimate result that this element of the "subjective" standard 
is actually merged into the recipient's burden to establish the "objective" meaning. As a 
result, observations by scholars regarding the effect of an unambiguous expression of 
intent under the "could not have been unaware" language of article 8(1) will apply with 
equal vigor to the burden of the recipient seeking to establish the "objective" import of 
such an "indication" of intent. See, e.g., Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 160, at 63 
("When one party clearly expresses his intent through a legal act, the addressee cannot 
pretend to have insufficient knowledge of that intent."). 
233. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 7, para. 5, Official Records, at 18 
("In determining the intent of a party or the intent a reasonable person would have had in 
the same circumstances, it is necessary to look first to the words actually used or the 
conduct engaged in."); Wey, supra note 46, at 232-33. 
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effectively preclude proof of an assertion that the recipient "rea-
sonably" understood a contrary implied intent 
Fmally, the flexible interpretive standards defined in article 8 
find support in specific protective provisions elsewhere in the Con-
vention. These provisions achieve the goal of limiting the risk of 
inaccurate determinations of intent by creating presumptions in 
certain circumstances against finding an intent to be bound to con-
tractual obligations. Such is the primary role of article 19. One 
essential function of that article is to establish a presumption that 
one party (the offeree) lacks an intent to be bound where she has 
proposed terms that deviate from those of the offer.234 This propo-
sition was sufficiently clear to the drafters that they deemed it 
unnecessary to include a more straightforward statement (found in 
some national systems )235 that the parties have not established 
mutual contractual obligations at the executory stage in their rela-
tionship as long as they have failed to reach an agreement on all 
terms proposed in the negotiation process.236 
A complementary protective presumption arises from the gen-
eral provision of article 18(1) governing acceptances. This provi-
sion requires that a valid acceptance not merely indicate an intent 
to be bound to contractual obligations in general, but that it 
express an assent to contract formation specifically on the basis of 
the terms proposed in the offer.237 The admonition in article 18(1) 
that "silence or inactivity" cannot alone be the basis for a conclu-
sion of "assent" to such obligations has a like function: it operates 
to protect against the imposition of contractual obligations based 
234. Article 19(1) sets forth two other noteworthy presumptions. The first, rejection 
with consequent termination of the offer, see CISG, supra note 2, art. 17, protects the 
interests of the offeror by making clear that she becomes free to contract elsewhere 
without fear of a later acceptance; the second, the acceptance becomes a counteroffer, 
serves to open the possibility of a subsequent acceptance by the original offeror. See 
Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art. 15, paras. 1, 3, art. 17, paras. 2, 5, Official 
Records, at 22-24. 
235. See, e.g., BQrgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 154 (F.RG.); see also Farnsworth, 
Contracts, supra note 48, at 125 (noting the traditional premise that no contract is formed 
until parties have agreed on all terms on which they expected to reach agreement). 
236. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, para. 208 (observing that each 
party "can always require agreement on those points that he considers essential" prior to 
the conclusion of the contract). In rejecting an interpretive rule based on the "common 
intent" of the parties, the Working Group commented that "it was hard to conceive of a 
court imposing a contract on the parties, if they had no actual common intent" ld. para. 
17. 
237. CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 150 (noting that the indication 
of assent must "also extend to the terms of the offer"); Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), 
supra note 14, at 166. 
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on normative considerations of a "duty to speak. "238 Similar policy 
determinations led to the refusal to grant broad effectiveness to the 
contents of a written confirmation of a previously concluded con-
tract based on normative considerations of a duty to object to pro-
posed terms. 239 
Ultimately, the tension between the moral significance of intent 
in recognizing binding obligations and the practical difficulties in 
divining that intent may frustrate any attempt to discern a single, 
unifying theme for the nature of contractual obligation under the 
U.N. Sales Convention. Nonetheless, the above analysis of the pol-
icies and principles of the Convention has identified certain values 
that underlie the recognition and enforcement of contractual obli-
gations in international sales transactions within the Convention's 
scope: 
(1) One core value that emerges from the principles and 
policies of the Convention is a reaffirmation of the signifi-
cance of actual intent in the recognition of contractual 
obligation. Risks of an inaccurate identification of intent 
necessarily attend a reference to the subsidiary "reason-
able person" interpretive standard of article 8(2). None-
theless, even with this "objective" standard the 
Convention reinforces a primary policy goal of giving 
effect to actual intent by mandating a highly particular-
ized, non-idealized interpretive analysis that concurrently 
rejects the imposition of normative standards. 
(2) As a corollary to the central role of actual intent in its 
interpretive values, the Convention mandates effectively 
unrestricted flexibility in the identification of that intent. 
The confluence of the particularized standard of article 
8(2) and this interpretive flexibility prescribed by article 
8(3) amounts to an injunction against the application of 
generalized or normative conclusions about how parties 
to international sales contracts express intent. 
(3) These flexible interpretive standards likewise reveal a 
general hostility to theories of contract obligation that 
proceed on the basis of normative fictions. Where the 
intent of the parties is clearly established or where one 
party has otherwise unambiguously expressed her intent, 
238. For a discussion of this provision, see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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normative considerations should not operate to frustrate 
that intent. 
(4) Although articles 14 through 24 identify an offer and 
its unqualified acceptance as the assumed building blocks 
of contracts, in its general, foundational principles, the 
Convention establishes the effectuation of the common 
intent of the parties as the primary value in its hierarchy 
of norms. Together with the mandate of flexibility in the 
search for that intent, this principle of the primacy of 
party autonomy makes clear that express provisions of 
the Convention are not to be applied in such a rigid, pre-
scriptive manner as to frustrate that common intent 
65 
IV. CoNTRACT FORMATION AND pARTIAL DISSENSUS UNDER 
THE U.N. SALES CoNVENTION 
As a device for conceptualizing the relationship between the par-
ties to a proposed transaction, the notion of a "partial dissensus" 
departs substantially from the traditional assumptions about the 
manner by which private actors create binding obligations. 
Accepted doctrine would seem to require that a complete agree-
ment be established by (or imposed on) the parties before the law 
will recognize contractual obligations. Within the scope of the U.N. 
Sales Convention, traditionalist commentators have pointed to the 
offer-acceptance scheme in general, as well as to the language of 
article 19(1), and have argued that the same rule should obtain 
there.240 
The problem from a conceptual perspective arises when the par-
ties proceed with the performance of their contemplated reciprocal 
"obligations" notwithstanding either a failure to agree or an out-
right disagreement on terms proposed by one or both of them at an 
earlier point in their relationship. Two principal solutions to this 
deviation from the lock-step model of contract formation present 
themselves: Hrst, contract law could view the relationship between 
the parties simply as a failed attempt to create binding obligations. 
To the extent the common error of the parties has created imbal-
ances as compared to their relative positions ex ante, the parties to 
a transaction otherwise within the scope of the U.N. Sales Conven-
tion would then be left with the appropriate restitutionary remedy 
under otherwise applicable national law. Alternatively, the law 
240. See infra part IV.A. 
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could cast the relationship as a "contractual" one and apply an 
appropriate standard to define the contours of the parties' obliga-
tions (that is, adopt an "agreement rule" to resolve the effect of the 
"partial" element of the dissensus). 
There is an almost intuitive allure to the first of these two solu-
tions. An examination of the drafting history and provisions (in 
particular articles 18(1) and 19(1)) of the Convention reveals a 
general policy of restraint against imposing contractual obligations 
on the parties while they continue to disagree over terms_proposed 
in the course of their negotiations.241 A straightforward applica-
tion of this policy would seem to mandate a conclusion that, 
notwithstanding the performance of perceived duties, the parties 
have failed to achieve the form of untainted agreement required 
for the recognition and enforcement of contractual obligations. 
This option does not survive a more penetrating examination, 
however. Whatever the nature of their pre-performance declara-
tions,242 where the parties have actually carried out the core ele-
ments of a sales contract (delivery of goods, payment of price), 
they have at a minimum manifested a common intent on the crea-
tion of some form of binding mutual obligations. The principle of 
the primacy of party autonomy mandates that this common intent 
be recognized as an enforceable contract.243 To be sure, the gen-
eral protective policy of the Convention against the imposition of 
contractual obligations will add color to the analysis of the scope of 
the parties' respective rights and obligations; it does not, however, 
defeat the determinative common intent of the parties where their 
conduct unambiguously confirms an agreement on the conclusion 
of a binding deal. In other words, as Professor Farnsworth has 
remarked in the case of mutual performance, "it is clear that a con-
tract has been concluded and the dispute is over the terms of that 
contract. "244 
This observation, though certainly correct when taken alone, 
may nonetheless plant the seeds of a misunderstanding if applied 
241. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text and infra notes 296-302 and 
accompanying text. 
242. This issue is addressed infra parts IV.A. and B. 
243. There will, of course, be cases on the margins where the conduct of the parties is 
sufficiently incomplete that it does not reveal a consensus on the essential elements of a 
sales contract as contemplated by article 14 (goods, quantity, and price). In such cases, the 
failure to agree on the "essentialia negotii" would preclude the recognition of a contract 
under article 14(1}, even if the parties intended to create binding obligations. See supra 
notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
244. Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth}, supra note 14, at 179. 
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beyond its limited context. There has been an unmistakable trend 
in recent academic literature in the United States to focus the anal-
ysis more on an identification of the appropriate substantive back-
ground rules to fill gaps in extant contracts, and less on the 
significance of the process of contract formation where the mutual 
intent of the parties to assume contractual obligations is clear.245 
This focus on the substantive "default»' rules, although important 
on its own plane, is one essential step removed from the analysis at 
issue here. In order to reach the issue of the appropriate back-
ground rules, one must first identify where there is a gap (a 
"default'') in the agreement of the parties in the first place. The 
more significant inquiry in assessing the role of partial dissensus in 
the formation process appears, therefore, at the threshold itself: 
What are the standards in such a case for detennining what the 
agreement of the parties is? 
The received wisdom on this score applies a fiction of assent in 
order to reconstruct the agreement process of the parties to fit a 
rigid lock-step mold of contract formation. I argue below that this 
approach contradicts the policies that underlie the nature of con-
tractual obligation under the Convention and that it should thus be 
rejected. I contend that the better-reasoned approach begins with 
first principles, and thus defines the contractual obligations of the 
parties in the first instance by the scope of the express agreement 
between their competing terms. 
A. The Traditional Solution246 
1. The "Fictional Assent" Rule 
The received wisdom on the treatment of a partial dissensus 
offers a deceptively appealing simplicity in terms of both its con-
tent and its scope. The argument under this approach proceeds as 
follows: The traditional rules of contract formation followed in 
principle in the Convention identify as the "building blocks" of 
contracts an offer and its unqualified acceptance. Where a reply to 
a proposal to conclude a contract deviates in any respect worthy of 
245. See sources cited supra note 121. 
246. It is, almost by definition, inaccurate to refer to any theory relating to the 
Convention as "traditional," in that it has been in force for a mere eight years. Because 
the approach I describe in this section nonetheless closely parallels (in its result if not 
necessarily in all parts of its analysis) the traditional approach in the United States and in 
some other legal systems, I will occasionally refer to it as such in my analysis of the Sales 
Convention. 
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note,247 article 19 prescribes a straightforward result: The reply is 
converted into a rejection of the offer coupled with a counteroffer. 
If the parties then proceed with performance notwithstanding the 
resultant dissensus between them, the (constructive) counteroffer 
is deemed accepted in its entirety by the original offeror solely as a 
result of her conduct.248 
The parallel simplicity of this approach is comprehensive scope. 
It applies broadly to all "contractual" relationships irrespective of 
their structure, complexity or level of formality, and without regard 
to the particular circumstances in which the parties formed their 
relationship. Once it is determined that the parties have mani-
fested a mutual intent to create binding obligations, an adjudicator 
need merely reconstruct the chronological sequence of their 
respective formal declarations and identify the most recent one. 
This declaration is then deemed the entirety of the contract of the 
parties. 
Although there has been little theoretical examination of the 
foundation for this approach under the U.N. Sales Convention, it 
would appear that it proceeds from a simple premise. As concep-
tual constructs, "offers" and "acceptances" are indispensable and 
irreducible elements of the formation process. Where the parties 
proceed to perform following a deviating acceptance in the sense 
of article 19(1), therefore, the only permissible interpretation is 
that they have agreed to the (constructive) counteroffer as the 
exclusive basis for their contractual relationship. The "last shot" 
rule, in other words, merely operates as a self-evidently correct 
extension of the "mirror image" rule.249 One would assume, then, 
that proponents of this approach would view a "partial dissensus" 
as either wholly irrelevant or an oxymoron-irrelevant because the 
constructive assent through performance supersedes any "partial" 
disagreements, an oxymoron because its counterpart ("partial con-
247. Article 19(2) admittedly purports to ameliorate the harsh effects of the traditional 
mirror image rule in the case of "non-material" deviations. In its practical effect, however, 
this provision changes nothing, for article 19(3) defines as "material" all terms that would 
be worth the cost and effort of a dispute between the parties. See supra part II.A.3. 
248. See Kelso, supra note 46, at 554; Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra note 14, at 
179; Herber & Czerwenka, supra note 91, at 107; Martin Karollus, UN-Kaufrecht: Eine 
systematische Darstellung ftlr Studium und Praxis 71 (1991). 
249. See Henry D. Gabriel, The Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the United 
Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 49 Bus. Law. 1053, 1053 (1994) (stating that the last shot rule "is the logical result of 
the 'mirror image rule"'); Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 1137 (observing that the last shot 
rule is viewed by its proponents to be "self-evident" in light of the mirror image rule). 
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sensus") is for purposes of contract doctrine not a "contractual" 
agreement at all. 
A review of the literature on this traditional approach nonethe-
less reveals some lack of clarity about its precise effect. Some com-
mentators seem to suggest that the approach is merely of a 
presumptive nature.250 This version would hold that even where 
both parties have proposed terms in the course of their negotia-
tions there is a presumption of mutual assent to the last proposal 
exchanged between them. Although this presumption is rebutta-
ble, the burden falls on the disadvantaged party to prove that she 
did not, in fact, express assent to the proposal. Other authors 
appear to support an even more rigid approach. Under this ver-
sion, performance of the (perceived) obligations is deemed to con-
stitute, apparently conclusively,251 the mutual assent of the parties 
to "last shot" before such performance.252 
The indication of assent required to impose contractual obliga-
tion, in other words, is taken as given. This conclusion apparently 
applies regardless of the complexity of the parties' previous rela-
tionship, the clarity of the disadvantaged party's previous insis-
tence on the inclusion of her own substantive terms and/or 
250. See Gabriel, supra note 249, at 1062 ("The CISG ••• obviously favor[s] the last 
party to submit its terms."); Herber & Czerwenka, supra note 91, at 107 n.18 (arguing that 
the assent to the counteroffer resulting from article 19 "regularly occurs by performance of 
the contract"). 
251. See Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra note 14, at 179 (the counteroffer resulting 
from the application of article 19(1) "is then accepted by the other party's performance"); 
Kelso, supra note 46, at 554 ("[T]he party who fires the 'last shot' will win the battle of 
forms.") (emphasis added); Leete, supra note 46, at 214 ("With regard to the battle of 
forms issue, it seems clear that the party sending the last form will be the one whose terms 
prevail."); Kofi Date-Bah, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods: An Overview and Consideration of Some Practical Issues Relating to It, in 
Uniform Commercial Law in the 1\venty·FII'St Century, Proceedings of the Congress of the 
United Nations Commission on International 'frade Law, at 69, 75, U.N. Doc. AJCN.91 
SER.D (1995) {"The traditional mirror image rule in paragraph (1) of article 19 will result 
in the so-called last shot in the battle of forms prevailing.") (emphasis added); Karl 
Neumayer, Das Wiener KaufrechtsUbereinkommen und die sogennannte "battle of 
forms", in Freiheit und Zwang 501, 524 (1989) (reasoning that the Convention requires 
either the last shot rule or the rer.ognition of no contract at all). 
252. Melvin Eisenberg identifies these two forms of rules as "presumptive" and 
"categorical," labels which roughly correspond to the "general" and "constitutive" 
classifications identified by John Rawls. See Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 1137-41 (citing 
John Rawls, 1\vo Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3, 23-25 (1955)). A third form identified 
by Professor Eisenberg is "maxims," which in effect are not rules at all but simply non-
binding guides to behavior. As Professor Eisenberg correctly observes, the level of 
necessary justification for a rule increases as one moves from a maxim to a presumption, 
and more so when the rule takes the categorical form. Id. at 1140. 
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rejection of foreign terms,253 as well as the circumstances attending 
the performance itself.254 Closely related to this fiction of assent is 
an implication of a prescriptive rigidity in the formation provisions 
of the Convention. In its practical application, the traditional rule 
requires that in all cases the statements and conduct of the parties 
be parsed into a formal offer and a formal acceptance and that the 
last express (often, the last written) declaration is the exclusive 
indication of intent of interest in the recognition of contractual 
obligations. 
Whatever the allure of the simplicity of its analysis, the tradi-
tional approach in its substance is founded on a premise that often 
operates directly contrary to, or at best gives only superficial defer-
ence to, the formation values of the Convention. The elemental 
flaw of the approach is that it proceeds on the basis of a fiction of 
assent. The fiction is that the mere performance of the essential 
elements of a sales transaction (shipment or payment) necessarily 
expresses the unqualified intent of a party to bind itself to contrac-
tual obligations solely on the substantive basis of the declaration 
fortuitously deemed the last one. This rigid conclusion of unquali-
fied assent disregards CISG's primary policy goal of identifying 
and giving effect to actual intent, a directive which emerges not 
only from the hierarchy of interpretive norms in article 8, but also 
from the nature of its subsidiary objective standard itself. At this 
level alone, the values of the Convention reveal a hostility to rules 
that apply a fiction of assent based on stylized assumptions of 
intent and meaning.255 
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the fictional assent rule with 
the Convention's policy of flexibility in interpretive inquiries (as 
revealed by articles 6, 8(2), 8(3), and 11). The sum of this policy is 
a mandate that an adjudicator consider all circumstances that could 
reflect on a party's actual intent, and that as a general proposition 
253. I use the phrase "foreign terms" here and in the text below to embrace all terms 
proposed by another party that deviate from one's own proposed terms. 
254. It bears emphasis here that article 19 applies only where a reply to an offer 
"purports to be an acceptance." A recipient of such a declaration (the original offeror) 
could thus by definition reasonably conclude as a factual matter that the original offeree 
indicated her assent to the original offer through the deviating acceptance alone. See supra 
part m.A.2. (discussing the interpretation of party statements and conduct under article 8): 
infra note 314 and accompanying text. 
255. Such standardized assumptions of meaning are suspect even in national law systems 
that govern individuals who, at some level at least, share a common culture and language. 
They are even more problematic for interpreting intent in international transactions 
involving parties from widely diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds. 
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the adjudicator prefer express declarations of intent over a pre-
sumed intent that can only be surmised through implication. The 
distilled essence of a fictional assent approach, in contrast, is that 
mere performance in all cases amounts to unqualified assent to the 
"last" declaration, apparently irrespective of the actual prior rela-
tionship between the parties. 
To be sure, article 19(1) contains a specific rule that defines a 
specific result: A deviating acceptance does not conclude a con-
tract but amounts to a counteroffer.256 That provision does not, 
however, define what happens next. The essential question left 
unanswered is how to describe the parties' relationship where the 
original offeror's declarations and conduct do not express the req-
uisite assent257 to such counteroffer, but the circumstances none-
theless indicate a mutual intent of the parties to conclude a 
contract. A reference to article 19 is circular, for the ultimate 
inquiry remains an interpretive one: Have the parties reached an 
agreement on contract formation on the basis of the counteroffer 
resulting from the application of article 19, or on some other basis? 
In other words, the structure of article 19 does not answer the 
essential interpretive issue of whether, in fact, the other party has 
"indicat[ed] assent to [the] [counter]offer" as required by article 
18(1) for the recognition of contractual obligations.258 
Indeed, a reference to the policies underlying articles 18(1) and 
19(1) would seem to require a conclusion directly contrary to a fic-
tional assent theory. One basic purpose underlying these provi-
sions is to protect against the imposition of contractual obligations 
where the parties have failed to agree on material matters raised by 
256. The "fictional assent" approach, once again, is a structural one: Because article 19 
prescribes that every deviating acceptance is a rejection and counteroffer, every 
subsequent deviation creates a cascade effect, until perfonnance (which is now deemed an 
unqualified acceptance) brings the game to an end. This ritualized view of contracting is 
inconsistent with the complexity of modem commercial transactions. To take only one 
example, there is a substantial lack of clarity about how the fictional assent approach 
would accommodate indirect exchanges of declarations, such as the tenns of letters of 
credit that often accompany international sales transactions. Does a reference in such a 
letter of credit to one declaration of the parties {often the buyer's purchase order) 
supersede the direct exchanges between the parties? A reliance solely on the "last shot," 
in other words, does not tell us what qualifies as a "shot." 
257. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(1); supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
258. In fact, this was the focal point in the substantial dispute over the drafting of article 
19. 'fraditionalists objected to any dilution of a strict mirror image rule precisely because it 
would permit parties to be bound to contractual obligations even though there remained a 
dissensus between them over proposed tenns. See supra notes 90.100 and accompanying 
text. 
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either of them in their negotiations.259 It would indeed be anoma-
lous for one to use precisely those provisions as the conceptual 
basis for doing so. 
2. The Issue of Continuing Intent 
The central flaw in the fictional assent (or "last shot") theory is 
that it fails to separate the narrow role of the specific provisions of 
the Convention from the broader, determinative inquiry into the 
actual (or reasonably perceived) intent of the parties. Recall that 
the premise of this traditional approach is a formalist one: By 
operation of the rule in article 19(1) a deviating "acceptance" is 
transformed into a rejection and a counteroffer. The predicate for 
the conclusion of assent to this counteroffer arises from a deriva-
tive consequence of the rejection, namely, that the formal legal 
construct of "offer" is "terminated" upon the original offeror's 
receipt of the deviating acceptance.26° From this predicate, the 
traditional rule makes a subtle, but significant leap to a factual con-
clusion about the intent of the original offeror: The formal legal 
rejection of the "offer" set forth in article 19 carries with it the 
much broader factual effect of "wiping clean the intent slate;" all 
prior statements, declarations of intent, and understandings of the 
parties thus wither to irrelevance. As a result, as of the deviating 
reply the original offeror apparently no longer has any relevant 
intent for purposes of contract formation. By default-so the 
traditional logic runs-her subsequent performance must amount 
to an implied assent to the only extant (albeit constructive) propo-
sal, the counteroffer arising from the deviating acceptance rule of 
article 19(1). 
The misapprehension of this reasoning lies in a failure to recog-
nize that, notwithstanding the legal effect prescribed by the mirror 
image rule, the declarations made in and other circumstances 
attending the original offer do not cease to be a factual indication 
of the intent of the original offeror. The formal legal termination 
of the original offer may indeed mean that, as a general proposi-
tion,261 the offeree's power to accept the formal offer is extin-
259. See infra notes 315-20 and accompanying text. 
260. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 17 ("An offer ... is terminated when a rejection 
reaches the offeror."). 
261. Professor Honnold has suggested that if the provisions of the Convention in fact 
require an adoption of one "shot" of the parties in its entirety, the terms of the original 
offer should prevail. This suggestion is premised on the observation that the offeree has 
designated her reply an "acceptance." As this is the only such express declaration, 
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guished.262 The flexibility mandated by the interpretive values of 
the Convention-in particular the injunction of article 8(3) that in 
interpretive inquiries an adjudicator consider "all relevant circum-
stances"-makes clear, however, that the indications of intent of 
the original offeror preceding this event cannot simply be disre-
garded in assessing the meaning of that party's subsequent 
performance. 
This issue might be termed one of "continuing intent." The 
question here is whether a party is able to declare her intent with 
respect to the conditions for the assumption of contractual obliga-
tions with sufficient clarity and prominence that the expressive 
value of the declaration survives a negative response from the 
other party. The interpretive flexibility prescribed by article 8(3) 
provides the answer. The first factor expressly identified by that 
provision as among the "relevant circumstances" an adjudicator 
must consider in the interpretive standards of article 8 is "the nego-
tiations" between the parties.263 As evidence of the broad signifi-
cance of such indications of the parties' intent, the Working Group 
deleted from an early draft of article 8(3) a proposed limitation 
that would have required consideration of only "preliminary" 
negotiations.264 The purpose of this deletion was to make clear 
"that all negotiations would be relevant" in the interpretive stan-
dards of article 8.265 The message here is that prior negotiations set 
the context for the interpretation of subsequent events, and thus 
shed important light on the meaning of subsequent statements and 
expressive conduct. The premise of the traditional "last shot" 
rule-that all prior declarations of intent become irrelevant upon a 
deviating acceptance-disregards this message entirely.266 
Professor Honnold suggests that if the original offeree proceeds with performance without 
clarifying the ambiguity a reasonable person in the position of the other party, see CISG, 
supra note 2, art. 8(2), could-notwithstanding the rule of article 19(1)-understand that 
conduct as assent to the original offer. Honnold, supra note 8, at 237-38. 
262. See CISG, supra note 2, art 17(1); Bianca & Bonell (Eorsi), supra note 14, at 162. 
263. CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(3) (in applying the standards of paragraphs 8(1) and 8(2) 
"due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the 
negotiations"). 
264. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, paras. 11, 31. 
265. Id para. 31. 
266. As a fall back argument, proponents of the fictional assent approach may suggest 
that as of the formal legal rejection of the offer manufactured by article 19(1) aU factual 
indications of intent contained in the offer are no longer "relevant" in the sense of article 
8(3). The unqualified specific inclusion in article 8(3) of the parties' negotiations as a 
"relevant" circumstance for purposes of interpretation ("all relevant circumstances of the 
case including the negotiations"), notwithstanding subsequent events, refutes such an 
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The required consideration of prior declarations and expressive 
conduct also addresses any argument that the original offeror failed 
to take advantage of a "last clear chance" prior to performance. 
Proponents of the fictional assent rule might point to the "reason-
able person" standard of article 8(2) and argue267 that the original 
offeror's performance with (constructive) knowledge of the effect 
of article 19(1) and without further objection necessarily amounts 
to her assent to the terms of the (constructive) counteroffer. There 
is a superficial appeal to this argument. But in the end it is merely 
a restatement of the same normative conclusion about a party's 
failure to object to proposed terms. The drafters of the Conven-
tion refused to grant dispositive effect to proposed terms in such 
circumstances based solely on normative notions of a "duty to 
speak."268 And where a party has declared her continuing intent 
not to be bound to foreign terms with sufficient clarity and promi-
nence,269 the Convention's flexible interpretive values require that 
argument. Alternatively, fictional assent proponents could argue that, although 
"relevant," an indication of intent in the offer need only be given "due consideration" as 
provided in article 8(3). That may indeed be the case, but the point does not support a 
rigid fictional assent approach in any event. The "due consideration" language of article 
8(3) simply makes clear that an adjudicator must take the indication of intent in the 
original offer into account along with other relevant circumstances; and, of course, the 
weight of this indication of intent will vary according to its clarity and the expressive 
content of other statements and conduct of the original offeror. In contrast to the fictional 
assent rule, the "due consideration" language certainly does not require stylized 
assumptions about the interpretive value of an indication of intent that disregard the 
specific circumstances attending that indication. 
267. As most commentators have, without detailed analysis, simply accepted the 
fictional assent rule as a necessary extension of the Convention's express contract 
formation scheme, see supra part IV.A.l., there has been little detailed scholarly 
investigation into such potential justifications for a fictional assent approach under the 
Convention. 
268. It is also worth emphasizing in this context that the fictional assent rule cannot find 
its justification solely in normative considerations such as a duty to object to proposed 
terms. See supra notes 193-205 and accompanying text. Even if the deviating acceptance 
itself provided that the original offeror would be deemed to assent to its proposed terms if 
she failed to object prior to performance, little would change in the analysis of the merit of 
the fictional assent rule. To be sure, under article 18(3) an offeror may permit an offeree to 
express her assent solely through the performance of an act. This does not mean, however, 
that the offeror has the power unilaterally to impose a conclusion of assent to the terms of 
the offer where the offeree (even if she performs the prescribed act) expressly or impliedly 
manifests a contrary intent. Cf. Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, paras. 112-18 
(noting the "general agreement" that the offeror could not unilaterally impose a rule that 
the offeree's silence would constitute assent to the offer); id. paras. 128-31 (rejecting a 
proposal that would have given an offeror the power to unilaterally impose a written form 
requirement for contract formation). 
269. In part IV.B3. I address the necessity for and contours of the adjective "sufficient" 
in this clause. · 
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an adjudicator weigh this "relevant circumstance" in interpreting 
the meaning of the party's subsequent conduct. 
The application of the rule of article 19(1) to a deviating accept-
ance will indeed permit the conclusion of a contract on the basis of 
the counteroffer if the original offeror makes a corresponding 
expression of assent.270 This is a very important "if," however. In 
the event of performance of the basic elements of the proposed 
transaction, the fictional assent approach would disregard the con-
ditional form of this statement entirely and simply take the assent 
as given. The interpretive inquiry is over before it begins. Admit-
tedly, the relevant interpretive standard under article 8 will often 
be the understanding of a "reasonable" person. But as we have 
seen, this too is a flexible standard that rejects static or similar nor-
mative conclusions for intent-based interpretive inquiries. 
A reference to the deviating acceptance rule of article 19(1) 
alone thus tells us nothing about the essential interpretive inquiry 
in the case of a partial dissensus. The indicative value of the decla-
rations and expressive conduct of the original offeror prior to a 
deviating acceptance will, of course, vary according to their relative 
clarity and context.271 In any event, in light of the flexible interpre-
tive values of the Convention the basic premise of the fictional 
assent approach-that the mere fact of performance demands a 
direct conclusion about the intent of the original offeror-is at a 
minimum in need of further justification. 
The entrenchment of this fictional assent approach will, finally, 
have significa9lt practical implications for the value of the U.N. 
Sales Convention in determining the rights of buyers and sellers in 
international sales transactions. In practical outcome, this 
approach requires that the standardized terms of one party (the 
one sending the "last shot") prevail in their entirety. This party 
270. The Commentary of the Secretariat of UNCITRAL on the pre-Vienna Conference 
draft of what is now article 19 (which differed only in a respect not directly relevant here) 
reflects this possibility. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, art 19, para. 15 {If 
there is performance after a materially deviating reply to an offer, "a contract may 
eventually be formed by notice to the original offeree of such performance."). Although 
one could suggest that this bland observation implies that the performance alone is an 
indication of assent, the essential inquiry, once again, remains an interpretive one, and 
articles 6, 8, and 11 provide the framework for the resolution of that inquiry. 
271. I explore this point in greater detail in connection with the alternative approach to 
the treatment of partial dissensus advocated in part IV.B. 
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will most often be the seller.272 As a result, exclusions of implied 
warranties and disclaimers of liability for consequential damages 
will, contrary to the value judgments made in the drafting of the 
Convention, become the standard for international sales transac-
tions.273 Sellers' common choice-of-forum and choice-of-law 
clauses (including exclusions of the Convention itself)274 will like-
wise become the customary basis for defining the law governing 
the parties' relationship. All of this will occur without an examina-
tion of whether the parties' actual common intent embraced these 
significant matters, nor whether the parties in fact agreed so to 
"derogate from or vary the effect of'' contrary substantive provi-
sions of the Convention. 
The traditional "last shot" rule thus encourages opportunism and 
dilutes the role of common intent in the formation of contractual 
obligations. Because modern means of communication now enable 
both parties routinely to transmit a list of all terms of potential 
relevance to them, the carefully-reasoned balance between the 
interests of buyer and seller reflected in Part III of the Convention 
will likewise routinely be displaced without requiring an analysis of 
the actual understanding between them. Contract formation 
instead becomes a game in which the party last able to maneuver a 
reference to its general business terms is rewarded with total vic-
272. The buyer will most often send the "first shot" through its purchase order. Even if 
the roles are reversed, the seller will have the claim that it sent the "las0shot" in the form 
of its (appropriately phrased) invoice forwarded along with the goods. 
273. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 2, art. 35(2) (a contract of sale includes implied 
warranties of fitness, etcetera, "[e]xcept where the parties have otherwise agreed"); id. art. 
74 (right to recover consequential damages). Moreover, the "winner-take-all" effect of the 
last shot rule is exacerbated by the absence of a provision in the Convention that would 
limit the effect of unreasonably harsh or unduly surprising standardized terms. As an issue 
relating to the "validity" of such terms as contemplated by article 4, the otherwise-
applicable (and non-uniform) domestic law of the member states would govern the effect 
of harsh or surprising terms in standard forms. The UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts nonetheless provide that a term in "standard terms" is 
not effective to the extent "that the other party could not reasonably have expected it." 
See UNIDROIT Principles, art. 2.20(1); supra note 20. In the absence of a corresponding 
agreement between the parties or until the principles attain a state of generally recognized 
usage of trade, this provision of the UNIDROIT Principles will only apply to the extent a 
national court finds such an application consistent with governing domestic law. See art. 
7(2) (domestic law applies for a gap not resolved by the Convention's general principles); 
supra note 35. But see UNIDROIT Principles, pmbl. (suggesting that the Principles can be 
used "to interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments"). 
274. Within its sphere of application, once again, CISG's formation principles will apply 
in the first instance to determine whether the parties have agreed on an exclusion of the 
Convention. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
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tory. This can hardly be the goal of a formation system which 
founds contractual obligation on the common intent of the parties. 
3. Potential Non-interpretive Justifications for the Traditional 
Approach 
The traditional "last shot" rule likewise is unlikely to find its jus-
tification beyond notions of the assumed intent of the parties 
alone. A recent article by Melvin Eisenberg addressing the rules 
governing the import of contractual expressions provides a useful 
structure for the analysis here.275 Professor Eisenberg identifies 
three principal justifications for such rules, which he terms "pol-
icy," "administrative," and "coordinating" justifications.276 None 
of these grounds provides an adequate justification for the fictional 
assent approach to the treatment of partial dissensus under the 
U.N. Sales Convention. 
Policy justifications are founded decidedly on non-interpretive 
considerations and are of a normative nature. Proponents of the 
fictional assent approach seeking justification on this basis might 
argue, for example, that the rule promotes efficiency in the con-
tract formation process,277 or that normative considerations (not 
founded directly on an analysis of actual intent) mandate that the 
party making the last express declaration be given protection. In a 
milder form, supporters of the fictional assent rule could suggest 
that the Convention imposes a general obligation on international 
merchants to object to proposed terms. 
In light of the discussion of the core formation values of the 
Convention in Part Ill above, this form of justification for the fic-
tional assent rule barely survives its statement. Precisely because 
of the widely divergent cultural and legal perspectives of the vari-
ous contracting states, the provisions and policies of the Conven-
275. See Eisenberg, supra note 111. 
276. Id. at 1143. The discussion in the text above addresses a fourth justification 
identified by Professor Eisenberg, "accuracy." Id. at 1142-43. The performance of 
perceived contractual obligations will carry a certain weight in the interpretive process. 
The fictional assent approach fails, however, to explain why this factor should ai\V3)'S (or 
presumptively) trump other indicative factors, and of equal importance, why this approach 
is more likely to result in accurate determinations of intent than is a direct resort to the 
general interpretive rules of article 8 themselves. See id. 
277. Professors Baird and Weisberg have suggested, for instance, that a strict rule giving 
effect to the last declaration will cause parties to sales transactions to revise their standard 
forms to accommodate more fairly the interests of the other party. Baird & Weisberg, 
supra note 75, at 1217. For a critical examination of the conclusions reached by Baird and 
Weisberg, see Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory 
and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 2n-84 (1990). 
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tion reveal a definite hostility to normative solutions to issues of 
interpretation.278 The resolution of the debate over the role of 
trade usages, for instance, carried with it a clear refusal to create a 
presumption of assent to the contents of a written confirmation of 
a purported agreement based on normative considerations of a 
duty to object to proposed terms.279 
Possible administrative justifications for the fictional assent rule 
are equally problematic. Such justifications relate principally to 
considerations of legal certainty. A particular rule may be justified 
under this category by proof that it provides clarity to transactors 
in structuring their contractual relationship, and derivatively to 
adjudicators in resolving disputes. This is a proper concern of any 
system based on the rule of law. Indeed, such a justification may 
support the application of a particular rule where there is a concern 
that a casuistic resort to the general interpretive standards may 
lead to uncertain or random results.280 
The problem here-even apart from the considerable question 
about whether the fictional assent rule would in fact contribute to 
certainty in international contracting281-is that such a justification 
tells us little about the proper content of a standard, only that it 
should be clear and easy to apply. Any other equally clear stan-
dard serves this justification equally well.282 In such a case of com-
peting standards of relatively equal clarity, the administrative 
justification merely leads the analysis back to the basic proposition 
278. See supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text. 
279. See supra note 197. 
280. Such a concern in fact militates in favor of adopting some form of an "agreement 
rule" to resolve a partial dissensus between the parties to a putative contract within the 
sphere of application of the U.N. Sales Convention. Simply relegating adjudicators, 
transactors, and practitioners to a casuistic application of the general interpretive standards 
of article 8 would directly frustrate the primary goal of the Convention of bringing 
uniformity to international sales law. See CISG, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 3; see also infra 
part IV.B.3. 
281. Even if one is able to construe the counteroffer manufactured by article 19(1) as 
inviting acceptance by performance in the sense of article 18(3)-a big "if," insofar as 
under article 19(1) the reply must have "purport[ed] to be an acceptance" in the first 
place-the actual performance of the transaction will, in many cases, take place long after 
the expiration of the "reasonable time" for acceptance prescribed by article 18(2). See 
supra note 72 and accompanying text. As a result, the acceptance upon which the fictional 
assent rule is premised will not be effective to conclude a binding contract. Even the 
proponents of the fictional assent rule will thus have to rely on some form of an application 
of the principle of the primacy of party autonomy in order to find an effective contract 
formation. This is precisely the point of the consensus approach I advocate below. 
282. Cf. Craswell, Reliance, supra note 111, at 548 (observing with regard to bright line 
rules that "[i]f all that matters is that the line be bright, then several possible rules will 
work more or less equally well"). 
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that an interpretive standard must be judged by its degree of con-
gruence with the relevant legal system's underlying interpretive 
values. As we have seen, this is precisely where the fictional assent 
approach is deficient. 
Proponents of the fictional assent rule might finally argue that 
the rule serves a "coordinating" function, a notion that approxi-
mates what John Rawls has called "constitutive" rules.283 The sum 
of this justification for a particular rule is that it serves to coordi-
nate "contracting" behavior by making the rule itself an essential 
element of the contracting game. The common analogy here is to 
"rules of the road;" the common aphorism is that the very point of 
such rules "is that they exist, not that they are right."284 The argu-
ment of the supporters of the fictional assent approach in this vein 
would thus be that they are not advocating a separate "rule" at all. 
Articles 14, 18, and 19 set forth the rules of the contracting game, 
they would likely argue, and define the very nature of a contract as 
solely the result of two formal declarations of intent with identical 
content. The fictional assent "approach" is not a formation rule in 
the strictest sense, therefore, but rather a mere observation about a 
necessary consequence of the offer-acceptance scheme.285 
The flaw in this potential justification for the fictional assent 
approach is that it disregards the primacy of party autonomy.286 
Under this core principle of the Convention's hierarchy of norms, a 
common intent of the parties-even on the manner by which they 
create obligations in the first instance-must be given effect 
notwithstanding the Convention's express formation provisions. 
As a result, and as outlined below, the formation values of the 
Convention clearly embrace mutually-intended formation 
processes that do not track the formal offer-unconditional accept-
ance format.287 And article 6 permits this determinative common 
intent of the parties to arise by implication as well,288 an option 
283. Rawls, supra note 252, at 24-25. 
284. Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 1144; see also Katz, supra note ?:17, at 1218 (observing 
that a common approach to the rules of offer and acceptance is that "it is more important 
for the law to be settled than to be settled correctly"). But cf. Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 
1143 (observing, in questioning the value of the administrative justification, that "disputes 
must be settled not only easily, but properly"). 
285. See supra note 249. 
286. See supra part III.A.l. 
'lET. See infra notes 332-38 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. 
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articles 8(3) and 11 complement by mandating effectively 
unrestricted flexibility in identifying that intent.289 
Similarly, the "coordination explanation" ignores the decisive 
role of the interpretive standards of the Convention. These stan-
dards govern as the final arbiter of whether, in fact, a party has 
"indicated" her assent to the imposition of contractual obligations. 
There may indeed be instances where a party's unqualified per-
formance will alone sufficiently manifest her assent to the content 
of the last deviating "acceptance," such that a contract will be 
formed in accordance with the lock-step model of formal offer and 
formal acceptance.290 That a "last shot" rule is an indispensable 
constitutive "rule of the game" does not follow from this observa-
tion, however. For the essential inquiry remains an interpretive 
one, and there is nothing in the mere structure of the Convention's 
formation provisions to suggest that the drafters sought to disre-
gard its interpretive standards in such cases solely out of normative 
concerns about "coordinating" contracting behavior. 
An examination of the fictional assent approach to the treatment 
of partial dissensus under the U.N. Sales Convention reveals, in 
sum, serious deficiencies. As a purported interpretive rule, this 
traditional approach contravenes, or at best disregards, the Con-
vention's core goals of identifying actual intent, promoting flexibil-
ity in the related interpretive determinations, and protecting 
against the imposition of contractual obligation on the basis of nor-
mative fictions. The approach likewise fails to find compelling sup-
port in non-interpretive policy, administrative, or coordination 
justifications. Adjudicators, transactors, and practitioners under-
standably prefer certainty in the resolution of such important and 
common issues as a partial dissensus in the formation of contrac-
tual relationships. That the fictional assent rule arguably provides 
such certainty does not mean, however, that it represents the cor-
rect (or preferable) approach when the application of that certainty 
runs contrary to the values that underlie the recognition of contrac-
tual obligations in the first place. 
289. See supra parts III.A.2. and 4. 
290. See infra text accompanying note 310. 
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B. The Solution: Identifying and Applying the Consensus 
1. An Alternative Approach to the Treatment of Partial 
Dissensus 
81 
In this Part I take to heart the admonition that one should not 
criticize a proposed solution to a problem without offering a better 
one in its stead. I argue below that a reasoned appreciation of the 
core formation values of the Convention requires the application 
of a standard for the treatment of a partial dissensus that gives 
effect to clearly expressed intent and does not arbitrarily favor the 
interests of one party based on inflexible assumptions about how 
transactors express their intent That standard is one that identifies 
the scope of the agreement of the parties by the conformity 
between their respective express declarations of intent (in particu-
lar their respective standardized terms) and not by the fortuity of 
the chronology of the exchange of those declarations.291 
In light of the premise of the fictional assent rule, a useful start-
ing point for an analysis of partial dissensus is a reemphasis of the 
significance of the basic notion of party autonomy. As we have 
seen,292 it is much more than a simple contract law truism under 
the Convention that contractual obligations are formed and 
defined by the agreement of the parties. The confluence of articles 
6, 8, and 11 reveals not only a primary goal of searching out that 
actual agreement but also a mandate that this be accomplished 
with a flexible consideration of "all relevant circumstances."293 
Indeed, as should now be abundantly clear the agreement of the 
parties stands at the very top of the Convention's hierarchy of 
norms.294 
This principle has both affirmative and negative implications. In 
the affirmative sense, the preeminence of party autonomy results in 
a relegation of even the express provisions of the Convention to 
291. Tentative suggestions in this direction can be found in the legal literature. See 
CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 166-67; Honnold, supra note 8, at 228-
29; Piltz, supra note 41, at 15, 23-24; see also Moccia, supra note 119, at 674-75 (relying on 
principles of "good faith"); van der Velden, supra note 119, at 244-46 {also relying on 
principles of "good faith"). Even under the more traditional deviating acceptance rule of 
the Hague ULF, commentators suggested that in light of the principle of party autonomy 
the general terms routinely proposed by both parties should be given effect only to the 
extent "they are reconcilable with each other." U. Drobnig, Standard Forms and General 
Conditions in International Trade; Dutch, German and Uniform Law, in Hague-Zagreb 
Essays 4, 117, 124-25 {C.C.A. Voskuil & J.A. Wade eds., 1983). 
292. See supra part Ill.A. 
293. CISG, supra note 2, art. 8{3) (emphasis added). 
294. See supra part III.A.l. 
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the background upon proof of a corresponding common intent. 
The negative sense of party autonomy results from the converse of 
the preceding sentence: As substantive values in themselves, the 
provisions of the Convention defining the rights and obligations of 
buyer and seller should only be displaced in the face of such a con-
trary common intent.295 
The interpretive difficulty in the treatment of a partial dissensus 
is to identify precisely the contours of the common intent of the 
parties where-as a consequence of the increased flexibility in 
modem commercial relationships-the parties exchange standard-
ized business terms as a matter of routine in the negotiation pro-
cess. This common problem did not escape the attention of the 
drafters of the U.N. Sales Convention. The original report 
requested by the Working Group from the Secretary-General of 
UNCITRAL addressed the effect of standardized forms in the con-
tract formation process, but included a provision that would have 
imposed a contract on the parties even in the case of material devi-
ations between their respective "pre-printed forms. "296 For this 
reason, the Working Group did not include this proposed provision 
in the original draft of what is now article 19.297 
295. This observation also applies, of course, to the express fonnation provisions of the 
Convention. The problem here is that those provisions fail to define the appropriate 
resolution where the parties proceed to perfonn even though the declarations and 
expressive conduct of neither indicate the requisite assent to the fonnal declaration of the 
other. As I explain below, in this sense the principle of party autonomy does not operate 
to displace the contract fonnation provisions of the Convention, but rather merely to 
describe the relationship of the parties not fonned by way of a fonnal acceptance of a 
fonnal offer (or counteroffer). 
296. See Secretary-General Fonnation Report, supra note 82, proposed alternative art. 
7. The proposal drew a distinction between such tenns in "pre-printed fonns" and "non-
printed tenns." Similar to the present version of article 19, conflicts between "material" 
non-printed tenns would have precluded the fonnation of a contract: 
If the offer and a reply which purports to be an acceptance are on printed fonns 
and the non-printed tenns of the reply do not materially alter the tenns of the 
offer, the reply constitutes an acceptance of the offer even though the printed 
tenns of the reply materially alter the printed tenns of the offer unless the offeror 
objects to any discrepancy without delay. If he does not so object the tenns of the 
contract are the non-printed tenns of the offer with the modifications in the non-
printed tenns contained in the acceptance plus the printed tenns on which both 
fonns agree. 
Id. proposed alternative art. 7(2)(b). 
297. See Report on the Eighth Session, supra note 132, para. 110. The Working Group 
also rejected a rough proposal to treat references to general conditions of sale differently 
from other tenns in an offer. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, paras. 276, 
278. 
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A similarly directed proposal from the Belgian delegation at the 
Vienna Conference three years later sought in effect to disregard 
standardized conditions in their entirety in the contract formation 
process.298 Although this proposal also failed to generate sufficient 
support, the debate on the proposal reveals that this failure 
resulted primarily from the complexity of the subject matter cou-
pled with the advanced state of the drafting process and the 
absence of analysis by the Working Group prior to the 1980 Vienna 
Conference.299 
The common element in each of these proposals (thus far largely 
disregarded in the discussion of the significance of their rejection) 
is that they sought to impose contractual obligations on the parties 
at the executory stage in their relationship even where their 
(mutual) intent to be bound remains unclear.300 In light of the 
Convention's structural protection of the parties from the imposi-
tion of contractual obligations in such cases, the delegates simply 
were unwilling to require a contrary presumption about the parties' 
intent. By doing so, the delegates were able to avoid the criticism 
whi~h was directed at U.C.C. § 2-207, that it "imposes a marriage 
on the parties while they are still fighting at the altar. "301 As a 
result, in absence of a contrary agreement of the parties the 
straightforward rule of article 19 (the deviating reply "is a rejec-
tion") will operate as a presumption at the executory stage of the 
298. See Fust Committee Deliberations (lOth Meeting), supra note 93, paras. 87-102 
(debating this proposal). 
299. See Fust Committee Deliberations (lOth Meeting), supra note 93, paras. 93, 99 
(comments of the German and Argentinean Delegations); see also Moccia, supra note 119, 
at 661; Schlechtriem, UN-Kaufrecht, supra note 106, at 43. The Belgian delegation to the 
Vienna Conference also proposed an amendment to article 16(1} which would have 
included within the definition of an "acceptance" conduct that indicated assent merely to 
the "material" terms of the offer. See Fust Committee Deliberations (lOth Meeting), 
supra note 93, paras. 87-102. For similar reasons, the Belgian delegation likewise withdrew 
this proposaL See Fust Committee Deliberations (9th Meeting), supra note 93, paras. 72-
80. 
300. Notwithstanding its decision not to accept the original proposal of the Seaetary-
General, the Working Group found the proposal an "acceptable solution" to the "practical 
problem" of the collision of standard business terms. The Working Group simply was 
unwilling to impose contractual obligations on the parties where their declarations 
revealed continued disagreement over material terms. See Report on the Eighth Session, 
supra note 132, para. 110. 
301. Farnsworth, Vienna Convention, supra note 7. For a Canadian perspective on this 
issue, see Errol P. Mendes, The U.N. Sales Convention & U.S.-Canada 'liansactions; 
Enticing the World's Largest 'll"ading Bloc to Do Business Under a Global Sales Law, 8 
J.L. & Com. 109, 132 (1988). 
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parties' relationship that the formal partial dissensus reveals an 
absence of the common intent necessary for contract formation.302 
The essential, more problematic issue left unresolved under the 
Convention thus first presents itself when the parties nonetheless 
proceed to carry out their perceived "obligations." At an elemen-
tary level, this conduct of the parties reveals a clear-that is, even 
under the subsidiary standard of article 8(2), an "objective"-man-
ifestation of an agreement that contractual obligations exist. What 
remains unclear, however, is the scope of that agreement. The sim-
ple performance alone is ambiguous on this score.303 Once again, 
taken alone it is of expressive worth only on the fact of the com-
mon intent to conclude binding obligations, and not on the broader 
content of those obligations beyond the scope of the actual per-
formance itself (type and quantity of goods, purchase price, and 
the like). 
The determination of whether the performance expresses assent 
to more extensive obligations-specifically to the constructive 
counteroffer arising by operation of article 19(1 )-will, therefore, 
require reference to other indicative circumstances that attend and 
thus illuminate the meaning of the conduct of the parties. A 
proper starting point in this analysis is what is often the most indic-
ative factor in assessing the common intent of the parties,304 their 
statements and conduct in the course of their pre-contractual rela-
tionship.305 The one U.S. court that has addressed the effect of 
conduct in response to an offer under the U.N. Sales Convention in 
fact squarely concluded, on the basis of the flexibility inherent in 
article 8(3), that "the Court may consider previous relations 
between the parties in assessing whether a party's conduct consti-
tuted acceptance. "306 
By definition, a partial dissensus arises only where at least one of 
the parties proposes terms in the negotiation process over which 
302. See supra part IJ.A.3.a. 
303. Actions, according to the old adage, may indeed speak louder than words. In light 
of the flexible interpretive standards of the Convention, the essential point here is that 
they do not necessarily speak more clearly than the actual words that attend such actions. 
304. See CISG Kommentar (Junge), supra note 32, at 96. 
305. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(3); supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
306. Flianto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), 
appeal dismissed, 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993). The principal issue in this case was a motion 
for a stay pending arbitration. The court concluded that, in light of the prior dealings 
between the parties and the subsequent affirming statements and conduct of the party 
opposing the stay, there had been an agreement by the parties to arbitrate the matter in 
dispute. 789 F. Supp. at 1240-41. 
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they have failed to agree or have affirmatively disagreed.307 In the 
typical case, both parties will contribute to this partial dissensus, 
the one by insisting on her terms (often, but by no means always, in 
the form of standardized business conditions) together with her ini-
tial declaration and the other by insisting on his standard terms 
preceding or as part of his reply. Alternatively, in the case of a less 
structured process the parties exchange a variety of substantive 
proposals during their negotiations or achieve a series of under-
standings during their relationship, in the course of which both will 
make reference to their desired "contractual" terms and 
conditions.308 
Where the parties nonetheless proceed to perform, the forma-
tion values of the Convention discussed in detail in Part ill above 
in my view require a more refined approach than a "one-size-fits-
all" fiction of assent to the last declaration exchanged between 
them. Instead, these flexible formation values reveal that the 
meaning of the parties' respective conduct must be calibrated to 
the degree of clarity in the statements and expressive conduct pre-
ceding and attending that performance.309 
At the one end of the spectrum, there may well be 
unproblematic cases in which the original offeror fails to raise any 
objection to contractual obligations on the basis of foreign terms 
either in the offer or otherwise prior to performance (which might 
be termed a "passive partial dissensus"). Suppose an offer merely 
includes a general reference to the offeror's standardized terms and 
that this general reference neither expressly insists on the exclusive 
application of those terms nor rejects deviating terms proposed by 
the other party. Suppose then that the reply for its part expressly 
insists on the application of different or additional terms. Such are 
the cases whose resolution is defined by articles 19(1) and 18(1). 
Here, the prior dealings between the parties give little indication 
that the original offeror objects to contractual obligations on the 
basis of the terms proposed by the other party. If the original 
307. Where only one party has proposed tenns, the argument that there was a dissensus 
notwithstanding performance is a much more difficult one to make. In such a case-in 
contrast to that of partial dissensus addressed in the text-there would be no external 
indications to call into question the assent of the other party. 
308. For a discussion of the great variety of such flexible relationships in modem 
commerce, see supra part II.B. 
309. See supra parts lli.A. and C. Calibrating meaning to the facts of each specific case 
of course raises concerns that the approach I advocate here will frustrate the Convention's 
very purpose of bringing uniformity to international sales law. I address those concerns in 
part IV.B.3. 
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offeror then proceeds to perform in the face of the deviating terms 
in the reply to the offer and without objection to them, a "reason-
able person" as contemplated by article 8(2) may well understand 
her unqualified conduct as assent to the (constructive) counteroffer 
arising from the deviating acceptance rule in article 19(1). In this 
way, the "objective" standard of article 8(2) will indeed result in 
the protection of the reasonable expectations of the other party.310 
Where the declarations and expressive conduct of the original 
offeror prior to performance are not clouded by such ambiguity, 
however, an application of the interpretive values of the Conven-
tion militates in favor of a decidedly different conclusion. Consider 
the case in which the original offeror expressly and unambiguously 
insists-either as part of her original declaration or otherwise prior 
to performance-on the exclusive application of her own terms 
and/or objects in like fashion to contrary foreign terms (a state one 
might term an "affirmative partial dissensus"). Suppose that this 
express declaration of the offeror's intent also makes clear that it is 
of a continuing nature, that is, that it will continue to apply irre-
spective of the nature or legal effect of the reply of the other party. 
One might imagine a declaration in this respect in which the origi-
nal offeror rejects in advance any terms that deviate from those in 
the offer and affirmatively states that any subsequent conduct 
should not be understood as assent to such terms.311 If this express 
declaration of intent is made with sufficient clarity and promi-
nence, the Convention's flexible interpretive values should pre-
clude-absent further express communications between the 
parties-an assertion that the other party reasonably understood 
the subsequent conduct by the original offeror as reflecting a 
directly contrary implied assent to the constructive counteroffer 
arising from the operation of article 19(1). 
310. See Report on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, para. 22 (noting that where a party 
fails to express her intent clearly, the subsidiary standard of article 8(2) will operate to 
protect the reasonable expectations of the other party). If the original offeror nonetheless 
had a contrary subjective intent not revealed clearly by her declarations and conduct, she 
could, of course, seek to prove that the other party "knew or could not have been 
unaware" of that intent under the primary subjective standard of article 8(1). 
311. A clause of this type might read roughly as follows: "We hereby object to the 
application of any terms that you have proposed or will propose (whether in your reply to 
this offer or at any other time) to the extent that such terms are in addition to or different 
from those set forth herein. This declaration of our express intent shall remain effective 
notwithstanding the terms or legal effect of any reply to this offer. Except in the case of a 
prior express written agreement signed by an authorized officer of this company, under no 
circumstances should you understand any conduct on our part as an implied assent to any 
such additional or different terms proposed in your reply to this offer or at any other time." 
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It bears emphasis here that the indicative value of such an 
express declaration of intent is not somehow nullified by the lim-
ited legal consequence of the rejection of the related formal 
"offer." Once again, the simple fact that the legal construct of 
"offer" is terminated does not mean that the content of the declara-
tion ceases to be an "indication" of the original offeror's intent. 
Rather, in conformance with the flexible interpretive standards of 
article 8 such prior declarations in the course of the parties' negoti-
ations continue to have indicative effect, including in the assess-
ment of the meaning of the parties' subsequent conduct 312 
The relative weight of this express declaration of intent is rein-
forced, moreover, by the factual context of the performance. As is 
clear from the language of article 19, that performance will occur 
following an indication of "acceptance" by the original offeree of 
the terms proposed by the original offeror. The rejection manufac-
tured by article 19(1) of the formal offer results only when:~ the 
reply "purports to be an acceptance." By definition, then, in a case 
originally governed by article 19(1) the original offeror will pro-
ceed to perform under circumstances in which she reasonably 
could conclude (as a factual matter) that the other party has 
assented at some level to the conclusion of a contract on the basis 
of her original offer.313 Suppose then that the original offeror has 
also previously declared her express intent not to be bound to for-
eign contract terms. Even under the subsidiary objective standard 
there is little to support a fixed conclusion in such a case that a 
reasonable person would understand the content-neutral perform-
ance of the basic elements of the transaction as of a greater expres-
sive weight in favor of a contrary implied intent. 314 
This conclusion should apply with particular vigor where the 
express declaration of intent of the original offeror occurs separate 
from her formal offer. Here, the argument that the rejection man-
ufactured by article 19(1) of the formal offer somehow sweeps 
away the effect of the separate express declaration of intent is of 
312. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text. With regard to the issue of 
"continuing intent," see supra part N.A2. 
313. In this sense, the common term "deviating acceptance" should be an oxymoron in 
the context of the U.N. Sales Convention. The result of the rule in article 19(1) is that a 
deviating "acceptance" does not, in fact, operate as an acceptance. Thus, such an 
"acceptance" is from its very nature ambiguous. In spite of this, the fictional assent 
approach holds that after a purported acceptance in this form the mere performance so 
clearly expresses the original offeror's unqualified assent that adjudicators should dispense 
with an analysis of the specific facts surrounding that performance. 
314. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
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even less merit. Even proponents of the traditional "last shot" rule 
would (presumably) give this effect to the separate rejection of for-
eign contract terms if it occurred subsequent to the counteroffer 
created by article 19(1).315 In light of the required consideration of 
all relevant circumstances under the flexible interpretive standards 
of article 8, there is no compelling reason to treat a subsequent 
declaration and a prior declaration as of such a qualitative differ-
ence that one is given dispositive effect and the other is disre-
garded in its entirety. 
Finally, even if it is made as part of the original offer such an 
express declaration of intent should have near dispositive effect if it 
also extends to the authority of agents to indicate a contrary 
implied intent. If the original offeror expressly states, together with 
her declaration of an intent not to be bound to foreign terms, that 
the employees involved in the mere physical execution of the trans-
action do not have authority to preempt this declared intent, there 
is (absent other circumstances)316 effectively no latitude for a blan-
ket argument that those employees somehow had the apparent 
authority to do so nonetheless.317 And, significantly, the simple 
rejection of the formal offer imposed by article 19(1) cannot, at 
least without a corresponding agreement between the parties, 
315. Pursuant to article 17, the result of such a "rejection" would be a formal 
"termination" of the counteroffer. An interesting issue here is the proper treatment of 
such a subsequent insistence on the application of one's own terms that does not itself 
"purport to be an acceptance" in the sense of article 19(1), but also does not amount to a 
formal rejection of the previous constructive counteroffer (in the typical case neither party 
will even be aware of this counteroffer manufactured by article 19(1)). In such a case, both 
parties will have valid offers outstanding at the time of performance. Like the more 
common case of partial dissensus discussed in the text, it is precisely here that the principle 
of party autonomy assumes its appropriate function of defining the contours of the parties' 
relationship where neither has assented to the proposal of the other. 
316. A contrary "party practice" in the sense of article 9(1)-for example, if through 
repeated conduct the original offeror had agreed to certain terms in prior dealings between 
the parties-may lead the determinative reasonable person (see article 8(2)) to conclude 
that she nonetheless agreed to be bound by the terms of the counteroffer manufactured by 
article 19(1). This observation, however, only leads the analysis back to the flexible 
interpretive standards that militate against the blanket conclusion of the fictional assent 
rule and in favor of the consensus approach advocated here. 
317. With regard to the United States, see Property Advisory Group, Inc. v. Bevona, 718 
F. Supp. 209, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("A party claiming reliance on an agent's apparent 
authority must not fail to heed warnings or inconsistent circumstances."), citing General 
Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin Int'l, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 684, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), afrd 
without opinion, 718 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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affect the separate factual issue of the original offeror's internal 
allocation of authority.31B 
Indeed, this matter cannot even be resolved within uniform 
international sales law, for the U.N. Sales Convention defers to 
national law to resolve such issues of the authority of an agent to 
bind her principal.319 The principal may indeed ratify the actions 
of her agents. But again, in light of the express declaration of 
intent the mere subsequent silence or inaction of the principal can-
not reasonably be understood as expressing a contrary implied 
intent beyond the basic elements of the transaction actually per-
formed by the parties. 
As the better-reasoned approach leads to the conclusion that in 
the case of an affirmative partial dissensus the original offeror does 
not, simply through performance alone, assent to the counteroffer 
arising from a deviating acceptance, where does this leave the anal-
ysis of the parties' relationship? The sum of the above analysis is 
that the resolution of such a case of a partial dissensus cannot be 
found in a rigid application of the offer-acceptance scheme. The 
fundamental flaw with such an approach is that the statements and 
conduct of neither of the parties can be interpreted as the requisite 
"indication of assent" to the formal declaration of the other {the 
offer or constructive counteroffer). As a result, although through 
their performance the parties have manifested an agreement on the 
creation of binding obligations that is enforceable under the princi-
ple of party autonomy,320 they have not done so by way of the for-
mal acceptance of a formal offer on which the process assumptions 
of the Convention are based. 
318. In light of the express disavowal of authority by the principal, the actions of the 
employees themselves cannot create the predicate "agreement" of the principal necessary 
to give the employees the apparent authority to do so. SeeD & G Equip. Co. v. FII'St Nat'l 
Bank of Greencastle, 764 F.2d 950, 954 (3d Cir. 1985) ("An agent cannot, simply by his 
own words, invest himself with apparent authority. Such authority emanates from the 
actions of the principal and not the agent"), quoting Jennings v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 
414 Pa. 641, 202 A.2d 51, 54 (1964); cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 168 (1958) ("A 
disclosed or partially disclosed principal is not thereby subject to liability because of untrue 
representations by an agent as to the existence or extent of his authority or the facts upon 
which it depends."). 
319. See Honnold, supra note 8, at 116; CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 
32, at 122; see also the Decision of the District Court of Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 26, 
1990, case no. 5 0 543/88, reprinted in UNILEX, supra note 18, at 43-44. 
320. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text In so doing, the parties overcome 
the basic policy concerns that underlie article 19, and that led to a rejection of proposals 
during the drafting process for a more accommodating approach to the recognition of 
contractual obligations. See supra notes 296-302 and accompanying text 
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It is precisely in such situations that the principle of party auton-
omy assumes its appropriate function in the hierarchy of norms of 
uniform international sales law. Because it is only the factual 
agreement of the parties in the form of their performance that 
establishes the contractual nature of their relationship,321 the con-
tours of the relationship are likewise appropriately constructed on 
the basis of.-and, significantly, limited by-the scope of that actual 
common intent. The application of this basic principle of party 
autonomy will mean that the parties' respective rights and obliga-
tions will, as an initial proposition, be defined by the scope of the 
conformity between their respective prior-and for that matter 
subsequent322-declarations. In practical outcome, the result will 
be that the parties' contract will consist of the terms on which their 
writings (in particular their standardized business terms) are in 
agreement. For it is to that extent alone that the parties have 
achieved the requisite common intent in the sense of the principle 
of party autonomy.323 In accordance with the flexibility of that 
principle itself,324 each party may also attempt to prove a broader 
(or more limited) common intent on the basis of implied (or less 
formal express) agreements between them, including by reference 
to established party practices and usages of trade.325 
321. The recognition of a binding contract under the Convention will require that the 
determinative consensus of the parties extend to the essential elements of a sales 
transaction as identified by article 14(1) (that is, the goods, quantity, and price). Where, 
even without actual performance, there is an agreement on these essential terms and 
neither party makes formation contingent on assent to other terms, a contract is created on 
such an agreement alone. See Bianca & Bonell (Etlrsi), supra note 14, at 138; cf. Murray, 
Convention, supra note 46, at 17 (arguing that if a reasonable person would conclude that 
the parties had a mutual intent to be bound notwithstanding an absence of agreement even 
on the price, a contract is formed under CISG). 
322. Under article 29(1), the parties may effectively modify the terms of their contract 
by "mere agreement." 
323. Traditionalists may suggest that this approach in its practical effect permits a 
"partial" acceptance of an offer, and that this runs contrary to the Convention's offer-
acceptance scheme as supplemented by the policy of the practical "mirror image" rule of 
article 19(1). Such a suggestion would miss the point. The contract recognized under this 
approach is not formed by an acceptance of part of the counteroffer manufactured by 
article 19; it is, rather, the absence of an acceptance of the formal counteroffer that creates 
the legal situation on which the approach advocated here is based. The core of such a 
contract is instead defined by those matters on which the performance of the parties has 
actual expressive worth (goods, price, quantity, et cetera). The remainder of the 
contractual obligations of the parties is then shaped by the common intent revealed by 
their prior writings (with each party free to prove that the actual common intent is broader 
or more limited). 
324. See supra part ill.A.l. 
325. See supra part III.A.3. (discussing the application of "party practices" and express 
and implied usages of trade). 
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Where gaps remain, the express "sale of goods" provisions in 
Part ill of the Convention likewise assume their appropriate func-
tion in the Convention's hierarchy of norms. This function of 
defining the "background" to the parties' relationship carries with 
it two important implications for the contours of the parties' con-
tractual obligations. Flrst, as express provisions of the Convention, 
the substantive rights and obligations defined in Part ill do not 
depend for their application on a corresponding agreement of the 
parties. The contrary proposition is worthy of equal emphasis: As 
important values in themselves, these express provisions, as the 
negative implication of the principle of party autonomy makes 
clear, must be given effect in absence of an actual, contrary, com-
mon intent of the parties.326 In other words, in defining the con-
tours of the parties' respective obligations the absence of a 
common intent between them on a particular matter is the sole 
necessary condition for the application of a substantive provision 
of the Convention governing that matter. 
In this way, this approach-which I will refer to as the "consen-
sus approach"-supports in a particular way the principles underly-
ing the Convention's hierarchy of norms. In light of the 
increasingly common use of standardized business terms by parties 
in international commerce, together with the increasing ease and 
rapidity of their transmission,327 a consequence of the rigid ''win-
ner-take-all" effect of the fictional assent rule is what can fairly be 
termed "unilaterally imposed default rules." Application of the 
consensus approach, in contrast, will result in a displacement of the 
Convention's substantive background rules only where one side 
can establish a corresponding actual agreement (or "consensus") 
between the parties (either on the basis of their writings or 
otherwise ).328 
326. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text (explaining that the failure 
adequately to account for this important negative implication of the principle of party 
autonomy is one of the principal failings of the fictional assent rule). The application of 
that rule results in a wholesale displacement of the substantive provisions of the 
Convention in favor of the standard terms of one of the parties even where there is a clear 
affirmative dissensus between them over the effect of those terms. 
327. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. 
328. With respect to the common use of the term "consensus," see supra note 43. 
Reasonable persons can disagree, of course, about the substantive merit of the particular 
background rules in the Convention. Nonetheless, their adoption by the drafters and 
subsequent ratification at the Vienna Conference reOect a policy determination that they 
should apply in absence of a contrary consensus of the parties. 
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The practical outcome of the consensus approach thus differs 
markedly from that under the traditional "last shot" rule. Where 
the parties continue to disagree over matters such as governing law 
and the extent of liability for implied warranties and consequential 
damages, the consensus approach does not arbitrarily choose the 
standard business terms of one party or the other. This approach 
likewise does not leave such significant issues as the forum and 
manner of dispute resolution solely to the timing of the last techni-
cal reference to a party's general conditions of sale or purchase. 
Instead, where the parties proceed to perform without achieving an 
agreement on these issues, their respective standard terms are 
given effect only to the extent of the overlap between them. If a 
seller's terms include an arbitration clause, for example, a binding 
agreement to arbitrate will arise only if the buyer's form contains a 
corresponding term. In the absence of such an agreement between 
the respective standard business terms, therefore, the substantive 
"background" provisions of the Convention will define the parties' 
rights and obligations as buyer and seller. 
Fmally, one German court has already interpreted the U.N. 
Sales Convention to require a practical conclusion similar to this 
consensus approach.329 At issue in the case before it was the effec-
tiveness of a choice-of-law provision contained in a German 
buyer's standard conditions of purchase. The court initially 
observed that if the Italian seller had responded to the buyer's 
order with its own standard terms (a disputed factual issue), this 
reply would have amounted to a counteroffer under the deviating 
acceptance rule of CISG article 19.330 Although the parties none-
theless proceeded to perform, the court did not apply the tradi-
tional "last shot" approach to resolve the partial dissensus between 
them. Instead, the court concluded that through this performance 
the parties had manifested a fundamental consensus on the essen-
tial terms of the contract but had either "waived their claim to the 
application of their respective standard business terms or dero-
gated from Art. 19- in exercise of their party autonomy under Art. 
6." As a consequence, "[t]he contract would then have been con-
cluded on the basis of the [background] rules of CISG."331 
329. Decision of the Local Court of Kehl, Gennany, No. C 925/93 (Oct. 6, 1995), 
reported in 1996 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-RR [NJW-RR] 565. 
330. NJW-RR, at 565. 
331. NJW-RR, at 566 [trans. by author]. Interestingly, the court arrived at this 
conclusion without any analysis of the parties' prior declarations and conduct. In this case 
of a partial dissensus between the parties, the court instead simply disregarded the parties 
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2. The Consensus Approach and a Preemptive Response to 
Traditionalists 
93 
'fraditionalists would likely argue that the consensus approach 
advocated above upsets the structure of the contract formation 
scheme under the Convention. They would likely assert that the 
Convention's formation provisions are premised exclusively on a 
formal offer and a subsequent, perfectly conforming acceptance, as 
the Convention's definition of when a contract is concluded332 and 
the references in its drafting history to "two unilateral acts" would 
seem to refiect.333 They would, moreover, likely point out the 
inability of the drafters of the Convention to agree on appropriate 
language for a provision that would have expressly recognized con-
tracts formed without a clearly identified formal offer and formal 
acceptance (as is found in the Uniform Commercial Code in the 
United States).334 
respective standardized tenns and applied the background rules of the Convention. Id. 
The court also concluded in the alternative that the buyer's standard tenns would not have 
become part of the contract because they were in the German language and the 
negotiations between the parties had been conducted in Italian. ld. 
332. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 23 ("A contract is concluded at the moment when an 
acceptance of an offer becomes effective in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention."). 
333. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 15, para. 2, Official Records, at 24 
{observing that for purposes of interpretation the Convention views even an integrated 
contract as a "product of two unilateral acts"). 
334. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1987) (stating that conduct of the parties that "recognizes 
the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale" even though their 
formal written declarations do not otherwise do so); see also U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (explaining 
that a sales contract "may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including 
conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract"). The United 
Kingdom made a proposal to incorporate a similar provision in the U.N. Sales Convention 
late in the drafting process. A working group formed by the Commission to address the 
issue then proposed a provision that would have recognized a contract based on "the 
mutual assent of the parties to form it, even though it is not possible to establish an offer 
and an acceptance." See Formation Deliberations, supra note 83, paras. 99-104. The 
Commission discussed this proposal and subsequent revisions in its 192d, 193d, 195th, and 
200th meetings, held in the period June 1-7, 1978. The "Summary Records" of those 
meetings are contained in U.N. Docs. NCN.9/SR.192, 193, 195, and 200, respectively. 
Although there was support for the substance of the proposal, the records of the 
deliberations reveal that the delegates were simply unable to agree so late in the drafting 
process on the proper wording of a corresponding provision. See Summary Record of the 
200th Meeting, U.N. Doc. NCN.9/SR.200, at 5 (announcement of the United Kingdom 
representative "that his delegation was withdrawing its request for the inclusion of the 
additional article in order to spare the Commission further time and trouble"); Formation 
Deliberations, supra note 83, para. 104 ("The proposals were withdrawn because of the 
extreme difficulty of formulating an acceptable text."). The Working Group also failed to 
adopt a similar proposal by the Secretary-General early in the drafting process. See 
Secretary-General Formation Report, supra note 82, proposed alternative art. 6(4)(b). The 
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Such a rigid view of contracting under the Convention in my 
view misses the mark on at least two levels. Ftrst, the fictional 
assent rule seems to proceed from the premise that the process 
assumptions of the Convention are of such a prescriptive rigidity 
that they must be imposed on the parties even to the point of frus-
trating clearly expressed intent.335 The core formation values of 
the Convention discussed above belie this premise.336 There may 
indeed be circumstances in which the party disadvantaged by the 
fictional assent rule will fail to express her intent with sufficient 
clarity such that her unqualified performance may "reasonably" be 
viewed as assent to the entirety of the counteroffer manufactured 
by article 19(1). Neither this alone nor its conjunction with the 
offer-acceptance scheme in general justifies-much less requires-
an approach that disregards the flexible interpretive values of the 
Convention in favor of stylized assumptions about how parties 
express their intent (particularly in light of the widely divergent 
cultural and legal systems337 represented among the Convention's 
contracting states).338 
Moreover, a mere structural observation about the necessity of 
two declarations of assent does little to illuminate the analysis of 
the partial dissensus issue. Of course, even the determinative con-
sensus under article 6 requires that each party contribute an intent. 
And it would be a rare case indeed if one indication of intent did 
only explanation given for this decision was the cryptic statement that the provision was 
"unnecessary." See Report on the Eighth Session, supra note 132. 
335. Although article 23 defines the moment of contract formation with reference to 
offers and acceptances, this provision does not operate to preclude the recognition of a 
contract concluded in a less formal manner. See Bianca & Bonell (Farnsworth), supra note 
14, at 199; CISG Kommentar (Schlechtriem), supra note 32, at 195. 
336. See supra part ill.B. 
337. 'll'aditionalists may respond that the need to address this diversity provides a policy 
justification for requiring a rigid rule for the treatment of a partial dissensus. Such non-
interpretive policy justifications are explored (and rejected) supra part IV.A.3. There is 
simply little to support-and much to refute-a suggestion that the elemental requirement 
of an "indication" of assent (as determined under the flexible interpretive standards of 
article 8) to the assumption of contractual obligations is to be disregarded in the case of a 
partial dissensus solely in the interests of "clarity." With respect to the role of uniformity 
under the consensus approach I advocate here, see infra part IV.B.3. 
338. The relative clarity of certain indicative factors may, after sufficient time and 
experience with CISG's interpretive standards in international contracting, permit 
generalized statements about what will "often" or "typically" be revealed by the presence 
of those factors in a particular context. The diversity of cultures involved in international 
contracting coupled with the mandated flexibility in interpretive inquiries under the 
Convention counsels, however, against a hasty adoption of interpretive presumptions so 
rigid in their application that they cease being an aid and begin to be an independent 
impediment to ascertaining intent. 
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not precede the other in time. The approach I advocate above sim-
ply gives effect to the core agreement of the parties where neither 
of those separate indications of intent can be interpreted as an 
unqualified assent to the content of the other party's formal decla-
ration (the offer or constructive counteroffer), but the parties 
nonetheless manifest a broader common understanding (a consen-
sus) on the creation of binding obligations.339 
In this sense, the consensus approach does not operate to dis-
place the express formation provisions of the Convention. Rather, 
on the basis of the principle of the primacy of party autonomy it 
serves in this context merely to accommodate a relationship of the 
parties formed in a manner not embraced by a rigid application of 
the offer-acceptance scheme. Articles 14 through 24 are admit-
tedly premised on "offers" and "acceptances." Nonetheless, as we 
have already seen, the drafters early on rejected attempts to struc-
ture the Convention on the basis of a policy of prescriptive, 
mandatory provisions. The compelling weight of authority thus 
correctly holds that the Convention's formation values are of suffi-
cient flexibility as to embrace contractual relationships formed in a 
manner that does not track the offer-unconditional acceptance 
format.340 
Even if one were to ignore party autonomy and read the Con-
vention to require that the actions of the parties be reconstructed 
to fit a rigid model of formal offer and formal acceptance, the con-
sensus approach would still be the preferable solution to the treat-
339. If the original offeror's express objection to foreign tenns were to occur subsequent 
to the receipt of the deviating acceptance, the counteroffer manufactured by article 19(1} 
would terminate by operation of article 17. If the parties nonetheless proceed \vith 
performance, traditionalists would presumably require that the performance be parsed into 
an offer by conduct and an acceptance by conduct, but that the content of the contract 
nonetheless be defined by the scope of the actual agreement of the parties. My thesis is 
that the same substantive outcome should obtain where the counteroffer manufactured by 
article 19(1) cannot be given effect for lack of a corresponding indication of assent by the 
original offeror (that is, where her mere performance cannot be interpreted as assent to the 
content of such counteroffer). 
340. See Honnold, supra note 8, at 192 ("The Convention does not compel the 
stretching or amputation of a living understanding to fit the Procrustean bed of 'offer' and 
'acceptance.'"); Rehbinder, supra note 32, at 166 (explaining that contract formations are 
possible under the Convention even in the absence of a clearly identified offer and 
acceptance if it is clear "that a material consensus was achieved and parties intended to be 
bound") (trans. by author); Piltz, supra note 41, at 15; cf. Summary Record of the !95th 
Meeting, UN. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.195, at 3 (statement of E. Allan Farnsworth} (observing in 
connection with the proposal of the United Kingdom for a corresponding express provision 
"that all legal systems recognized the principle of offer and acceptance but were not so 
rigid as to preclude situations where that principle was not strictly applied"). 
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ment of a partial dissensus. What is often overlooked in the 
analysis of the issue of performance notwithstanding a partial dis-
sensus is that interpretation is required of the actions of both par-
ties. That is, where the party making the "final" deviating 
declaration proceeds with performance (typically the seller ship-
ping the goods) the meaning of that performance must likewise be 
subjected to the interpretive standards of article 8. The purpose of 
this exercise is to identify what this party is substantively proposing 
with respect to the creation of contractual obligations. Under the 
Convention, an intent to make a binding offer can arise solely from 
the conduct of the offeror, 341 including the shipment of goods by 
the seller, although the negotiations of the parties have not yet led 
to the creation of a binding contract. 
In resolving this interpretive issue, it is important to observe that 
the meaning of this proposal must be determined according to the 
understanding of a reasonable person in the position of the other 
party (in this context the original offeror). 342 Though all of the fac-
tors discussed above in connection with the consensus approach 
will apply also in this interpretation,343 two will be of particular 
significance: (1) the original responsive declaration of the party 
now beginning with performance will reflect neither a rejection nor 
a counteroffer but rather an "acceptance;"344 and (2) in the com-
mon case of an affirmative partial dissensus the other party will 
already have insisted on the exclusive application of her own terms 
and/or rejected foreign terms prior to that performance. 
In light of these considerations, the more compelling interpreta-
tion-if one were forced to reshape the transaction to fit stylized 
notions of "offer" and "acceptance"-of the content of the propo-
sal arising from the initial performance is the following: that the 
parties proceed with performance on the basis of the express 
agreement thus far achieved on the essential terms of the transac-
tion and that they disregard the partial dissensus between them. 345 
341. Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 160, at 83. 
342. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(2). Of course, the original offeree/counterofferor 
remains free to attempt to prove a contrary subjective intent of which the other party 
"knew or could not have been unaware" as contemplated by article 8(1). 
343. See supra part IV.B.l. 
344. The rule of article 19(1), once again, only applies where the reply to the original 
offer purports to be an acceptance. 
345. Such an interpretation that accommodates the interests of both parties is 
particularly appropriate in the standard case in which the original offeree is the seller (it is 
the buyer that commonly marks the end of informal discussions by forwarding a purchase 
order and the seller that initiates performance through the shipment of the goods). If the 
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In other words, where the party beginning with performance has 
already received an unequivocal rejection of her proposed terms, 
but nonetheless proceeds to perform without clarifying the broader 
scope of the parties' relationship, the more principled interpreta-
tion is that this performance "indicates" an intent to ignore the 
lack of agreement over non-essential terms in favor of a binding 
relationship on the basis of the express agreement on the essential 
terms of the transaction.346 
It will, of course, often be the case that the party beginning with 
performance will likewise have insisted on the exclusive applica-
tion of her own terms. In this form of an affirmative partial clissen-
sus, the consensus approach I advocate above should apply with 
particular force. Where the parties proceed with the performance 
of the contemplated transaction, notwithstanding such an obvious 
dissensus over the respective non-essential terms proposed by 
them, the appropriate resolution consonant with the formation val-
ues of the Convention and the reality of the mutual rejection of 
foreign terms is to construct the content of the parties' obligations 
on the basis of the actual conformity between their respective 
express declarations.347 
Fmally, the reasoning of the German Supreme Civil Court 
(known by its German acronym BGH)348 with respect to the treat-
ment of partial clissensus under domestic German law is illuminat-
ing on this score as well. The Civil Code in that country also 
prescribes a "mirror image rule" for the treatment of deviating 
parties in fact understand the deviating acceptance as a rejection {the premise of the 
fictional assent rule), no reasonable seller would undertake the expense and risk of 
shipping the goods to the buyer (particularly in light of the distances typically involved in 
international transactions) without a binding contractual relationship and at the same time 
propose terms so contrary to the buyer's interests that the buyer would be compelled to 
reject the proposed contract upon arrival of the goods. This commercially significant fact is 
certainly among the "relevant circumstances" that must be considered under the 
interpretive standards of article 8. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(3). 
346. The burden of proving the content of the proposal will, pursuant to the structure of 
article 8, admittedly fall on this other party (the original offeror). Even where she fails to 
meet this burden, however, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that she has 
assented to the content of the counteroffer manufactured by article 19(1}. The original 
offeree will have the burden on that score. As I discuss in part N.A., if a contrary intent is 
clearly expressed in the original offer, this burden will often likewise not be satisfied. The 
only principled means remaining to define the content of such a relationship is the actual 
consensus of the parties. 
347. See supra part N .B.l. 
348. Bundesgerichtshof. 
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acceptances.349 In addition, the Code sets forth an express pre-
sumption that the parties lack an intent to be bound where they 
have failed to agree on all terms proposed by either of them in the 
negotiation process.350 Notwithstanding these injunctions, the 
BGH recognized as early as the 1970s that a binding contract may 
be formed if, through performance or otherwise, the parties recog-
nize the existence of a contract in spite of a clear partial dissensus 
arising from their formal declarations.351 
The more instructive aspect of the German Supreme Civil 
Court's treatment of partial dissensus is the priority it accords 
express indications of intent over traditional notions of fictional 
assent. Where a party has expressly insisted on the exclusive appli-
cation of its own terms and/or objected to foreign terms in a like 
manner, the BGH has refused to interpret the mere performance 
of the basic elements of the transaction as a contrary implied assent 
to the entire content of the other party's formal declaration, in par-
ticular the standardized terms referred to therein.352 What is signif-
icant here is that the Court has given effect to such express 
indications of intent in spite of a traditional fictional assent rule 
that otherwise applies in Germany as well (where it is known as the 
"theory of the last word").353 
Where the parties nonetheless proceed to perform, the conse-
quence with respect to the content of the resulting contract is a 
straightforward one for the BGH. In application of the fundamen-
349. BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 150(2) (F.R.G.) {"An acceptance subject to 
additions, limitations or other deviations operates as a rejection coupled with a new 
offer."). 
350. Id. § 154{1) ("In cases of doubt, no contract is concluded as long as the parties have 
not agreed on all terms of the contract on which, according to the declaration of even one 
of them, an agreement should be made."). 
351. See, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 26, 1973, BGH (F.R.G.), Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift [NJW] 2106; Judgment of Oct. 6, 1974, BGH (F.R.G.), Der Betriebsberater 
1136. 
352. See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 20, 1985, BGH (F.R.G.), NJW 1838, 1839 (concluding 
that the decisive issue is the intent that emerges from an express objection to foreign terms 
in the formal declaration of the original offeror; absent additional contrary circumstances, 
a change from that intent "in particular cannot be seen in the fact that [she] did not object 
again to the standardized terms of [the other party] and accepted delivery of the goods 
without reservation"). 
353. The "theory of the last word" ("Theorie des letzten Wortes") is the German analog 
to the "last shot rule" in the United States. This approach governed in all cases in 
Germany as well until the modifications initiated by the BGH beginning in the 1970s. See 
Hermann Ebel, Die Kollision Allgemeiner Geschliftsbedingungen, NJW 1033; P. Ulmer et 
al., AGB-Gesetz § 2, at 181-83 (7th ed. 1993). For an English language discussion of this 
development in German law, see A.T. von Mehren, The 'Battle of the Forms': A 
Comparative View, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 265, 290-96 (1990). 
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tal role of the common intent of the parties in the creation of con-
tractual obligations, the content of the contract must be defined in 
terms of the conforming provisions of the parties' respective writ-
ten forms: 
it emerges from the will of the parties that those terms ... 
should be given effect that are contained in the parties' 
standardized forms[,] have the same content and thus are 
assented to by both parties.354 
In absence of proof of an implied agreement on the subject, the 
substantive background law assumes its appropriate role, in the 
view of the BGH, of filling gaps in the parties' agreement.355 
Although the BGH has not discussed in any detail the theoreti-
cal bases for its conclusions,356 its reasoning is instructive for an 
analysis of this issue under the U.N. Sales Convention as well. As 
does the Convention, German law identifies an offer and its 
unqualified acceptance as the general "building blocks" of con-
tracts.357 Moreover, in contrast to the Convention the German 
Civil Code does not contain an express provision similar to article 6 
of the Convention establishing the consensus of the parties as the 
prime norm in the recognition of contractual obligations. 
The BGH has nonetheless arrived at a conclusion consonant 
with the consensus approach discussed above by rejecting fictional 
notions of implied assent where a party has made an express indi-
cation of an intent not to be bound to contractual obligations uni-
laterally proposed by the other party. Where-through their 
performance or otherwise-both parties recognize the existence of 
a contract without requiring agreement on the various terms previ-
ously proposed, the appropriate approach in the view of the BGH 
is to limit their contractual rights and obligations to the conformity 
354. Judgment of Mar. 20, 1985, BGH (F.RG.), NJW at 1839. 
355. Id. 
356. Although the BGH has focused its analysis primarily on the treatment of the 
standardized terms routinely exchanged by the parties in modem commerce, it has not 
discussed the specific role of the offer-acceptance scheme defined for contract formation 
under German law. See Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) §§ 145-53. As noted in the text, 
in the case of an express rejection of foreign terms by the original offeror the Court has 
structured its analysis on the basis of first principles by asking: FJ.J'St. do the statements and 
conduct of the parties establish a consensus on the creation of contractual obligations? 
Second, what is the consensus of the parties with respect to the content of those 
obligations? Whatever the specific role of the offer-acceptance scheme in this analysis, the 
BGH has not viewed that scheme to be of such a prescriptive rigidity that it must be 
applied even in frustration of the actual expressed intent of the parties. 
357. See id. §§ 145-51. 
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between their prior declarations of intent. This reasoning applies 
with equal vigor to the U.N. Sales Convention.358 
3. Accommodating the Needs of Uniformity 
In advocating a "consensus approach" to the treatment of partial 
dissensus under the Convention I am cognizant of the possibility of 
an increased level of flexibility in the analysis as compared to the 
rigid fictional assent rule. In contrast to that traditional "one-size-
fits-all" rule, the consensus approach analyzed above argues that 
the formation values of the Convention require a flexible interpre-
tation of the performance of the original offeror that is calibrated 
to the degree of clarity in her prior express indications of intent. 
This level of flexibility directly implicates the admonition in article 
7(1) that in the interpretation of the Convention itself, "regard ... 
be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application. "359 
In the development of a consensus approach to the treatment of 
partial dissensus under CISG, therefore, the interests of uniformity 
of application may well require courts to fashion appropriate, spe-
cific standards for the declaration of a party's unwillingness to be 
bound to foreign contract terms. These standards should at a mini-
mum include the following: First, courts should demand that such 
an expression of intent be made conspicuously and/or outside of 
the party's standardized form. It should likewise be appropriate to 
insist that the expression include not only an explicit insistence on 
the exclusive application of one's own terms but also, and perhaps 
more important, an unequivocal objection to deviating terms pro-
posed by the other party. Finally, the express declaration of intent 
should make clear that it is of a continuing nature, that is, that the 
rejection of contractual obligations on the basis of foreign terms 
358. Indeed, in contrast to the BGB, see § 154, para. 1, the Convention contains no 
express presumption that the parties lack an intent to be bound where they have failed to 
agree on all terms proposed by either of them in the negotiation process. A proposal to 
include such a presumption in the Convention was rejected as "unnecessary." See Report 
on the Ninth Session, supra note 57, para. 208; supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. 
359. For a discussion of the importance of a uniform application of the Convention, see 
John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action-Uniform International Words: Uniform 
Application?, 8 J.L. & Com. 207 (1988). See V. Susanne Cook, Note, The Need for 
Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 197 (1988). 
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will continue to apply irrespective of the nature of the formal 
response of the other party.36° 
The articulation of such standards will ensure uniformity in the 
application of the consensus approach by national courts in trans-
actions governed by the Convention. At the same time, these 
requirements of clarity in a party's rejection of foreign terms will 
address any concerns that the consensus approach will introduce 
unnecessary uncertainty to the formation process. An expression 
of intent that satisfies such standards will thus serve a marking 
function; that is, it will signal from the outset of the potential rela-
tionship of the parties that the mere subsequent performance by 
the original offeror following a deviating acceptance should not 
(without further inquiry) be interpreted as an unqualified assent to 
the counteroffer manufactured by article 19(1). In terms of the 
concept of "continuing intent" explored above,361 such an unam-
biguous expression of intent will make clear that it is of such a 
broad and permanent nature that it will survive the termination of 
the formal legal construct of offer that is imposed on the parties by 
the interaction of article 19(1) and article 17. 
An expression of intent that satisfies the defined standards of 
clarity and prominence will simultaneously preclude an application 
of the fiction of assent upon which the rigid traditional rule is 
based and create the foundation for the consensus approach I have 
advocated here. If, in spite of such a clear expression of continuing 
intent, the parties proceed with performance without clarifying the 
effect of the partial dissensus between them, the contours of their 
relationship are appropriately limited to the express consensus 
360. U.S. case law in this country on the necessary content of an "expressly made 
conditional" clause as contemplated by U.C.C. § 2-207(1) may prove instructive in the 
development of correlative standards under the U.N. Sales Convention. This clause of§ 2-
207(1) has the effect of precluding the formation of a contract, notwithstanding a "definite 
and seasonable expression of acceptance" as contemplated by the initial clause of the 
section. See J. White & R. Summers, The Uniform Commercial Code 41-42 (3d ed. 1988). 
The prevailing interpretation of the "expressly made conditional" clause of § 2-207(1) is a 
strict one. The seminal opinion in this area holds that an offeree satisfies the clause only if 
the reply to the offer "clearly reveals that the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the 
transaction unless he is assured of the offeror's assent to the additional or different terms." 
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972). For a recent case 
discussing this clause, see Thft-Peirce Mfg. Co. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1220, 
1225-26 (D.RL 1992). Although § 2-207(1) addresses the responsive declaration as 
opposed to the original proposal that is the subject of the discussion in the text, the foeus of 
the analysis is the same: whether a party has with sufficient clarity expressed its 
unwillingness to be bound to contractual obligations as proposed by the other party. 
361. See supra part IV.A2. 
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arising from the conformity between their respective standard con-
tract terms. Where, in contrast, the expression of the original 
offeror fails to satisfy the standards of clarity articulated in the 
development of the consensus approach, her performance without 
reservation may reasonably be interpreted as assent to the content 
of the counteroffer resulting from the application of the deviating 
acceptance rule of article 19(1). 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods presents for contract scholars a unique oppor-
tunity to reexamine the assumptions of traditional contract law 
and, where appropriate, cast off those assumptions that have 
cemented themselves into static rules detached from the interpre-
tive values they purport to reflect. In the formation context, the 
Convention admittedly proceeds, at a structural level, from the 
traditional assumption that private actors express their assent to 
the creation of contractual obligations through a formal offer and a 
formal acceptance. Similar traditional notions are also to be found 
in the treatment of a deviating acceptance: The inability of the 
drafters of the Convention to agree on a comprehensive solution 
for this issue left only a narrow compromise that, in its practical 
effect, merely carries forward the traditional assumption that such 
a deviating acceptance amounts to a rejection of the offer coupled 
with a counteroffer. 
The difficult issue comes in assessing the precise role of these 
process assumptions in the formation scheme of the Convention. 
Some commentators have concluded that the adherence to tradi-
tional notions reflects a prescriptive rigidity in the Convention's 
express formation provisions. The traditional constructs of "offer" 
and "acceptance" thus operate as the "atomic particles" of the for-
mation process, as irreducible and indispensable elements in the 
formation of a contractual relationship. As a consequence, under 
this view the recognition of contractual obligations requires that in 
all cases the declarations and conduct of the parties be recon-
structed to fit the lockstep offer-unconditional acceptance format. 
The fallout from this rigid interpretation has also infected the 
received wisdom on the interpretation of the formation process 
where the parties proceed to perform notwithstanding a conflict 
between their formal declarations. Traditionalist scholars have 
argued that the Convention's formation scheme mandates in such 
situations that the last formal declaration exchanged between the 
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parties be given effect in its entirety. I have termed this approach 
the "fictional assent" rule, for it prescribes an inflexible conclusion 
of assent apparently irrespective of the clarity of the expressed 
intent of the parties. As the label implies, my examination of this 
traditional approach through the prism of the principles and poli-
cies of the Convention has found the fictional assent rule lacking. 
The primary deficiency of that approach is that it fails ade-
quately to accommodate a variety of more flexible and informal 
relationships in modem commerce that the law would nonetheless 
recognize as contractual in nature. It is often precisely because of 
these attributes of their relationship that the parties are unwilling 
or unable to assume the effort and/or incur the cost necessary to 
reach an express agreement on all of the details proposed in the 
course of their negotiations. 
I have described this common state of affairs as a "dissensus" 
between the parties, specifically, a "partial dissensus." Not all 
cases of such a partial dissensus are the same. The dissensus 
between the parties over the respective terms proposed by them 
can range from an affirmative, express disagreement to a passive 
failure to agree. Where they nonetheless proceed to perform, the 
fictional assent rule would disregard the specific nature or degree 
of their partial dissensus and instead impose an apparently inflexi-
ble conclusion of mutual assent to the entirety of the last formal 
declaration exchanged between them. 
The above analysis of the role of a partial dissensus in contract 
formation reveals that the appropriate resolution of this issue is to 
be found not in such a rigid application of the offer-acceptance 
structure, but rather in a deeper appreciation of the values that 
underlie the recognition of contractual obligations in the first 
place. These values include a heightened flexibility in the search 
for intent and meaning, a primacy of the common intent of the 
parties ("party autonomy") even in the face of express provisions 
of the Convention, and a hostility to normative solutions for intent-
based interpretive issues. 
The confluence of these flexible formation values makes clear 
that the treatment of a partial dissensus requires a more refined 
analysis than the traditional "last shot" rule. This traditional 
approach correctly recognizes that through their performance the 
parties have manifested an enforceable agreement creating con-
tractual obligations. What is unclear is the content of that agree-
ment. My thesis is that the meaning of the parties' performance on 
this score must be determined with reference to the nature of the 
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prior partial dissensus between them. Specifically, the interpreta-
tion of the expressive value of the performance of the party who 
has not made the "last declaration" must be calibrated to the 
degree of clarity in her prior express declarations of intent. 
Where the party in this position has prominently, clearly, and 
expressly declared her continuing intent not to be bound to foreign 
terms and/or insisted in a like manner on the exclusive application 
of her own terms (a situation I have referred to as an "affirmative 
partial dissensus"), the mere performance of the basic aspects of 
the contemplated transaction should not-absent other, more com-
pelling circumstances-be interpreted as an unqualified assent to 
the constructive counteroffer of the other party. The essential ele-
ment here is the expression of a continuing intent, that is, an intent 
not to be bound to foreign terms irrespective of the nature of the 
response of the other party. Where this expression is of sufficient 
clarity and prominence, I argue that the interpretive values of the 
Convention require that this express manifestation of continuing 
intent prevail over assertions that the mere performance alone 
reflects a contrary implied intent. 
The result that emerges in such a case is that the declarations 
and expressive conduct of neither party can be interpreted as 
assent to the formal declaration of the other (the offer or construc-
tive counteroffer). It is here that the principle of party autonomy 
fulfills its essential function in the hierarchy of norms of uniform 
international sales law. In conformance with this prime formation 
value, the analysis in this Article demonstrates that the content of 
the parties' relationship in such a case is appropriately constructed 
on the basis of-and, significantly, limited by-the conformity 
between their prior express declarations. It is to that extent alone 
that the parties have manifested the common intent necessary for 
the definition of contractual obligations. In practical outcome, this 
will mean that the parties' respective standardized terms will 
become part of the contract only to the extent that the terms are in 
agreement. If one party is of the view that there are additional 
implied understandings, the burden remains with that party to 
prove the agreement on the subject. Where gaps remain, the 
express provisions of the Convention defining the substantive 
rights and obligations of buyer and seller likewise assume their 
appropriate function of defining the "background" to the parties' 
relationship. 
In sum, the traditional inflexible, prescriptive approach to the 
treatment of a partial dissensus contradicts the values that underlie 
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the nature of contractual obligation under uniform international 
sales law. The better reasoned approach on this issue begins with 
first principles, and thus limits the contractual obligations of the 
parties in the first instance to the common intent that arises from 
the conformity between their express declarations of intent. 
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